Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
Read article
20.08.2004 • 29/2004
IWH-Industrieumfrage im Juli 2004: Eingetrübte Erwartungen sorgen für eine leichte Abkühlung des Geschäftsklimas in der ostdeutschen Industrie
Das Geschäftsklima im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe Ostdeutschlands hat sich laut IWH-Umfrage unter rund 300 Unternehmen im Juli leicht eingetrübt. Während eine der Maiumfrage vergleichbar gute Geschäftslage berichtet wurde, haben bei der Einschätzung der Geschäftsaussichten die pessimistischen Stimmen zugenommen.
Download Press Release
Bank Market Discipline and Indicators of Banking System Risk: The European Evidence
Reint E. Gropp
Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries,
2004
Abstract
Read article
IWH Construction Industry Survey: East German Construction Industry in June 2004: Business climate still dominated by exceptional effects
Brigitte Loose
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2004
Abstract
Die Geschäftslage im Juni wird laut Umfrage des IWH unter 300 ostdeutschen Bauunternehmen saisonüblich günstiger beurteilt als in der vorangegangenen Befragung im April. Gegenüber dem Vorjahr ergibt sich ein nahezu identisches Bild. Auch die Geschäftserwartungen werden nach dem Einbruch im Frühjahr wieder etwas besser bewertet. Das entsprechende Vorjahresniveau wird hier unterschritten. Die Firmenmeldungen lassen alles in allem erkennen, dass die allgemeine Abwärtstendenz in der nächsten Zeit punktuell noch durch Sondereffekte geprägt wird. Schaltet man die Saisonkomponente aus, bestätigt die Untersuchung aber die bereits in der vorangegangenen Umfrage beobachtete Rückkehr zur Abwärtstendenz.
Read article
The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
Read article
Risikoorientierte Prämiendifferenzierung in der Kfz-Haftpflichtversicherung
Christian Growitsch, R. Schwarze, H.-P. Schwintowski, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
Read article
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights Regimes for R&D Cooperation between Industry and Academia
Ulrich Blum, S. Müller
Academia-Business Links,
2004
Abstract
Read article
The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
Read article
Is East Germany successful in catching up? An empirical investigation of the technological capability in manufacturing industry
Jutta Günther, Harald Lehmann
VEST Journal for Science and Technology Studies,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
Read article
Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 192,
2004
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.
Read article