The Corporate Investment Benefits of Mutual Fund Dual Holdings
Rex Wang Renjie, Patrick Verwijmeren, Shuo Xia
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.
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Ecological Preferences and the carbon Intensity of Corporate Investment
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2025
Abstract
Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents’ preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high.
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Creditor-control Rights and the Nonsynchronicity of Global CDS Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Miriam Marra, Eliza Wu, Gaiyan Zhang
Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
No. 1,
2025
Abstract
We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.
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Media Response
Media Response March 2025 IWH: Ifo Dresden schließt 2027 in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.03.2025 Steffen Müller: Pleitewelle rollt: Es trifft auch viele namhafte…
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People
People Doctoral Students PhD Representatives Alumni Supervisors Lecturers Coordinators Doctoral Students Afroza Alam (Supervisor: Reint Gropp ) Julian Andres Diaz Acosta…
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Media Response Archive 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 December 2021 IWH: Ausblick auf Wirtschaftsjahr 2022 in Sachsen mit Bezug auf IWH-Prognose zu Ostdeutschland: "Warum Sachsens…
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OVERHANG: Debt overhang and green investments
OVERHANG: Debt overhang and green investments - the role of banks in climate-friendly management of emission-intensive fixed assets Subproject 1: Policy Changes, Lending and…
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Poison Bonds
Rex Wang Renjie, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
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Research Clusters
Three Research Clusters Research Cluster "Economic Dynamics and Stability" Research Questions This cluster focuses on empirical analyses of macroeconomic dynamics and stability.…
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