Price-cost Margin and Bargaining Power in the European Union
Ana Cristina Soares
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
Using firm-level data between 2004 and 2012 for eleven countries of the European Union (EU), we document the size of product and labour market imperfections within narrowly defined sectors including services which are virtually undocumented. Our findings suggest that perfect competition in both product and labour markets is widely rejected. Levels of the price-cost margin and union bargaining power tend to be higher in some service sectors depicting however substantial heterogeneity. Dispersion within sector and across countries tends to be higher in some services sectors assuming a less tradable nature which suggests that the Single Market integration is partial particularly relaxing the assumption of perfect competition in the labour market. We report also figures for the aggregate economy and show that Eastern countries tend to depict lower product and labour market imperfections compared to other countries in the EU. Also, we provide evidence in favour of a very limited adjustment of both product and labour market imperfections following the international and financial crisis.
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Gute Absicht – böses Ende: Die US-Wohnungspolitik als Brandbeschleuniger der Weltfinanzkrise
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
Der Boom auf dem US-amerikanischen Eigenheimmarkt in den frühen 2000er Jahren führte zur schwersten Finanzkrise der vergangenen Jahrzehnte. Wissenschaftler haben unterschiedliche Faktoren dokumentiert, die zum rasanten Anstieg der Immobilienpreise beigetragen haben. Kaum beleuchtet wurde bisher die Rolle der US-Wohnungspolitik, insbesondere die Förderung des privaten Wohneigentums durch den Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte dieses Bundesgesetzes und seine Auswirkungen auf den Markt für Hypotheken und Wohneigentum seit den späten 1990er Jahren. Infolge des CRA wurden seit 1998 deutlich mehr Hypotheken aufgenommen. Der Anstieg der Immobilienpreise in der Boomphase beruhte zum Teil auf diesem politisch induzierten Anstieg der Hypothekenvergabe. Der CRA ermöglichte es auch Kreditnehmern mit geringerer Kreditwürdigkeit, eine Hypothek aufzunehmen – in der Folge kam es zu vermehrten Zahlungsausfällen. Der CRA hat also zum Boom-Bust-Zyklus auf dem amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt beigetragen. Er kann als Beispiel einer wohlmeinenden Politik gelten, die unbeabsichtigt wohlfahrtsmindernde Wirkungen zeitigt.
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Private Equity and Financial Fragility During the Crisis
Shai B. Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Filippo Mezzanotti
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
Does private equity (PE) contribute to financial fragility during economic crises? The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms may increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. During the 2008 crisis, PE-backed companies decreased investments less than did their peers and experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects are especially strong among financially constrained companies and those whose PE investors had more resources at the crisis onset. In a survey, PE firms report being active investors during the crisis and spending more time working with their portfolio companies.
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Elevated Uncertainty during the Financial Crisis: Do Effects on Subjective Well-being Differ across European Countries?
Lena Tonzer
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
This paper focuses on the effect of uncertainty as reflected by financial market variables on subjective well-being. The analysis is based on Eurobarometer surveys, covering 18 countries over the period 2000–2013. Individuals report lower levels of life satisfaction in times of higher uncertainty approximated by stock market volatility. This effect is heterogeneous across respondents: the probability of being unsatisfied is higher for respondents who are older, unemployed, less educated, and live in one of the GIIPS countries of the Euro area. Furthermore, higher uncertainty in combination with a financial crisis increases the probability of reporting low values of life satisfaction.
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An Evaluation of Early Warning Models for Systemic Banking Crises: Does Machine Learning Improve Predictions?
Johannes Beutel, Sophia List, Gregor von Schweinitz
Abstract
This paper compares the out-of-sample predictive performance of different early warning models for systemic banking crises using a sample of advanced economies covering the past 45 years. We compare a benchmark logit approach to several machine learning approaches recently proposed in the literature. We find that while machine learning methods often attain a very high in-sample fit, they are outperformed by the logit approach in recursive out-of-sample evaluations. This result is robust to the choice of performance measure, crisis definition, preference parameter, and sample length, as well as to using different sets of variables and data transformations. Thus, our paper suggests that further enhancements to machine learning early warning models are needed before they are able to offer a substantial value-added for predicting systemic banking crises. Conventional logit models appear to use the available information already fairly effciently, and would for instance have been able to predict the 2007/2008 financial crisis out-of-sample for many countries. In line with economic intuition, these models identify credit expansions, asset price booms and external imbalances as key predictors of systemic banking crises.
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Too Connected to Fail? Inferring Network Ties from Price Co-movements
Jakob Bosma, Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
We use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007/2008. Financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions. This result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too-big-to-fail concerns, systemic, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Both credit default swap (CDS)-based and equity-based connections are significant predictors of bailouts. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.
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Avoiding the Fall into the Loop: Isolating the Transmission of Bank-to-Sovereign Distress in the Euro Area and its Drivers
Hannes Böhm, Stefan Eichler
Abstract
We isolate the direct bank-to-sovereign distress channel within the eurozone’s sovereign-bank-loop by exploiting the global, non-eurozone related variation in stock prices. We instrument banking sector stock returns in the eurozone with exposure-weighted stock market returns from non-eurozone countries and take further precautions to remove any eurozone crisis-related variation. We find that the transmission of instrumented bank distress, while economically relevant, is significantly smaller than the corresponding coefficient in the unadjusted OLS framework, confirming concerns on reverse causality and omitted variables in previous studies. Furthermore, we show that the spillover of bank distress is significantly stronger for countries with poorer macroeconomic performances, weaker financial sectors and financial regulation and during times of elevated political uncertainty.
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SMEs and Access to Bank Credit: Evidence on the Regional Propagation of the Financial Crisis in the UK
Hans Degryse, Kent Matthews, Tianshu Zhao
Journal of Financial Stability,
2018
Abstract
We study the sensitivity of banks’ credit supply to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in the UK with respect to the banks’ financial condition before and during the financial crisis. Employing unique data on the geographical location of all bank branches in the UK, we connect firms’ access to bank credit to the financial condition (i.e., bank health and the use of core deposits) of all bank branches in the vicinity of the firm for the period 2004–2011. Before the crisis, banks’ local financial conditions did not influence credit availability irrespective of the functional distance (i.e., the distance between bank branch and bank headquarters). However, during the crisis, we find that SMEs with banks within their vicinity that have stronger financial conditions faced greater credit availability when the functional distance is close. Our results point to a “flight to headquarters” effect during the financial crisis.
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Kommentar: Mit bester Absicht in die Krise
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2018
Abstract
Zehn Jahre nach der Lehman-Pleite werden die Finanzmärkte besser kontrolliert denn je. Das kann böse Folgen haben.
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On DSGE Models
Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin S. Eichenbaum, Mathias Trabandt
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
No. 3,
2018
Abstract
The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.
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