Die Kosten von Wahlversprechen: Wie lokale Sparkassen eine neue Landesregierung finanzieren
Michael Koetter, Shasha Li, Paulina Scheit
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2022
Abstract
Staatliche Banken in Deutschland verfolgen einen lokalen Entwicklungsauftrag in ihrer jeweiligen Gemeinde. Da sie dem Staat gehören, sind sie jedoch politischem Einfluss ausgesetzt. Dies birgt das Risiko, dass eine politisierte Mittelvergabe den Entwicklungsauftrag beeinträchtigt. Dennoch ist erstaunlich wenig darüber bekannt, ob die Kreditvergabe durch Banken in staatlichem Besitz in erster Linie dem Ziel der Entwicklung der Region oder einem politischen Ziel dient. In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie sich ein Wechsel der Regierungspartei auf Landesebene auf die Kreditvergabe durch Sparkassen an die Landesregierung in Deutschland zwischen 1992 und 2018 ausgewirkt hat. Die Schätzergebnisse bestätigen: Lokale Sparkassen erhöhen nach einem wahlbedingten Wechsel der Regierungspartei die Kreditvergabe an die Landesregierung – auf Kosten der Kreditvergabe an lokale Haushalte. Ein Regierungswechsel kann also die Indienstnahme der Sparkassen für landespolitische Ziele aktivieren und möglicherweise ihren öffentlichen Auftrag zur lokalen Entwicklung beeinträchtigen.
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Xiang Li
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2022
Abstract
By adopting a difference-in-differences specification combined with propensity score matching, I provide evidence using the microdata of German banks that stateowned savings banks have lent less than credit cooperatives during the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, the weaker lending effects of state-owned banks are pronounced for long-term and nonrevolving loans but insignificant for short-term and revolving loans. Moreover, the negative impact of government ownership is larger for borrowers who are more exposed to the COVID-19 shock and in regions where the ruling parties are longer in office and more positioned on the right side of the political spectrum.
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Macroprudential Policy and Intra-Group Dynamics: The Effects of Reserve Requirements in Brazil
Chris Becker, Matias Ossandon Busch, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Corporate Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.
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Political Cycles in Bank Lending to the Government
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Review of Financial Studies,
No. 6,
2021
Abstract
We study how political party turnover after German state elections affects banks’ lending to the regional government. We find that between 1992 and 2018, party turnover at the state level leads to a sharp and substantial increase in lending by local savings banks to their home-state government. This effect is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in private lending. A statistical association between political party turnover and government lending is absent for comparable cooperative banks that exhibit a similar regional organization and business model. Our results suggest that political frictions may interfere with government-owned banks’ local development objectives.
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Politics, Banks, and Sub-sovereign Debt: Unholy Trinity or Divine Coincidence?
Michael Koetter, Alexander Popov
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
No. 53,
2018
Abstract
We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians, increase significantly their holdings of home-State sovereign bonds when the local government and the State government are dominated by different political parties. Banks' holdings of other securities, like federal bonds, bonds issued by other States, or stocks, are not affected by election outcomes. We argue that banks use sub-sovereign bond purchases to gain access to politically distant government authorities.
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Financial Constraints of Private Firms and Bank Lending Behavior
Patrick Behr, L. Norden, Felix Noth
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 9,
2013
Abstract
We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.
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Government Banking in Russia: Magnitude and New Features
Andrei Vernikov
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2011
Abstract
State-controlled banks are currently at the core of financial intermediation in Russia. This paper aims to assess the magnitude of government banking, and to reveal some of its special features and arrangements. We distinguish between directly and indirectly state-controlled banks and construct a set of bank-level statistical data covering the period between 2000 and 2011. By January 2011 the market share of state-controlled banks reached almost 54 percent of all bank assets, putting Russia in the same league with China and India and widening the gap from typical European emerging markets. We show that direct state ownership is gradually substituted by indirect ownership and control. It tends to be organized in corporate pyramids that dilute public property, take control away from government bodies, and underpin managerial opportunism. Statecontrolled
banks blur the borderline between commercial banking and development
banking. Dominance of public banks has a bearing on empirical studies whose results might suggest state-owned banks’ greater (or lesser) efficiency or competitiveness compared to other forms of ownership. We tend to interpret such results as influenced by the choice of indicator, period of observations, sample selection, etc., in the absence of an equal playing field for all groups of players. We suggest that the government’s planned retreat from the banking sector will involve non-core assets mainly, whereas control over core institutions will just become more subtle.
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