Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance
Michael Koetter, Kasper Roszbach, G. Spagnolo
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
The financial crisis has ignited a debate about the appropriate objectives and the governance structure of Central Banks. We use novel survey data to investigate the relation between these traits and banking system stability focusing in particular on their role in micro-prudential supervision. We find that the separation of powers between single and multiple bank supervisors cannot explain credit risk prior or during the financial crisis. Similarly, a large number of Central Bank governance traits do not correlate with system fragility. Only the objective of currency stability exhibits a significant relation with non-performing loan levels in the run-up to the crisis. This effect is amplified for those countries with most frequent exposure to IMF missions in the past. Our results suggest that the current policy discussion whether to centralize prudential supervision under the Central Bank and the ensuing institutional changes some countries are enacting may not produce the improvements authorities are aiming at. Whether other potential improvements in prudential supervision due to, for example, external disciplinary devices, such as IMF conditional lending schemes, are better suited to increase financial stability requires further research.
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Interbank Lending and Distress: Observables, Unobservables, and Network Structure
Ben Craig, Michael Koetter, U. Krüger
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No. 18/2014,
No. 18,
2014
Abstract
We provide empirical evidence on the relevance of systemic risk through the interbank lending channel. We adapt a spatial probit model that allows for correlated error terms in the cross-sectional variation that depend on the measured network connections of the banks. The latter are in our application observed interbank exposures among German bank holding companies during 2001 and 2006. The results clearly indicate significant spillover effects between banks’ probabilities of distress and the financial profiles of connected peers. Better capitalized and managed connections reduce the banks own risk. Higher network centrality reduces the probability of distress, supporting the notion that more complete networks tend to be more stable. Finally, spatial autocorrelation is significant and negative. This last result may indicate too-many-to-fail mechanics such that bank distress is less likely if many peers already experienced distress.
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Im Fokus: Die Entwicklung der Kernkapitalquoten der deutschen Banken seit der Finanzkrise
Manuel Buchholz, Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Das Eigenkapital einer Bank dient aus aufsichtsrechtlicher Sicht zwei Zielen: zum einen dem Ausgleich von Verlusten aus laufenden Geschäften oder der Begleichung von Gläubigeransprüchen im Insolvenzfall, zum anderen der Begrenzung von Verlustrisiken aus bestimmten Geschäften. Ein wichtiger Bestandteil des Eigenkapitals ist dabei das Kernkapital. Das Kernkapital ist der Anteil des Eigenkapitals einer Bank, der dem Institut dauerhaft zur Verfügung steht und somit als echter Verlustpuffer dienen kann. Bestandteile sind unter anderem das Stammkapital, Kapitalrücklagen, Gewinnrücklagen oder eigene Aktien der Bank. Aus dem Kernkapital ergibt sich eine wichtige aufsichtsrechtliche Kenngröße: die Kernkapitalquote (Tier 1 Capital Ratio). Diese berechnet sich als das Verhältnis von Kernkapital zur Summe der Risikoaktiva einer Ba
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How Important are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?
Reint E. Gropp
FRBSF Economic Letters,
No. 11,
2014
Abstract
Before the 2007–09 crisis, standard risk measurement methods substantially underestimated the threat to the financial system. One reason was that these methods didn’t account for how closely commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were linked. As financial conditions worsened in one type of institution, the effects spread to others. A new method that more accurately accounts for these spillover effects suggests that hedge funds may have been central in generating systemic risk during the crisis.
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Estimating Monetary Policy Rules when the Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates is Approached
Konstantin Kiesel, M. H. Wolters
Kiel Working Papers, No. 1898,
2014
Abstract
Monetary policy rule parameters estimated with conventional estimation techniques can be severely biased if the estimation sample includes periods of low interest rates. Nominal interest rates cannot be negative, so that censored regression methods like Tobit estimation have to be used to achieve unbiased estimates. We use IV-Tobit regression to estimate monetary policy responses for Japan, the US and the Euro area. The estimation results show that the bias of conventional estimation methods is sizeable for the inflation response parameter, while it is very small for the output gap response and the interest rate smoothing parameter. We demonstrate how IV-Tobit estimation can be used to study how policy responses change when the zero lower bound is approached. Further, we show how one can use the IV-Tobit approach to distinguish between desired policy responses, that the central bank would implement if there was no zero lower bound, and the actual ones and provide estimates of both.
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Im Fokus: Nach dem EU-Beitritt stoppt die institutionelle Konvergenz in den mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Staaten
Marina Grusevaja, Toralf Pusch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2013
Abstract
Die institutionelle Konvergenz wird seit der Gründung der Europäischen Union als Voraussetzung für die wirtschaftliche Konvergenz angesehen. In den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern wurde eine institutionelle Konvergenz de jure bzw. eine Harmonisierung ex ante durch die Verpflichtung der EU-Beitrittskandidaten zur Übernahme des Acquis Communautaire angestrebt. Die institutionelle Angleichung der neuen Mitgliedstaaten an die EU-Normen sollte die Grundlage für ein schnelleres Wachstum (und damit für die wirtschaftliche Konvergenz in der EU) legen. In diesem Beitrag wird unter Verwendung der „Transition Indicators“ der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBRD) mit Hilfe einer Clusteranalyse das Vorhandensein einer institutionellen Konvergenz de facto in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine tatsächliche institutionelle Annäherung nur bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre stattgefunden hat. Seitdem ist in den neuen Mitgliedstaaten eine Tendenz zur Stagnation bzw. Divergenz der institutionellen Entwicklung zu verzeichnen. Die untersuchten Länder scheinen in ihren regionalen Clubs (Clustern) „festzustecken“, statt sich de facto weiter an die EU-Normen anzugleichen.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Festakt zur Amtseinführung der Präsidentin Prof. Dr. Claudia M. Buch
Tobias Henning
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
Im Rahmen eines Festaktes im historischen großen Saal des Stadthauses der Stadt Halle (Saale) wurde Professorin Claudia M. Buch am 4. Juli 2013 feierlich in ihr Amt als Präsidentin des IWH eingeführt.
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Foreign Bank Entry, Credit Allocation and Lending Rates in Emerging Markets: Empirical Evidence from Poland
Hans Degryse, Olena Havrylchyk, Emilia Jurzyk, Sylwester Kozak
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2012
Abstract
Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.
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Financial Crisis Risk, ECB “Non-standard“ Measures, and the External Value of the Euro
Stefan Eichler
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of banking and sovereign debt crisis risk of EMU member states on the external value of the euro. Using a regime switching model, I find that the external value of the euro has significantly responded to financial crisis risk during the period of November 2008–November 2011, while no significant effect is found for the period from February 2006 to October 2008. This suggests that the monetary expansion and interest rate cuts associated with the ECB's “non-standard” measures may have reduced the external value of the euro.
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