On the Distribution of Refugees in the EU
Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Andreas Schmalzbauer, Götz Zeddies
Intereconomics,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
The current situation regarding the migration of refugees can only be handled efficiently through closer international cooperation in the field of asylum policy. From an economic point of view, it would be reasonable to distribute incoming refugees among all EU countries according to a distribution key that reflects differences in the costs of integration in the individual countries. An efficient distribution would even out the marginal costs of integrating refugees. In order to reach a political agreement, the key for distributing refugees should be complemented by compensation payments that distribute the costs of integration among countries. The key for distributing refugees presented by the EU Commission takes account of appropriate factors in principle, but it is unclear in terms of detail. The compensation payments for countries that should take relatively high numbers of refugees for cost efficiency reasons should be financed by reallocating resources within the EU budget.
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The Role of Information in Innovation and Competition
Ufuk Akcigit, Qingmin Liu
Journal of the European Economic Association,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner.
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Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Julia Cagé, William R. Kerr
European Economic Review,
2016
Abstract
We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
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Buy, Keep, or Sell: Economic Growth and the Market for Ideas
Ufuk Akcigit, Murat Alp Celik, Jeremy Greenwood
Econometrica,
No. 3,
2016
Abstract
An endogenous growth model is developed where each period firms invest in researching and developing new ideas. An idea increases a firm's productivity. By how much depends on the technological propinquity between an idea and the firm's line of business. Ideas can be bought and sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea that is not relevant to its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The developed model is matched up with stylized facts about the market for patents in the United States. The analysis gauges how efficiency in the patent market affects growth.
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How Selective Are Real Wage Cuts? A Micro-analysis Using Linked Employer–Employee Data
Boris Hirsch, Thomas Zwick
LABOUR: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations,
No. 4,
2015
Abstract
Using linked employer–employee panel data for Germany, we investigate whether firms implement real wage reductions in a selective manner. In line with insider–outsider and several strands of efficiency wage theory, we find strong evidence for selective wage cuts with high-productivity workers being spared even when controlling for permanent differences in firms' wage policies. In contrast to some recent contributions stressing fairness considerations, we also find that wage cuts increase wage dispersion among peers rather than narrowing it. Notably, the same selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to firms covered by collective agreements or having a works council.
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Bank Market Power, Factor Reallocation, and Aggregate Growth
R. Inklaar, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Journal of Financial Stability,
2015
Abstract
Using a unique firm-level sample of approximately 700,000 firm-year observations of German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), this study seeks to identify the effect of bank market power on aggregate growth components. We test for a pre-crisis sample whether bank market power spurs or hinders the reallocation of resources across informationally opaque firms. Identification relies on the dependence on external finance in each industry and the regional demarcation of regional banking markets in Germany. The results show that bank markups spur aggregate SME growth, primarily through technical change and the reallocation of resources. Banks seem to need sufficient markups to generate the necessary private information to allocate financial funds efficiently.
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Stress Testing and Bank Efficiency: Evidence from Europe
Iftekhar Hasan, Fotios Pasiouras
International Journal of Corporate Finance and Accounting,
No. 2,
2015
Abstract
This study examines whether and how the stress testing of European banks in 2010, 2011, and 2014 is related to their technical, allocative, and cost efficiency. Using a sample of large commercial banks operating in 20 European countries, and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the authors perform comparisons between banks that were included in one of the three European stress tests and untested banks operating in the same countries. They estimate various specifications as for the inputs and outputs, cross-section and pooled estimations, and they also examine alternative samples as for the ownership of banks. In general, the authors conclude that banks included in the stress-test exercises are more efficient that their counterparties. The differences tend to be statistically significant in the case of allocative efficiency and cost efficiency, but not in the case of technical efficiency. With regards to the latter form of efficiency, the results depend upon the specification and the stress test in question.
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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Corporate Taxation and Firm Location in Germany
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2015
Abstract
German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.
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The Efficiency of Municipal Service Provision: A Study on the Example of Saxony-Anhalt
Peter Haug, Annette Illy, Claus Michelsen
Gebiets- und Verwaltungsstrukturen im Umbruch: Beiträge zur Reformdiskussion aus Erfahrungen in Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen,
No. 360,
2015
Abstract
Vor dem Hintergrund der jüngsten Gemeindegebietsreform in Sachsen-Anhalt, besteht das Ziel dieses Beitrags darin, für dieses Bundesland empirisch zu untersuchen, ob die frühere, sehr kleinteilige kommunale Verwaltungsstruktur generell als „ineffizient“ zu bezeichnen war. Insbesondere geht es darum zu prüfen, ob dezentrale Verwaltungsformen wie die mittlerweile aufgelösten Verwaltungsgemeinschaften einen Effizienznachteil gegenüber den stärker zentralisierten Einheitsgemeinden aufwiesen und ob die damaligen Gemeinden hinsichtlich ihrer „Betriebsgröße“ zu klein waren.
Aus der durchgeführten Analyse können für die Bildung kommunaler Großeinheiten keine Rechtfertigungen abgeleitet werden. Es steht daher zu befürchten, dass großflächige Gemeinden im ländlichen Raum aufgrund der Siedlungsstruktur und nur begrenzten Größenvorteilen bei der kommunalen Leistungserstellung nicht nur keine wesentliche Verbesserung der Kosteneffizienz erreichen werden, sondern auch aufgrund der negativen Anreizeffekte für Bürger wie Politik und Verwaltung (beispielsweise geringeres bürgerschaftliches Engagement aufgrund geringerer Identifikation, fehlende Kontrolle politischer Entscheidungsträger, geringere Präferenzgerechtigkeit des Verwaltungshandelns), die solche „Riesengemeinden“ mit sich bringen, eine weitere Effizienzverschlechterung erfahren.
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