Erinnerung an soziale Isolation des Lockdowns macht Menschen egoistischer
Sabrina Jeworrek, Joschka Waibel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
Nachdem Teilnehmer eines Online-Experiments an die soziale Isolierung des Lockdowns erinnert wurden, verhielten sich diese egoistischer als eine neutrale Vergleichsgruppe. Allerdings beurteilten Teilnehmer eines weiteren Experiments, die ebenfalls an die soziale Isolation im Lockdown erinnert wurden, ein solches egoistisches Verhalten als prinzipiell sozial unangemessen. Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass lediglich die Neigung zur Befolgung sozialer Normen, welche menschliches Verhalten in den verschiedensten Lebenssituationen maßgeblich beeinflussen, durch die soziale Distanzierung gesunken ist. Auch für eine Zeit nach der Bewältigung der Corona-Pandemie werfen diese Ergebnisse Fragen auf: Wie lässt sich in einer digitalisierten Welt, in der persönliche Interaktionen immer seltener werden, die Bereitschaft zur Einhaltung sozialer Normen aufrechterhalten?
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Do Affiliated Bankers on Board Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility? US Evidence
Iftekhar Hasan, Hui Li, Haizhi Wang, Yun Zhu
Sustainability,
No. 6,
2021
Abstract
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent affiliated bankers on board may affect firms’ corporate social performance. Using a propensity score-matched sample from 2002 to 2016, we find that board directors from affiliated banks exert significantly positive influence on firms’ corporate social performance. Furthermore, board of directors from affiliated banks are negatively associated with firm investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities when firms experience financial distress. Finally, we find that the effect of affiliated bankers on board on firms’ CSR performance depends on the affiliated banks’ CSR orientation, as affiliated banker directors from banks with higher CSR orientation have a stronger influence on firms’ investments in CSR activities. The results suggest that improving firm’s CSR performance is consistent with the affiliated banks’ interests.
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Team Building and Hidden Costs of Control
Gerhard Riener, Simon Wiederhold
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
March
2016
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the interaction of two prominent firm strategies to increase worker effort: team building and control. We compare a team-building treatment where subjects initially play a coordination game to gain common experience (CE) with an autarky treatment where subjects individually perform a task (NCE). In both treatments, subjects then play two-player control games where agents provide costly effort and principals can control to secure a minimum effort. CE agents always outperform NCE agents. Conditional on control, however, CE agents’ effort is crowded out more strongly, with the effect being most pronounced for agents who successfully coordinated in the team-building exercise. Differential reactions to control perceived as excessive is one explanation for our findings.
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