Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
December
2020
Abstract
A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.
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Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining: A Path to Productivity?
Daniele Aglio, Filippo di Mauro
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2020
Abstract
Productivity developments have been rather divergent across EU countries and particularly between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and elsewhere in the continent (non-CEE). How is such phenomenon related to wage bargaining institutions? Starting from the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) shock, we analyse whether the specific set-up of wage bargaining prevailing in non-CEE may have helped their respective firms to sustain productivity in the aftermath of the crisis. To tackle the issue, we merge the CompNet dataset – of firm-level based productivity indicators – with the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey on wage bargaining institutions. We show that there is a substantial difference in the institutional set-up between the two above groups of countries. First, in CEE countries the bulk of the wage bargaining (some 60%) takes place outside collective bargaining schemes. Second, when a collective bargaining system is adopted in CEE countries, it is prevalently in the form of firm-level bargaining (i. e. the strongest form of decentralisation), while in non-CEE countries is mostly subject to multi-level bargaining (i. e. an intermediate regime, only moderately decentralised). On productivity impacts, we show that firms’ TFP in the non-CEE region appears to have benefitted from the chosen form of decentralisation, while no such effects are detectable in CEE countries. On the channels of transmission, we show that decentralisation in non-CEE countries is also negatively correlated with dismissals and with unit labour costs, suggesting that such collective bargaining structure may have helped to better match workers with firms’ needs.
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Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia
Sabien Dobbelaer, Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
IZA Discussion Paper,
No. 13909,
2020
published in: ILR Review
Abstract
This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace co-determination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labourmarket imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative Germanplant data for the years 1999{2016, we document that labour market imperfections arethe norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginalrevenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalentoutcome. We further nd that both types of organised labour are accompanied by asmaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wagemark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers'monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labourmarket imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensityof wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premiawhereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.
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Competition, Cost Structure, and Labour Leverage: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry
Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2020
Abstract
I study the effect of increasing competition on financial performance through labour leverage. To capture competition, I exploit variation in product market contestability in the U.S. airline industry. First, I find that increasing competitive pressure leads to increasing labour leverage, proxied by labour share. This explains the decrease in operating profitability through labour rigidities. Second, by exploiting variation in human capital specificity, I show that contestability of product markets induces labour market contestability. Whereas affected firms might experience more stress through higher wages or loss of skilled human capital, more mobile employee groups benefit from competitions through higher labour shares.
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Wages and the Value of Nonemployment
Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer, Samuel Young, Josef Zweimüller
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
Nonemployment is often posited as a worker’s outside option in wage-setting models such as bargaining and wage posting. The value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages. We measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers. Our quasi-experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels in Austria. We document that wages are insensitive to UI benefit changes: point estimates imply a wage response of less than $0.01 per $1.00 UI benefit increase, and we can reject sensitivities larger than $0.03. The insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration, and among job switchers hired out of unemployment. The insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used Nash bargaining model, which predicts a sensitivity of $0.24–$0.48. Our evidence supports wage-setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment.
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IWH-Tarif-Check: Kräftige reale Netto-Tariflohnzuwächse für Beschäftigte im Öffentlichen Dienst
Oliver Holtemöller, Birgit Schultz
IWH-Tarif-Check,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
Steuerfreie „Corona-Sonderzahlung“ und Abbau des Solidaritätszuschlags bringen Beschäftigten bei Bund und Kommunen kräftiges Gehalts-Plus.
Die Tarifvertragsparteien des Öffentlichen Dienstes von Bund und Kommunen haben sich auf einen neuen Tariflohnabschluss mit einer Laufzeit bis Ende 2022 geeinigt: Im Dezember 2020 gibt es eine steuerfreie „Corona-Sonderzahlung“, die je nach Entgeltgruppe bis zu 600 Euro beträgt. Ab April 2021 steigt dann das Gehalt um 1,4%, jedoch mindestens um 50 Euro je Monat, ein Jahr später um weitere 1,8%. Zudem gibt es noch eine Reihe von Zusatzvereinbarungen wie beispielsweise die Reduzierung der wöchentlichen Arbeitszeit in Ostdeutschland auf das Westniveau, die Erhöhung der Jahressonder-zahlung oder die Einführung einer Pflegezulage.
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Robot Adoption at German Plants
Liuchun Deng, Verena Plümpe, Jens Stegmaier
Abstract
Using a newly collected dataset of robot use at the plant level from 2014 to 2018, we provide the first microscopic portrait of robotisation in Germany and study the potential determinants of robot adoption. Our descriptive analysis uncovers five stylised facts concerning both extensive and, perhaps more importantly, intensive margin of plant-level robot use: (1) Robot use is relatively rare with only 1.55% German plants using robots in 2018. (2) The distribution of robots is highly skewed. (3) New robot adopters contribute substantially to the recent robotisation. (4) Robot users are exceptional along several dimensions of plant-level characteristics. (5) Heterogeneity in robot types matters. Our regression results further suggest plant size, low-skilled labour share, and exporter status to have strong and positive effect on future probability of robot adoption. Manufacturing plants impacted by the introduction of minimum wage in 2015 are also more likely to adopt robots. However, controlling for plant size, we find that plant-level productivity has no, if not negative, impact on robot adoption.
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Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller
ILR Review,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
The authors use three distinct methods to investigate the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. First, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects decomposition of workers’ wages reveal that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. Next, recentered influence function (RIF) regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Finally, in an Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, the authors find that decreasing bargaining coverage is the only factor they consider that contributes to the marked rise in premia dispersion over time.
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