Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis
Christian Growitsch, Heike Wetzel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies – companies owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more efficient we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European Railway companies exist economies of scope.
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The unemployment-growth relationship in transition countries
Hubert Gabrisch, Herbert Buscher
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
Does the disappointingly high unemployment in Central and East European countries reflect non-completed adjustment to institutional shocks from transition to a market economy, or is it the result of high labour market rigidities, or rather a syndrome of too weak aggregate demand and output? In the case of transitional causes, unemployment is expected to decline over time. Otherwise, it would pose a challenge to the European Union, particular in case of accession countries, for it jeopardizes the ambitious integration plans of, and may trigger excessive migration to the Union. In order to find out which hypothesis holds 15 years after transition has started, we analyze the unemploymentgrowth dynamics in the eight new member countries from Central-Eastern Europe. The study is based on country and panel regressions with instrument variables (TSLS). The results suggest to declare the transition of labour markets as completed; unemployment responds to output and not to a changing institutional environment for job creation. The regression coefficients report a high trend rate of productivity and a high unemployment intensity of output growth since 1998. The conclusion is that labour market rigidities do not to play an important role in explaining high unemployment rates. Rather, GDP growth is dominated by productivity progress, while the employment relevant component of aggregate demand is too low to reduce substantially the high level of unemployment.
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Structural Change during Transition: Is Russia Becoming a Service Economy?
Albrecht Kauffmann
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Universität Potsdam, Nr. 80,
No. 80,
2005
Abstract
This paper analyses the structural change in Russia during the transition from the planned to a market economy. With regard to the famous three sector hypothesis, broad economic sectors were formed as required by this theory. The computation of their shares at GNP at market prices using Input-Output tables, and the adjustment of results from distortions, generated as side effects of tax avoidance practices, shows results that clearly reject claims that Russia would be on the road to a post-industrial service economy. Instead, at least until 2001, a tendency of “primarisation“ could be observed, that presents Russia closer to less-developed countries.
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Distance and International Banking
Claudia M. Buch
Review of International Economics,
No. 4,
2005
Abstract
This paper asks how important distance is as a determinant of international banking and whether distance has become less important over time. If technological progress has lowered information costs and if information costs increase in distance, the importance of distance should have declined. I use data on assets and liabilities of commercial banks from five countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK, and US) in 50 host countries for the years 1983–99 to test this hypothesis. Generally, I find that banks hold significantly lower assets in distant markets and that the importance of distance for the foreign asset holdings of banks has not changed.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Are European Equity Style Indexes Mean Reverting? Testing the Validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Marian Berneburg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 193,
2004
Abstract
The article tests for a random walk in European equity style indexes. After briefly
introducing the efficient market hypothesis, equity styles in general and the used
statistical techniques (Variance Ratio Test and modified Rescaled Range Test) it is
shown that a random walk in European equity style indexes cannot be rejected. At least in the period since the mid 70s, for which this research has been conducted, the weak form efficient market hypothesis seems to hold.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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