Nothing Special about an Allowance for Corporate Equity: Evidence from Italian Banks
Dennis Dreusch, Felix Noth, Peter Reichling
Journal of International Money and Finance,
February
2025
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.
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The Bright Side of Bank Lobbying: Evidence from the Corporate Loan Market
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Thomas Y. To, Eliza Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2024
Abstract
Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.
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Media Response
Media Response November 2024 IWH: Manchmal wäre der Schlussstrich die angemessenere Lösung in: TextilWirtschaft, 21.11.2024 IWH: Existenzgefahr Nun droht eine Pleitewelle in: DVZ…
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Alumni
IWH Alumni The IWH maintains contact with its former employees worldwide. We involve our alumni in our work and keep them informed, for example, with a newsletter. We also plan…
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Media Response Archive 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 December 2021 IWH: Ausblick auf Wirtschaftsjahr 2022 in Sachsen mit Bezug auf IWH-Prognose zu Ostdeutschland: "Warum Sachsens…
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People
People Doctoral Students PhD Representatives Alumni Supervisors Lecturers Coordinators Doctoral Students Afroza Alam (Supervisor: Reint Gropp ) Julian Andres Diaz Acosta…
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OVERHANG: Debt overhang and green investments - the role of banks in climate-friendly management of emission-intensive fixed assets
OVERHANG: Debt overhang and green investments - the role of banks in climate-friendly management of emission-intensive fixed assets Subproject 1: Policy Changes, Lending and…
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DPE Course Programme Archive
DPE Course Programme Archive 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2024 Presenting and Writing about your Research Tim Korver October 14-15, 2024 (IWH)…
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Courses
Courses Courses are organised in coordination with partner institutions within the Central-German Doctoral Program Economics (CGDE) network. IWH organises First-Year Courses in…
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Regulation and Information Costs of Sovereign Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lending Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Suk-Joong Kim, Panagiotis Politsidis, Eliza Wu
Journal of Corporate Finance,
October
2023
Abstract
We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.
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