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Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Kräftiger Aufschwung dank günstigem Öl und schwachem Euro

Oliver Holtemöller, Ferdinand Fichtner, Roland Döhrn, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst, No. 5, 2015
Abstract
In ihrem Frühjahrsgutachten prognostizieren die an der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose teilnehmenden Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute einen Anstieg des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) um 2,1% im Jahr 2015 und um 1,8% im Jahr 2016. Die Institute korrigieren damit ihre Prognose vom Herbst 2014 erheblich nach oben; vor einem halben Jahr war für 2015 noch eine Veränderungsrate von 1,2% erwartet worden. Ein großer Teil der Revision geht auf eine seit dem Herbst unerwartet deutliche Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für die deutsche Konjunktur zurück. Vor allem der massive Rückgang des Ölpreises stimuliert die deutsche Wirtschaft, aber auch die deutliche Abwertung des Euro, die mit der Ausweitung der Anleiheankaufprogramme der Europäischen Zentralbank einherging.
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EFN Report Spring 2015: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016

EFN Reports, No. 2, 2015
Abstract
Recent movements on world markets for commodities, currencies and capital stimulate the world economy, but they entail also considerable risks: income losses of energy exporting countries might trigger financial crises with worldwide repercussions; crises might also emerge from financial distress of emerging market debtors with liabilities denominated in US dollars. Extremely low interest rates might not only trigger stock and bond price booms, but also more volatility if investors become fearful of financial bubbles. Quite a few conditions are highly beneficial for a recovery of the euro area economy: governments and large corporations benefit from ultra-low bond yields, banks’ composite costs of debt financing have been converging during the past two years to very low levels, and borrowing costs for non-financial corporations have come down markedly. Prices for stocks, bonds and (on average) houses have gone up. Real disposable incomes of private households have risen due to oil prices. The real effective exchange rate is about 10% lower in March 2015 than it was a year ago, strengthening the price competitiveness of firms in the euro area. According to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.6% in 2015 and by 2.1% in 2016. Structural impediments, however, still limit the ability of the euro area economy to grow strongly: firms and, in particular, private households are only slowly reducing their heavy debt burdens, and confidence will not fully come back in France and Italy, as long as reform processes are inconclusive in both countries and as long as unemployment is not coming down markedly. Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.1%, with the possibility of a mild deflation not excluded. In 2016 inflation will increase up to 1.3%, still clearly below the 2% ECB’s target. This calls for continued monetary expansion, though its effects could be limited in the absence of a complementary fiscal stimulus, in particular in those countries where the implementation of structural reforms brings long term gains but short term losses.
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Understanding the Great Recession

Mathias Trabandt, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin S. Eichenbaum
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, No. 1, 2015
Abstract
We argue that the vast bulk of movements in aggregate real economic activity during the Great Recession were due to financial frictions. We reach this conclusion by looking through the lens of an estimated New Keynesian model in which firms face moderate degrees of price rigidities, no nominal rigidities in wages, and a binding zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. Our model does a good job of accounting for the joint behavior of labor and goods markets, as well as inflation, during the Great Recession. According to the model the observed fall in total factor productivity and the rise in the cost of working capital played critical roles in accounting for the small drop in inflation that occurred during the Great Recession.
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EFN Report Winter 2014/15: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016

EFN Reports, No. 1, 2015
Abstract
At the beginning of the year 2015 crude oil is, with little more than 50 dollars per barrel (Brent), about 50% cheaper than in the summer 2014. The oil price hike is a stimulus for the whole world economy, even though the gains of energy users are matched by losses of the suppliers: oil producing countries frequently run high current account surpluses vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It is therefore plausible to assume that, reacting to the redistribution of incomes, the oil user countries will increase their spending by more than what will be lost in spending by producers. Investment activity in the euro area has recently been particularly weak. Remarkably, investment in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, i.e. in countries that had to accept international support during the euro crisis, has strengthened. The setback took place in the so-called core countries, including Germany. Consumption growth was also subdued. Lower oil prices, by increasing real incomes of consumers and lowering production costs for firms, should increase private consumption and, in particular, investment. Moreover, the depreciation of the euro will favour exports. Overall, according to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.3% in 2015 and by 1.6% in 2016. GDP growth is about 0.3 percentage points higher due to the impact of lower oil prices in 2015. However, these forecasts are subject to substantial uncertainty, and we do not see any significant reduction of the unemployment rate during the forecasting horizon. Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.3%, with the possibility of a mild deflation not excluded. In 2016 inflation will increase up to 1.1%, still clearly below the 2% ECB’s target. This calls for further monetary expansion, though its effects could be limited in the absence of a complementary fiscal stimulus. The expansionary cyclical policies should be combined with more structural reforms to enhance the competitiveness of the euro area and its growth potential, which in our forecasts remains quite limited. In fact, we expect potential output to grow by only 0.4% both in 2015 and 2016.
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Switching to Exchange Rate Flexibility? The Case of Central and Eastern European Inflation Targeters

Andrej Drygalla
FIW Working Paper, No. 139, 2015
Abstract
This paper analyzes changes in the monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland following the policy shift from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting around the turn of the millennium. Applying a Markovswitching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, switches in the policy parameters and the volatilities of shocks hitting the economies are estimated and quantified. Results indicate the presence of regimes of weak and strong responses of the central banks to exchange rate movements as well as periods of high and low volatility. Whereas all three economies switched to a less volatile regime over time, findings on changes in the policy parameters reveal a lower reaction to exchange rate movements in the Czech Republic and Poland, but an increased attention to it in Hungary. Simulations for the Czech Republic and Poland also suggest their respective central banks, rather than a sound macroeconomic environment, being accountable for reducing volatility in variables like inflation and output. In Hungary, their favorable developments can be attributed to a larger extent to the reduction in the size of external disturbances.
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Euro Area External Imbalances and the Burden of Adjustment

Filippo di Mauro, Francesco Pappadà
Journal of International Money and Finance, November 2014
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explore the consequences of the correction of Euro area trade imbalances on real exchange rates. This analysis requires one additional dimension with respect to the standard Global Imbalances framework à la Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), since the adjustment takes place within and outside the Euro area. Both types of adjustments are analyzed in a three-country general equilibrium model with a tradable and a non-tradable sectors, and heterogeneous firms built upon Pappadà (2011). ECB (CompNet) data are used to measure the differences in firm size and productivity dispersion across Euro area countries. With respect to the surplus country (Germany), countries running a trade deficit (Spain, Italy) are characterised by a productivity distribution with a lower mean and a less fat right tail. This increases the relative price movement associated with the external adjustment because of the limited role played by the extensive margin. We show that the real exchange rate movements are underestimated when the cross-country differences in terms of productivity distributions are neglected.
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Forecast Dispersion, Dissenting Votes, and Monetary Policy Preferences of FOMC Members: The Role of Individual Career Characteristics and Political Aspects

Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Public Choice, No. 3, 2014
Abstract
Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.
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EFN Report Summer 2014: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2014 and 2015

, 2014
Abstract
World growth disappointed at the beginning of the year, when in the US extremely cold weather caused production to contract, the recovery in the euro area stumbled and the slowdown of the Chinese economy continued. At present, however, confidence indicators and order books point to a moderate pickup of growth in most regions. Prices on markets for energy, real and financial assets have reacted little to recent bad news about rising geopolitical risks in the Middle East and Eastern Europe up to now. A sudden increase of risk aversion or a change of believes among investors could trigger a swift deterioration of financial conditions for the world economy. In the euro area, strong stimuli from abroad are not to be expected and private households continue to keep their real spending about constant. Investment has been expanding since summer 2013, but at a very moderate rate. In this context, our forecast for GDP growth is 1.1% in 2014 and 1.6% in 2015. For 2014 and 2015, we do not see any significant reduction of the unemployment rate, because employment dynamics will stay weak due to subdued growth and the still rising participation rate in the euro area. Our inflation forecast for 2014 is 0.6%. In 2015 inflation will also remain subdued, at about 1.0%. In this context of very low price dynamics, monetary policy keeps the recovery alive: official interest rates around zero and the search for yields on financial markets have depressed yields for government bonds; the fall in financing costs allows euro area governments to conduct fiscal policies that are much less restrictive than in the years before, with tax cuts in Italy, France, and Spain starting this year. Nonfinancial firms benefit from a shrinking burden of interest payments, and the availability of bank loans for small and medium enterprises has improved since 2012 in most countries.
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Geriet die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Euroraum-Ländern nach Gründung der Währungsunion aus dem Gleichgewicht?

Makram El-Shagi, Axel Lindner, Gregor von Schweinitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel, No. 3, 2014
Abstract
Waren die Peripherieländer im Euroraum am Vorabend der Eurokrise nicht mehr wettbewerbsfähig? Oder war die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in den Kernländern wie Deutschland ungewöhnlich hoch? Antworten auf diese Fragen sind nicht einfach. Das gängige Maß für die preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit sind die realen effektiven Wechselkurse. Deren Bestimmungsfaktoren waren jedoch kurz vor der Krise selbst möglicherweise nicht im Gleichgewicht und lassen daher kaum Rückschlüsse auf gleichgewichtige Wechselkurse zu. Um dieses Messproblem zu umgehen, wird ein Matching-Ansatz zur Schätzung realer effektiver Wechselkurse verwendet. Dazu wird für jedes Mitgliedsland des Euroraums ein synthetisches Vergleichsland als Kombination mehrerer anderer Länder konstruiert, die den Euro nicht eingeführt haben. Es zeigt sich, dass die Peripherieländer des Euroraums am besten durch eine Mischung von Schwellenländern und entwickelten Volkswirtschaften beschrieben werden, während für ein Matching der Kernländer keine Schwellenländer notwendig sind. Die hier angewendete Methode zeigt, dass die realen effektiven Wechselkurse in den Peripherieländern zwischen Oktober 2007 und September 2008 teilweise deutlich zu hoch waren, während sie in den Kernländern mehr oder weniger nah bei ihrem Gleichgewichtsniveau lagen.
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Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy

Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No. 38, 2014
published in: Journal of Banking and Finance
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.
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