1. Publications
  2. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 4/2019
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Wage Delegation in the Field

By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.

14. October 2019

Authors Sabrina Jeworrek Vanessa Mertins

See Publication

Keywords

compensation delegation field experiment reciprocity responsibility alleviation worker empowerment workplace democracy

JEL Classification

C91 C93 J33 M52 M54

Whom to contact

For Researchers

Professor Dr Sabrina Jeworrek
Professor Dr Sabrina Jeworrek
Vice Department Head

If you have any further questions please contact me.

+49 345 7753-730 Request per E-Mail

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Dr Wolfgang Sender
Dr Wolfgang Sender
Head of Public Relations

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+49 345 7753-720 Request per E-Mail
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