The Reverse Revolving Door in the Supervision of European Banks
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Alex Sclip, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2023
Abstract
We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects. Appointments of former bankers, in turn, spark positive stock market reactions. This „proximity premium“ of supervised banks is a more likely driver of positive valuation effects than superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of former executives from the financial industry. Prior to the inception of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, the presence of former financial industry executives on the board of NSA associates with lower regulatory capital and faster growth of banks, pointing to a more lenient supervisory style.
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Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
No. 1,
2023
Abstract
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
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