The Influence of Bondholder Concentration and Temporal Orientation on Investments in R&D
Pengfei Ye, Jonathan O’Brien, Christina Matz Carnes, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Management,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
Although innovation can be a critical source of competitive advantage, research has found that debt can erode management’s willingness to invest in R&D. In this article, we employ a stakeholder bargaining power perspective to argue that this effect is most pronounced when the firm’s bonds are concentrated in the hands of bond blockholders. Furthermore, we contend that the temporal orientation of bondholders influences this relationship. Specifically, while it is commonly assumed that bondholders have a limited temporal orientation that induces them to focus on short-term value appropriation, we argue that some bond blockholders adopt a long-term temporal orientation. This orientation, in turn, makes them more inclined to support long-term value creation for the firm in the form of enhanced investments in R&D. Moreover, while agency theory suggests that there is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, our results suggest that the temporal orientation of investors (i.e., both shareholders and bondholders) matters much more than whether they invested in the firm’s equity or its debt.
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Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries
Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, Michael Peters
American Economic Review,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
Delegating managerial tasks is essential for firm growth. Most firms in developing countries, however, do not hire outside managers but instead rely on family members. In this paper, we ask if this lack of managerial delegation can explain why firms in poor countries are small and whether it has important aggregate consequences. We construct a model of firm growth where entrepreneurs have a fixed time endowment to run their daily operations. As firms grow large, the need to hire outside managers increases. Firms’ willingness to expand therefore depends on the ease with which delegation can take place. We calibrate the model to plant-level data from the U.S. and India. We identify the key parameters of our theory by targeting the experimental evidence on the effect of managerial practices on firm performance from Bloom et al. (2013). We find that inefficiencies in the delegation environment account for 11% of the income per capita difference between the U.S. and India. They also contribute to the small size of Indian producers, but would cause substantially more harm for U.S. firms. The reason is that U.S. firms are larger on average and managerial delegation is especially valuable for large firms, thus making delegation efficiency and other factors affecting firm growth complements.
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Evolvement of China-related Topics in Academic Accounting Research: Machine Learning Evidence
June Cao, Zhanzhong Gu, Iftekhar Hasan
China Accounting and Finance Review,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
This study employs an unsupervised machine learning approach to explore the evolution of accounting research. We are particularly interested in exploring why international researchers and audiences are interested in China-related issues; what kinds of research topics related to China are mainly investigated in globally recognised journals; and what patterns and emerging topics can be explored by comprehensively analysing a big sample. Using a training sample of 23,220 articles from 46 accounting journals over the period 1980 to 2018, we first identify the optimal number of accounting research topics; the dynamic patterns of these accounting research topics are explored on the basis of 46 accounting journals to show changes in the focus of accounting research. Further, we collect articles related to Chinese accounting research from 18 accounting journals, eight finance journals, and eight management journals over the period 1980 to 2018. We objectively identify China-related accounting research topics and map them to the stages of China’s economic development. We attempt to identify the China-related issues global researchers are interested in and whether accounting research reflects the economic context. We use HistCite TM to generate a citation map along a timeline to illustrate the connections between topics. The citation clusters demonstrate “tribalism” phenomena in accounting research. The topics related to Chinese accounting research conducted by international accounting researchers reveal that accounting changes mirror economic reforms. Our findings indicate that accounting research is embedded in the economic context.
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Measuring the Indirect Effects of Adverse Employer Behaviour on Worker Productivity – A Field Experiment
Matthias Heinz, Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins, Heiner Schumacher, Matthias Sutter
Economic Journal,
No. 632,
2020
Abstract
We conduct a field experiment to study how worker productivity is affected if employers act adversely towards their co-workers. Our employees work for two shifts in a call centre. In our main treatment, we lay off some workers before the second shift. Compared to two control treatments, we find that the lay-off reduces the productivity of unaffected workers by 12%. We find suggestive evidence that this result is not driven by altered beliefs about the job or the management’s competence, but caused by the workers’ perception of unfair employer behaviour. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a prediction experiment with professional HR managers. Our results suggest that the price for adverse employer behaviour goes well beyond the potential tit for tat of directly affected workers.
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Marginal Returns to Talent for Material Risk Takers in Banking
Moritz Stieglitz, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2020
Abstract
Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.
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Investor Relations and IPO Performance
Salim Chahine, Gonul Colak, Iftekhar Hasan, Mohamad Mazboudi
Review of Accounting Studies,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
We analyze the value of investor relations (IR) strategies to IPO firms. We find that firms that are less visible and have inexperienced management tend to hire IR consultants prior to the issue date. IR consultants help create positive news coverage before an IPO, as reflected in a more optimistic tone of published media. Their presence is associated with higher underpricing at the IPO date but with lower long-run returns. IR-backed IPOs also exhibit disproportionately higher insider-related agency problems, as IR-induced higher underpricing tends to occur primarily in IPOs where underwriter and venture capitalist agency conflicts are more severe. These findings suggest that the IR programs of IPO firm are mostly short-term oriented and facilitate the ulterior motives of some insiders (underwriters and venture capitalists) targeting higher first-day returns.
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How to Talk Down Your Stock Performance
Andreas Barth, Sasan Mansouri, Fabian Wöbbeking, Severin Zörgiebel
SSRN Discussion Papers,
2020
Abstract
We process the natural language of verbal firm disclosures in order to study the use of context specific language or jargon and its impact on financial performance. We observe that, within the Q&A of earnings conference calls, managers use less jargon in responses to tougher questions, and after a quarter of bad economic success. Moreover, markets interpret the lack of precise information as a bad signal: we find lower cumulative abnormal returns and a higher implied volatility following earnings calls where managers use less jargon. These results support the argument that context specific language or jargon helps to efficiently and precisely transfer information.
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18.02.2020 • 3/2020
Presseeinladung zur IWH-Konferenz „Europas Finanzmarkt: Zwangsehe oder lose Bekanntschaft?“ am 26. Februar 2020
Ein Jahrzehnt nach der weltweiten Finanzkrise steht das Finanzsystem noch immer vor enormen Herausforderungen. Wie diese in Europa gemeistert werden können, ist Thema einer hochkarätig besetzten Tagung am Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). Zur Eröffnung spricht Claudia Buch, Vizepräsidentin der Deutschen Bundesbank.
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Managerial Effect or Firm Effect: Evidence from the Private Debt Market
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Financial Review,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the managerial effect is a key determinant of firms’ cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method developed by an earlier study to a large sample that tracks the job movement of top managers, we find that the managerial effect is a critical and significant factor that explains a large part of the variation in loan contract terms more accurately than firm fixed effects. Additional evidence shows that banks “follow” managers when they change jobs and offer loan contracts with preferential terms to their new firms.
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Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans
Tim R. Adam, Valentin Burg, Tobias Scheinert, Daniel Streitz
Management Science,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (performance-sensitive debt [PSD]). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue rate-increasing PSD than regular debt. They choose PSD with steeper performance-pricing schedules than those chosen by rational managers. We reject the possibility that overconfident managers have (persistent) positive private information and use PSD for signaling. Finally, firms seem to benefit less from using PSD ex post if they are managed by overconfident rather than rational managers.
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