01.11.2017 • 38/2017
IWH Policy Talk „Risk Sharing and Risk Reduction – The Challenges that Lie Ahead“
The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association is pleased to inform about its next upcoming IWH Policy Talk „Risk Sharing and Risk Reduction – The Challenges that Lie Ahead“ with Andrea Enria, first Chairperson of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The talk will take place on Tuesday, No¬vember 7, 2017, 5:00 p.m., in the IWH conference room. You are hereby cordially invited to attend.
Read
Nationale Aufsicht versus Europäische Bankenunion: Unterscheidet sich die Beurteilung der Einflussfaktoren systemischen Risikos von Banken?
Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2017
Abstract
Als Reaktion auf die Finanzkrise unterliegt das Finanzsystem zahlreichen neuen regulatorischen Änderungen. Zum einen wurden bestehende mikroprudenzielle Regeln für Eigenkapital und Liquidität verschärft. Zum anderen wurden makroprudenzielle Instrumente eingeführt. Makroprudenzielle Regulierung hat dabei zum Ziel, systemische Risiken im Finanzsystem frühzeitig zu erkennen, zu reduzieren und somit die Finanzmarktstabilität zu erhöhen. Zudem wurde mit der Einführung der Bankenunion die Aufsicht der größten Banken des Euroraums der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) übertragen. Diese Studie untersucht, ob das systemische Risiko von Banken unterschiedlich groß ist, wenn eine europäische im Vergleich zu einer nationalen Perspektive eingenommen wird. Im Anschluss wird die Frage geklärt, welche Faktoren systemisches Risiko beeinflussen und ob sich diese Faktoren zwischen der nationalen und europäischen Ebene unterscheiden. Es zeigt sich, dass Banken auf nationaler Ebene im Durchschnitt etwas mehr zum systemischen Risiko beitragen, wobei es große Unterschiede zwischen Banken und Ländern gibt. Zudem haben größere und profitablere Banken sowie Banken, deren Geschäftsmodell durch eine geringere Kreditvergabe geprägt ist, ein höheres systemisches Risiko.
Read article
Real Effects of Bank Capital Regulations: Global Evidence
Yota D. Deli, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2017
Abstract
We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.
Read article
How Do Political Factors Shape the Bank Risk-Sovereign Risk Nexus in Emerging Markets?
Stefan Eichler
Review of Development Economics,
No. 3,
2017
Abstract
This paper studies the role of political factors for determining the impact of banking sector distress on sovereign bond yield spreads for a sample of 19 emerging market economies in the period 1994–2013. Using interaction models, I find that the adverse impact of banking sector distress on sovereign solvency is less pronounced for countries with a high degree of political stability, a high level of power sharing within the government coalition, a low level of political constraint within the political system, and for countries run by powerful and effective governments. The electoral cycle pronounces the bank risk–sovereign risk transfer.
Read article
Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
Read article
Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Financial Regulation,
No. 1,
2017
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from banks’ trading activities. The goal of this article is to look at the alternative reforms in the US, the UK and the EU, specifically with respect to the role of proprietary trading. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of proprietary trading, as reflected in the Volcker Rule in the US and in the current proposal of the European Commission (Barnier proposal), is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it is likely to crowd out desired trading activities, thereby possibly affecting financial stability negatively. Second, trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations, as suggested under the Vickers proposal for the UK and the Liikanen proposal for the EU, is a more effective solution. Separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies and risk management across banking, non-proprietary trading, and proprietary trading.
Read article
Assessing the Effects of Regulatory Bank Levies
Claudia M. Buch, Lena Tonzer, Benjamin Weigert
VOX CEPR's Policy Portal,
2017
Abstract
In response to the Global Crisis, governments have implemented restructuring and resolution regimes backed by funds financed by bank levies. Bank levies aim to internalise system risk externalities and to provide funding for bank recovery and resolution. This column explores bank levy design by considering the German and European cases. The discussion points to the importance of structured policy evaluations to determine the effects of levies.
Read article
The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the U.S.: Evidence from Corporate Loan Data
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Nikolaos Mylonidis
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 1,
2017
Abstract
To study the presence of a risk-taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk-taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply-side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk-taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk-taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations.
Read article
Bank Risk Proxies and the Crisis of 2007/09: A Comparison
Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 7,
2017
Abstract
The global financial crisis has again shown that it is important to understand the emergence and measurement of risks in the banking sector. However, there is no consensus in the literature which risk proxy works best at the level of the individual bank. A commonly used measure in applied work is the Z-score, which might suffer from calculation issues given poor data quality. Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk.
Read article
