The Effect of Bank Organizational Risk-management on the Price of Non-deposit Debt
Iftekhar Hasan, Emma Peng, Maya Waisman, Meng Yan
Journal of Financial Services Research,
April
2024
Abstract
We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.
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Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is constructed, how it works, how to keep it fit and what good a bit of chocolate can do. Dossier In…
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Kommentar: Das Corona-Dilemma
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
Die Politik steht zurzeit vor einem scheinbar unlösbaren Dilemma. Einerseits sollen die Infektionszahlen niedrig gehalten werden: um die medizinische Infrastruktur nicht zu überfordern, und weil in Abwesenheit einer wirkungsvollen Behandlung Menschenleben gerettet werden sollen. Andererseits wäre aber die Ansteckung großer Teile der Bevölkerung (jünger als 60 Jahre und ohne Vorerkrankungen) vielleicht sogar erstrebenswert, weil die Symptome bei dieser Gruppe ohnehin kaum bis gar nicht wahrnehmbar sind und durch sie eine Herdenimmunität entstehen würde, die systematisch Infektionsketten unterbrechen könnte.
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Too Connected to Fail? Inferring Network Ties from Price Co-movements
Jakob Bosma, Michael Koetter, Michael Wedow
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,
No. 1,
2019
Abstract
We use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007/2008. Financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions. This result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too-big-to-fail concerns, systemic, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Both credit default swap (CDS)-based and equity-based connections are significant predictors of bailouts. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.
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Katrina und die Folgen: Sicherere Banken und positive Produktionseffekte
Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2018
Abstract
Welche Auswirkungen haben große Schocks wie Naturkatastrophen auf das Risiko von Banken, und welche realwirtschaftlichen Implikationen ergeben sich daraus? Diesen Fragen geht ein aktueller Beitrag unter IWH-Beteiligung nach, der die Auswirkungen des Wirbelsturms Katrina in den USA untersucht. Dabei finden die Autoren, dass vor allem eigenständige und besser kapitalisierte Banken auf das erhöhte Risiko reagieren, indem sie ihre Risikovorsorge in Form deutlich erhöhter Eigenkapitalpuffer nach oben fahren und den Anteil risikoreicher Aktiva in ihren Bilanzen verkleinern. Das geschieht allerdings nicht durch eine Verknappung des Kreditangebots, sondern potenziell durch Kreditverkäufe. Die Ergebnisse legen deshalb nahe, dass das Instrument der Verbriefung es betroffenen Banken ermöglicht, einerseits ihre Bilanzen sicherer zu machen und andererseits Unternehmen mit neuen Krediten zu versorgen. Dadurch profitieren auch die vom Schock betroffenen Regionen. Solche Regionen, die durch mehr eigenständige und besser kapitalisierte Banken gekennzeichnet sind, haben nach der Wirbelsturmsaison von 2005 deutlich höhere Produktionseffekte und geringere Arbeitslosenquoten.
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Too connected to fail? Wie die Vernetzung der Banken staatliche
Rettungsmaßnahmen vorhersagen kann
Friederike Altgelt, Michael Koetter
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Seit der globalen Finanzkrise 2007/2008 liegt aufgrund ihrer Schlüsselrolle für ein funktionierendes Finanzsystem ein besonderer Fokus auf den so genannten systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen (systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs). Neben der Größe von Finanzinstitutionen ist auch das Ausmaß ihrer Vernetzung im internationalen Finanzsystem entscheidend für die Klassifikation als systemrelevant. Obwohl die Vernetzung von Banken untereinander in der Regel schwer zu messen ist, kann sie aus der Entwicklung von Prämien von Kreditausfallversicherungen (den so genannten Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spreads) und Aktienrenditen abgeleitet werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit sich mit Hilfe der sich daraus ergebenden Co-Crash-Probability vor der Finanzkrise vorhersagen lässt, welche Finanzinstitutionen während der Krise Teil von staatlichen Rettungsprogrammen (bailout programmes) wurden.
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09.08.2017 • 29/2017
Networked and protected
During the financial crisis, billions were spent to rescue banks that were according to their governments too big to be allowed to fail. But a study by Michael Koetter from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and co-authors shows that besides the size of the banks, the centrality within the global financial network was also pivotal for financial institutions to receive a bail-out.
Michael Koetter
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State Aid and Guarantees in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, Lena Tonzer
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
2016
Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, governments massively intervened in the banking sector by providing liquidity assistance and capital support to banks in distress. This helped stabilize the financial system in the short run. However, public bailouts also bear the risk of longer-term distortions, for example, by affecting bailout expectations of banks. In this chapter, the authors first provide an overview of state aid interventions during the recent crisis episode. The third section then analyzes the effects of state aid on financial stability from a theoretical view. This is followed by the description of results obtained from empirical studies. The link between the provision of state aid and politics is discussed in the section “Institutional Design and Policy Implications”. Finally, in the section “The European Banking Union” the authors describe the elements of the European Banking Union meant to resolve and restructure banks in distress and to lower the need for public intervention. Based on the preceding analysis, conclusions are drawn regarding the new design.
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18.10.2016 • 46/2016
No Sign of Price Distortions – Lack of Evidence for Effects of US Bank Bailouts
There has been much political and public controversy surrounding the very large rescue packages offered to the banking sector in the course of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The aim of the packages was to stabilise the financial sector and, therefore, the development of the real economy. The downsides of these bailouts were the enormous financial cost to the taxpayer, increased assumption of risk by the government and possible distortive effects on competition in the banking market – since not all banks were given financial support. Researchers at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association led by Professor Felix Noth have now studied the long-term, indirect and possible market-distorting effects of the US rescue packages.
Felix Noth
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Bank Recapitalization, Regulatory Intervention, and Repayment
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 7,
2016
Abstract
We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed-out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.
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