Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming
from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
Axel Lindner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 16,
2007
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Telecommunications, Trade and Growth: Gravity Modeling and Empirical Analysis for Eastern Europe and Russia
Albrecht Kauffmann
Economic Liberalization and Integration Policy: Options for Eastern Europe and Russia,
2006
Abstract
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The integration of imperfect financial markets: Implications for business cycle volatility
Claudia M. Buch, C. Pierdzioch
Journal of Policy Modeling,
No. 7,
2005
Abstract
During the last two decades, the degree of openness of national financial systems has increased substantially. At the same time, asymmetries in information and other financial market frictions have remained prevalent. We study the implications of the opening up of national financial systems in the presence of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility. In our empirical analysis, we show that countries with more developed financial systems have lower business cycle volatility. Financial openness has no strong impact on business cycle volatility, in contrast. In our theoretical analysis, we study the implications of the opening up of national financial markets and of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility using a dynamic macroeconomic model of an open economy. We find that the implications of opening up national financial markets for business cycle volatility are largely unaffected by the presence of financial market frictions.
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Braucht die E-conomy ein neues Wettbewerbsleitbild?
Ulrich Blum, Michael A. Veltins
Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
Wir untersuchen die Bedingungen, unter denen infolge der Globalisierung, insbesondere des Verfalls der (Informations-) Transaktionskosten Wettbewerbspolitik möglich ist. Dabei gelangen die Arrangements der "E-conomy" und der - als Gegensatz begriffenen - "old economy" in das Zentrum des Interesses. Wir zeigen die wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen beiden Arrangements auf und prüfen, ob die bekannten Wettbewerbsleitbilder mit der E-conomy grundlegend kompatibel sind. Wir erkennen wesentliche Unvereinbarkeiten, die anschließend vor dem Hintergrund des deutschen Kartellrechts reflektiert werden. Dabei liegt der Fokus auf den Instituten der Mißbrauchsaufsicht sowie der Kontrolle von Kartellen und Fusionen.
Wir zeigen, daß die abstrakte Struktur des deutschen Kartellrechts hinreichend ist, daß eine vermehrte Theorieabwägung, welche wettbewerbspolitischen Bedingungen im einzelnen vorliegen, erforderlich wird, um zu wirtschaftlich befriedigenden Ergebnissen zu kommen. Eine besondere Bedeutung gewinnt das Institut der Legalausnahme, das im Rahmen der 7. Kartellrechtsnovelle in das deutsche Kartellrecht im Rahmen der Anpassung an europäisches Recht eingefügt wird.
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Position and perspectives of Saxony-Anhalt in the New Economy
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Joachim Ragnitz, Rupert Kawka, Walter Komar
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 6,
2003
Abstract
Der technische Fortschritt zählt zu den zentralen Determinanten des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums. Regionen, in denen viel Forschung und Entwicklung betrieben wird, haben daher eine bessere Ausgangsposition im Standortwettbewerb als solche, wo dies in nur geringerem Maß geschieht. Eine besondere Hoffnung gilt dabei den Hochtechnologiebranchen und nicht zuletzt dem hier untersuchten Informations- und Kommunikationssektor sowie dem Biotechnologiesektor. Diese beiden Bereiche bilden einen wesentlichen Teilbestand der so genannten New Economy. Die Vergangenheit hat gezeigt, dass die New Economy nicht von Krisen verschont bleibt, und so ist ein realistischeres Bild von den Chancen, die diese Hochtechnologien bieten können, entstanden. Dennoch besteht die berechtigte Hoffnung, dass die beiden genannten Branchen weiterhin einen weitreichenden Einfluss auch auf andere Wirtschaftssektoren ausüben, indem sie so genannte Schlüssel- oder Querschnittstechnologien entwickeln und anbieten.
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Recent Developments and Risks in the Euro Area Banking Sector
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2002
Abstract
This article provides an overview of euro area banks’ exposure to risk and examines the effects of the cyclical downturn in 2001. It describes the extent to which euro area banks’ risk profile has changed as a result of recent structural developments, such as an increase in investment banking, mergers, securitisation and more sophisticated risk management techniques. The article stresses that the environment in which banks operated in 2001 was fairly complex due to the relatively weak economic performance of all major economies as well as the events of 11 September in the United States. It evaluates the effects of these adverse circumstances on banks’ stability and overall performance. The article provides bank balance sheet information as well as financial market prices, arguing that the latter may be useful when assessing the soundness of the banking sector in a forward-looking manner. It concludes with a review of the overall stability of euro area banks, pointing to robustness in the face of the adverse developments in 2001 and the somewhat improved forward-looking indicators of banks’ financial strength in early 2002.
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