CEO Network Centrality and the Likelihood of Financial Reporting Fraud
Salim Chahine, Yiwei Fang, Iftekhar Hasan, Mohamad Mazboudi
Abacus,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
This paper investigates the association between CEO’s relative position in the social network and the likelihood of being involved in corporate fraud. Tracing a large sample of US publicly listed firms, we find that CEO network centrality is inversely related to the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. We also document a significant spillover effect of financial reporting behaviour from the dominant (most central) CEO to other CEOs in the same social network, suggesting that the ethical corporate behaviour of CEOs is, on average, influenced by that of their dominant CEO in the network. We further find that the role of CEO network centrality in reducing fraud risk is more prominent in firms with lower auditor quality. Overall, our results suggest that network centrality is an important CEO trait that promotes ethical financial reporting behaviour within social networks.
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Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firms’ Choice of Debt Structure
Iftekhar Hasan, Walid Saffar, Yangyang Chen, Leon Zolotoy
Journal of Banking and Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.
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Military Directors, Governance and Firm Behavior
Chen Cai, Iftekhar Hasan, Yinjie (Victor) Shen, Shuai Wang
Advances in Accounting,
December
2021
Abstract
We build a large dataset of board of directors with military experience and document a substantial and persistent presence of independent military directors serving on corporate boards. We find that firms with independent military directors are associated with better monitoring outcomes, including less excessive CEO compensation, greater forced CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, and less earnings management.
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Aspects of the Political Economy of the European Banking Union
Lena Tonzer
PolEconFin Initiative,
2021
Abstract
The regulatory architecture of the financial system has significantly changed after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In Europe, the introduction of the Single Rulebook has been a major change and provides the legal foundation for the European Banking Union (EBU). The Single Rulebook consists of a regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), and three main directives targeting capital regulation and compensation of managers, harmonization of deposit insurance schemes, as well as resolution and restructuring rules (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).
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Stock Price Fragility and the Cost of Bank Loans
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yinjie (Victor) Shen, Pengfei Ye
Journal of Empirical Finance,
September
2021
Abstract
This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms’ financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar’s (2011) stock price fragility measure, we find that there is a positive relationship between fragility and firms’ costs of bank loans. This effect is most pronounced when lenders rely more on institutional shareholders to discipline corporate management, or when loans are made by relationship lenders, suggesting that unstable flows could weaken institutional investors’ monitoring effectiveness and strengthen relationship banks’ bargaining power.
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29.07.2021 • 20/2021
Communication instead of conflict – why are female CEOs so interesting for hedge funds
The value of female-led firms is enhanced more by the intervention of activist investors than that of firms with male CEOs. This is the result of a recent paper by Iftekhar Hasan (Fordham University and IWH) and Qiang Wu (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, RPI) at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). "The results show that female CEOs particularly benefit from the intervention of hedge fund activists due to their strong communication and interpersonal skills," explains Iftekhar Hasan. This is because, on average, the intervention of an activist hedge fund increases the value of the firm ex post. To achieve this, activist hedge funds such as Carl Icahn, Trian Fundmanagement or Elliott prefer to rely on communication and cooperation with the management.
Reint E. Gropp
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Executives with Customer Experience and Firm Performance in the B2B Context
Yiwei Fang, Cong Feng, Iftekhar Hasan, Jiong Sun
European Journal of Marketing,
No. 7,
2021
Abstract
Purpose:
This paper aims to examine the presence of an executive with customer experience (ECE) in a supplier firm’s top management team (TMT). The role of ECE presence remains understudied in the marketing literature. This study attempts to examine the relationship between ECE presence and firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach:
This paper draws on the resource-based view of the firm and adopts a panel firm fixed effects estimator to test the proposed hypotheses. The empirical analysis uses a sample of 1,974 firm-year observations with 489 unique supplier firms. Selection-induced endogeneity is mitigated through the Heckman procedure.
Findings:
ECE presence improves firm performance. Additionally, firms benefit less from ECE presence if a board member with customer experience (BCE) is also present, if a chief executive officer commands a higher pay slice (compared to other executives), and if a TMT is more functionally diversified. However, ECE presence is particularly beneficial if the overall economy is in contraction. Comparing the functional positions held by ECEs reveals that ECE in the marketing function (as a chief marketing officer) offers the largest benefit to an average supplier firm. ECE presence is also associated with other firm outcomes (e.g. bankruptcy odds, innovation and customer orientation).
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Unethical Employee Behavior Against Coworkers Following Unkind Management Treatment: An Experimental Analysis
Sabrina Jeworrek, Joschka Waibel
Managerial and Decision Economics,
No. 5,
2021
Abstract
We study unethical behavior toward unrelated coworkers as a response to managerial unkindness with two experiments. In our lab experiment, we do not find that subjects who experienced unkindness are more likely to cheat in a subsequent competition against another coworker who simultaneously experienced mistreatment. A subsequent survey experiment suggests that behavior in the lab can be explained by individuals' preferences for norm adherence, because unkind management behavior does not alter the perceived moral appropriateness of cheating. However, having no shared experience of managerial unkindness opens up some moral wiggle room for employees to misbehave at the costs of others.
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Family Firms and Management Practices
Margarita Tsoutsoura
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
No. 2,
2021
Abstract
This article reviews the existing literature about management practices in family firms, the most prevalent form of corporate ownership around the world. I summarize the existing evidence that shows family firms are less likely to adopt structured management practices, especially ‘dynastic’ family firms that combine family ownership and control. I discuss what might be the unique features of family firms that drive the lower adoption of management practices, despite the evidence that improving management boosts their productivity and performance.
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Are Credit Rating Disagreements Priced in the M&A Market?
Iftekhar Hasan, He Huang, Thomas To
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
May
2021
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of credit rating disagreements on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We show that acquirers with split ratings prefer to use stock to finance their acquisitions. More importantly, we find that acquirers with split ratings experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that overpayment by acquirers with split ratings is concentrated in acquirers with entrenched managers. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Overall, our evidence indicates that credit rating disagreements are heavily priced in the M&A market.
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