The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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A revised theory of contestable markets : applied on the German telecommunication sector
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 275,
2002
Abstract
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit is possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are satisfied for potential competition to exist. We applied the ‘revised’ contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the value added stages in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which can be determined as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as monopolistic bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers; hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Assumed that network access is regulated, services can be supplied by several competing firms.
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Environmental policy under product differentiation and asymmetric costs - Does leapfrogging occur and is it worth it?
Jacqueline Rothfels
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 124,
2000
Abstract
This paper studies the influence of environmental policies on environmental quality, domestic firms, and welfare. Point of departure is Porter’s hypothesis that unilateral environmental regulation may enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. This hypothesis has recently received considerable support in theoretical analyses, especially if imperfectly competitive markets with strategic behavior on behalf of the agents are taken into account. Our work contributes to this literature by explicitely investigating the implications of asymmetric cost structures between a domestic and a foreign firm sector. We use a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation, where the consumption of a product causes environmental harm. Allowing for differentiated products, the domestic industry can either assume the market leader position or lag behind in terms of the environmental quality of the produced product. Assuming as a benchmark case that the domestic industry lags behind, we investigate the possibility of the government to induce leapfrogging of the domestic firm, i.e. a higher quality produced by the domestic firm after regulation than that of the competitor prior to regulation. It is shown that in the case of a cost advantage for the domestic firm in the production process the imposition of a binding minimum quality standard can serve as a tool to induce leapfrogging. In case of a cost disadvantage the same result can be achieved through an adequate subsidization of quality dependend production costs. Thus, careful regulation enables the domestic firm in both scenarios to better its competitive position against foreign competitors and to earn larger profits. Additionally, environmental quality and welfare can be enhanced.
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Make Work Pay – The effects of combination wage programs in the USA and in Great Britain
Lioba Trabert
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
1999
Abstract
Derzeit werden in Deutschland verschiedene Modelle zur reform des Steuer- und Transfersystems zur Subventionierung eines Niedriglohnsektors diskutiert. In anderen Ländern gibt es bereits seit mehreren jahren Konzepte zur finanziellen Besserstellung von beschäftigung gegenüber Arbeitslosigkeit. Zu den wohl bekanntesten programmen gehören der Earned Income Taxe Credit (EITC) in den USA sowie der Family Credit (FC) in Grossbritannien.Von besonderen Interesse sind die dort gewonnenen Erfahrungen über die Anreizwirkungen auf das Arbeitsangebot. Die Untersuchungen zeigen, daß für die Gruppe der bereits der bereits Erwerbstätigen eine Verringerung des Arbeitsvolumens folgt. Dieser negative Effekt kann jedoch überkompensiert werden durch positive Partizipationseffekte von bislang Nichterwerbstätigen. Eine Übertragung dieser programme auf Deutschland würde aufgrund einer vergleichsweise komprimierten Einkommensverteilung sowie eiem höherem Grundsicherungsniveau voraussichtlich zu einer stärkeren fiskalischen Belastung als in den USA oder Grossbritannien führen.
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