Poison Bonds
Rex Wang Renjie, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
Read article
DPE Course Programme Archive
DPE Course Programme Archive 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2024 Presenting and Writing about your Research Tim Korver October 14-15, 2024 (IWH)…
See page
Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is constructed, how it works, how to keep it fit and what good a bit of chocolate can do. Dossier In…
See page
DPE Course Programme Archive
DPE Course Programme Archive 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2023 Microeconomics several lecturers winter term 2023/2024 (IWH) Econometrics several…
See page
Gender Pay Gap in American CFOs: Theory and Evidence
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Gayane Hovakimian, Zenu Sharma
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2023
Abstract
Studies document persistent unexplained gender-based wage gap in labor markets. At the executive level, where skill and education are similar, career interruptions and differences in risk preferences primarily explain the extant gender-based pay gap. This study focuses on CFO compensation contracts of Execucomp firms (1992–2020) and finds no gender-based pay gap. This paper offers several explanations for this phenomenon, such as novel evidence on the risk preferences of females with financial expertise and changes in the social and regulatory climate.
Read article
Financial Constraints and Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-level Evidence
Claudia M. Buch, I. Kesternich, A. Lipponer, Monika Schnitzer
Review of World Economics,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
Low productivity is an important barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their impact on the FDI decision. Theoretically, we show that financial constraints can affect highly productive firms more than firms with low productivity because the former are more likely to expand abroad. We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German domestic and multinational firms which contains information on parent-level financial constraints as well as on the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms’ foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by firms most likely to consider investing abroad. The locational information in our dataset allows exploiting cross-country differences in contract enforcement. Consistent with theory, we find that poor contract enforcement in the host country has a negative impact on FDI decisions.
Read article
Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities
Shai B. Bernstein, Eyal Winter
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts, we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities' asymmetry.
Read article
Macroeconomic Challenges in the Euro Area and the Acceding Countries
Katja Drechsel
Dissertation, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Osnabrück,
2010
Abstract
deutscher Titel: Makroökonomische Herausforderungen für die Eurozone und die Beitrittskandidaten
Abstract: The conduct of effective economic policy faces a multiplicity of macroeconomic challenges, which requires a wide scope of theoretical and empirical analyses. With a focus on the European Union, this doctoral dissertation consists of two parts which make empirical and methodological contributions to the literature on forecasting real economic activity and on the analysis of business cycles in a boom-bust framework in the light of the EMU enlargement. In the first part, we tackle the problem of publication lags and analyse the role of the information flow in computing short-term forecasts up to one quarter ahead for the euro area GDP and its main components. A huge dataset of monthly indicators is used to estimate simple bridge equations. The individual forecasts are then pooled, using different weighting schemes. To take into consideration the release calendar of each indicator, six forecasts are compiled successively during the quarter. We find that the sequencing of information determines the weight allocated to each block of indicators, especially when the first month of hard data becomes available. This conclusion extends the findings of the recent literature. Moreover, when combining forecasts, two weighting schemes are found to outperform the equal weighting scheme in almost all cases. In the second part, we focus on the potential accession of the new EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe to the euro area. In contrast to the discussion of Optimum Currency Areas, we follow a non-standard approach for the discussion on abandonment of national currencies the boom-bust theory. We analyse whether evidence for boom-bust cycles is given and draw conclusions whether these countries should join the EMU in the near future. Using a broad range of data sets and empirical methods we document credit market imperfections, comprising asymmetric financing opportunities across sectors, excess foreign currency liabilities and contract enforceability problems both at macro and micro level. Furthermore, we depart from the standard analysis of comovements of business cycles among countries and rather consider long-run and short-run comovements across sectors. While the results differ across countries, we find evidence for credit market imperfections in Central and Eastern Europe and different sectoral reactions to shocks. This gives favour for the assessment of the potential euro accession using this supplementary, non-standard approach.
Read article
Corporate Governance in the Multinational Enterprise: A Financial Contracting Perspective
Diemo Dietrich, Björn Jindra
International Business Review,
2010
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to bring economics-based finance research more into the focus of international business theory. On the basis of an analytical model that introduces financial constraints into incomplete contracting in an international vertical trade relationship, we propose an integrated framework that facilitates the study of the interdependencies between internalisation decisions, firm-internal allocations of control rights, and the debt capacity of firms. We argue that the financial constraint of an MNE and/or its supplier should be considered as an important determinant of internal governance structures, complementary to, and interacting with, institutional factors and proprietary knowledge.
Read article
The (never) ending story of the truck toll system – a contract theory view
Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2005
Abstract
Nach langer Ausschreibung und rechtlichen Auseinandersetzungen mit unterlegenen Anbietern unterzeichneten Vertreter der Bundesregierung und des Konsortiums Toll Collect am 20. September 2002 einen 17 000 Seiten umfassenden Vertrag. Darin war festgeschrieben, daß Toll Collect bis Ende August 2003 ein System zur automatischen Erfassung und Abrechnung einer streckenbezogenen satellitenunterstützten Mauterfassung aufbauen und danach betreiben soll. Technische Schwierigkeiten bei der Entwicklung des neuartigen Systems führten aber zu Verzögerungen in unvorhergesehenem Ausmaß. In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, inwiefern sich die Ergebnisse der darauffolgenden Nachverhandlungen aus der ökonomischen Vertragstheorie herleiten lassen. Es zeigt sich, daß beide Vertragsparteien derart an die Umsetzung der Vertragsbeziehung gebunden waren, daß die am 17. Februar 2004 einseitig vom Bundesverkehrsminister eingeleitete Kündigung durch eine Einigung nur wenige Tage später hinfällig wurde. Daneben wird dargestellt, daß der Vertrag zwischen Bundesregierung und Toll Collect die richtigen Anreize für die Parteien gesetzt und die Möglichkeit von effizienten Nachverhandlungen geboten hat.
Read article
