Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, E. Sheshinski
Economica,
2010
Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
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Going Public to Acquire? The Acquisition Motive in IPOs
Ugur Celikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3,
2010
Abstract
Newly public firms make acquisitions at a torrid pace. Their large acquisition appetites reflect the concentration of initial public offerings (IPOs) in mergers and acquisitions-(M&A-) intensive industries, but acquisitions by IPO firms also outpace those by mature firms in the same industry. IPO firms' acquisition activity is fueled by the initial capital infusion at the IPO and through the creation of an acquisition currency used to raise capital for both cash- and stock-financed acquisitions along with debt issuance subsequent to the IPO. IPO firms play a bigger role in the M&A process by participating as acquirers than they do as takeover targets, and acquisitions are as important to their growth as research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures (CAPEX). The pattern of acquisitions following an IPO shapes the evolution of ownership structure of newly public firms.
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How an IPO Helps in M&A
Ugur Celikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
No. 2,
2010
Abstract
An initial public offering (IPO) can often provide a powerful stimulus to private companies seeking to pursue an acquisition-driven growth strategy. Based on a comprehensive analysis of U.S. IPOs, the authors show that newly public companies are prolific acquirers. Over 30% of companies conducting an IPO make at least one acquisition in their IPO year, and the typical IPO firm makes about four acquisitions during its first five years as a public company. IPOs facilitate M&A not only by providing infusions of capital but also by creating ongoing access to equity and debt markets for cash-financed deals. In addition, IPOs create an acquisition currency that can prove valuable in stock-financed deals when the shares are attractively priced. The authors also argue that IPOs improve the ability of companies to conduct M&A by resolving some of the valuation uncertainty facing privately held companies.
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The Economic Theory of Institutional Change (ETIC) as an Approach to Explain the Emergence of Public Activities (Überarbeitete Fassung eines Vortrags anläßlich der Jahrestagung 1996 des International Institute of Public Finance in Tel Aviv )
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS),
1997
Abstract
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Revenue Boosting Instruments in Municipal Finance from a Public Choice Perspective
Peter Haug
Diamond, J. (ed.), Proceedings. 98th Annual Conference on Taxation, Miami, Florida, November 17-19, 2005 and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, Thrusday, November 17, 2005,
2006
Abstract
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Reform of joint tasks: How far can the federal and state governments disengage? A contribution to the discussion about the new establishment of the German system of public finance
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 91,
1999
Abstract
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Components of a municipal finance reform: Trade tax and public assistance – Expert report for the Bundestag group Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
Thomas Notheis, Martin Junkernheinrich
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 1,
1996
Abstract
Die Reform des Gemeindesteuersystems steht bereits seit Jahren auf der politischen Tagesordnung. Mittlerweile haben sich die kontroversen Positionen zwischen Bundesgesetzgeber, Wirtschaft und Kommunen deutlich angenähert. Die weit fortgeschrittene Aushöhlung der Gewerbesteuer und die zunehmende Delegation von ausgabenintensiven Aufgaben auf die lokale Ebene haben die Verhandlungsposition der Städte und Gemeinden geschwächt. Für viele Kämmerer dominiert das fiskalische Deckungsziel, so daß man auch Reformmodelle zu akzeptieren bereit ist, die man lange und mit Gründen abgelehnt hat.
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