The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

Die Ankündigungen und Entscheidungen der neuen US-Regierung um den Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt und die Zollpolitik haben weltweit zu hoher Unsicherheit geführt. Im Euroraum bleibt die Konjunktur schwach. Auch die deutsche Konjunktur ist weiter im Abschwung. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2025 um 0,1% und im Jahr darauf um 1,3% zunehmen.

Das Produktionspotenzial der deutschen Wirtschaft wächst mittelfristig (2023 bis 2029) mit einer jahresdurchschnittlichen Rate von 0,3% und damit deutlich schwächer als in den Jahren zuvor. Dies ist auf eine ungünstigere Entwicklung aller drei Faktoren (Arbeitsvolumen, Kapitalstock, totale Faktorproduktivität) zurückzuführen. Das potenzielle Wachstum wird insbesondere durch den Rückgang der durchschnittlichen Arbeitszeit gedämpft.

Zur Jahreswende dürfte die weltweite Produktion weiterhin in etwa so schnell wie in der Dekade vor der Pandemie expandieren. Die Konjunktur im Euroraum ist nur verhalten, und die Stagnation der deutschen Wirtschaft setzt sich fort. Die Industrie verliert an internationaler Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Unternehmen und Verbraucher halten sich aufgrund unklarer wirtschaftspolitischer Aussichten mit ihren Ausgaben zurück. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2024 um 0,2% sinken und im Jahr 2025 um 0,4% expandieren.

This paper investigates the critical role of church membership in the process of economic recovery after high-impact natural disasters. We document a significant adverse treatment effect of the 2005 hurricane season in the Southeastern United States on establishment-level productivity. However, we find that establishments in counties with higher rates of church membership saw a significantly stronger recovery in terms of productivity for 2005–10. We also show that church membership is correlated with post-disaster entrepreneurship activities and population growth.

The German economy has stagnated for over two years, with a slow recovery anticipated in the coming quarters. However, growth is unlikely to reach pre-COVID-19 levels anytime soon. Decarbonisation, digitisation, demographic changes, and heightened competition from China are dampening growth prospects. GDP is projected to decline by 0.1 % in 2024, with increases of 0.8 % and 1.3 % in the subsequent years. Rising private consumption and improving foreign trade are expected to contribute positively to the economic upturn in Germany. Economic policy should prioritise reducing productivity barriers, facilitating structural changes, and lowering political uncertainty to support recovery.