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The Impact of Delay: Evidence from Formal out-of-Court Restructuring
Stjepan Srhoj, Dejan Kovač, Jacob N. Shapiro, Randall K. Filer
Journal of Corporate Finance,
February
2023
Abstract
Different types of bankruptcy restructuring procedures are used in most legal systems to decide the fate of businesses facing financial hardship. We study how bargaining failures in an under-researched type of restructuring procedure, a formal out-of-the court procedure impacts the economic performance of participating firms. Croatia introduced a “pre-bankruptcy settlement” (PBS) process in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. A novel dataset provides us with annual financial statements for both sides of more than 180,000 debtor–creditor pairs, enabling us to address selection into failed negotiations by matching a rich set of creditor and debtor characteristics. Failures to settle at the PBS stage due to idiosyncratic bargaining problems, which effectively delay entry into the standard bankruptcy procedure, lead to a lower rate of survival among debtors as well as reduced employment, revenue, and profits. We are the first study to track how bargaining failures diffuse through the network of creditors, finding a significant negative effect on small creditors, but not others. Our results highlight the impact of delay and the importance of structuring bankruptcy procedures, to rapidly resolve uncertainty about firms’ future prospects.
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The Impact of Delay: Evidence from Formal Out-of-Court Restructuring
Randall K. Filer, Dejan Kovač, Jacob N. Shapiro, Stjepan Srhoj
Abstract
Bankruptcy restructuring procedures are used in most legal systems to decide the fate of businesses facing financial hardship. We study how bargaining failures in such procedures impact the economic performance of participating firms in the context of Croatia, which introduced a „pre-bankruptcy settlement“ (PBS) process in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007 - 2009. Local institutions left over from the communist era provide annual financial statements for both sides of more than 180,000 debtor-creditor pairs, enabling us to address selection into failed negotiations by matching a rich set of creditor and debtor characteristics. Failures to settle at the PBS stage due to idiosyncratic bargaining problems, which effectively delays entry into the standard bankruptcy procedure, leads to a lower rate of survival among debtors as well as reduced employment, revenue, and profits. We also track how bargaining failures diffuse through the network of creditors, finding a significant negative effect on small creditors, but not others. Our results highlight the impact of delay and the importance of structuring bankruptcy procedures to rapidly resolve uncertainty about firms‘ future prospects.
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Aspects of the Political Economy of the European Banking Union
Lena Tonzer
PolEconFin Initiative,
2021
Abstract
The regulatory architecture of the financial system has significantly changed after the global financial crisis of 2008/09. In Europe, the introduction of the Single Rulebook has been a major change and provides the legal foundation for the European Banking Union (EBU). The Single Rulebook consists of a regulation, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), and three main directives targeting capital regulation and compensation of managers, harmonization of deposit insurance schemes, as well as resolution and restructuring rules (Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD), Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)).
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Do courts matter for Firm Value? Evidence from the U.S. Court System
Stefano Colonnello, Christoph Herpfer
Journal of Law and Economics,
No. 2,
2021
Abstract
We estimate how US state courts impact firm value by exploiting a US Supreme Court ruling that exogenously changed firms’ exposure to different courts. We find that increased exposure to more business-friendly courts is associated with positive announcement returns. We find no such association for objective court quality. Consistent with the ruling impacting firm value through the legal environment channel, we find that effects are stronger for firms with high litigation exposure. We find that the ruling led to a shift in both the geographic distribution of lawsuits and operations of firms.
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Do Courts Matter for Firm Value? Evidence from the U.S. Court System
Stefano Colonnello, Christoph Herpfer
Abstract
We estimate the impact of U.S. state court characteristics on firm value by exploiting a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that exogenously changed firms‘ exposure to different courts. We find that increased exposure to more business-friendly courts is associated with positive announcement returns. We find no such association for objective court quality. We confirm that this U.S. Supreme Court ruling impacted firm value through the legal environment channel. We show that this ruling reduced the ability of affected firms to remove cases from certain state courts, and we show that announcement returns are stronger for firms that have high litigation exposure.
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Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.
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