Financial Stability
Financial Systems: The Anatomy of the Market Economy How the financial system is constructed, how it works, how to keep it fit and what good a bit of chocolate can do. Dossier In…
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Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
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A Market-based Measure for Currency Risk in Managed Exchange Rate Regimes
Stefan Eichler, Ingmar Roevekamp
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money,
November
2018
Abstract
We introduce a novel currency risk measure based on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Using an augmented ADR pricing model, we exploit investors’ exposure to potential devaluation losses to derive an indicator of currency risk. Using weekly data for a sample of 807 ADRs located in 21 emerging markets over the 1994–2014 period, we find that a deterioration in the fiscal balance and higher inflation increase currency risk. Interaction models reveal that the fiscal balance and inflation drive the determination of currency risk for countries with poor sovereign rating, low foreign reserves, low capital account openness and managed float regimes.
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A Market-based Indicator of Currency Risk: Evidence from American Depositary Receipts
Stefan Eichler, Ingmar Roevekamp
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2016
Abstract
We introduce a novel currency risk measure based on American Depositary Receipts(ADRs). Using a multifactor pricing model, we exploit ADR investors’ exposure to potential devaluation losses to derive an indicator of currency risk. Using weekly data for a sample of 831 ADRs located in 23 emerging markets over the 1994-2014 period, we find that a deterioration in the fiscal and current account balance, as well as higher inflation, increases currency risk. Interaction models reveal that these macroeconomic fundamentals drive currency risk, particularly in countries with managed exchange rates, low levels of foreign exchange reserves and a poor sovereign credit rating.
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Exit Expectations and Debt Crises in Currency Unions
Alexander Kriwoluzky, G. J. Müller, M. Wolf
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2015
Abstract
Membership in a currency union is not irreversible. Exit expectations may emerge during sovereign debt crises, because exit allows countries to reduce their liabilities through a currency redenomination. As market participants anticipate this possibility, sovereign debt crises intensify. We establish this formally within a small open economy model of changing policy regimes. The model permits explosive dynamics of debt and sovereign yields inside currency unions and allows us to distinguish between exit expectations and those of an outright default. By estimating the model on Greek data, we quantify the contribution of exit expectations to the crisis dynamics during 2009 to 2012.
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Financial Stability and Central Bank Governance
Michael Koetter, Kasper Roszbach, G. Spagnolo
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
The financial crisis has ignited a debate about the appropriate objectives and the governance structure of Central Banks. We use novel survey data to investigate the relation between these traits and banking system stability focusing in particular on their role in micro-prudential supervision. We find that the separation of powers between single and multiple bank supervisors cannot explain credit risk prior or during the financial crisis. Similarly, a large number of Central Bank governance traits do not correlate with system fragility. Only the objective of currency stability exhibits a significant relation with non-performing loan levels in the run-up to the crisis. This effect is amplified for those countries with most frequent exposure to IMF missions in the past. Our results suggest that the current policy discussion whether to centralize prudential supervision under the Central Bank and the ensuing institutional changes some countries are enacting may not produce the improvements authorities are aiming at. Whether other potential improvements in prudential supervision due to, for example, external disciplinary devices, such as IMF conditional lending schemes, are better suited to increase financial stability requires further research.
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Devaluation Expectations Based on Cross-listed Stocks: Evidence for Financial Crises in Argentina Then and Now
Stefan Eichler
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 10,
2014
Abstract
I use the relative prices of American Depositary Receipts and their underlying stocks to derive devaluation expectations. I find that stockholders currently perceive an overvalued peso. Devaluation expectations are driven by the incentive of competitive devaluation and sovereign default risk.
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Exchange Rate Regime, Real Misalignment and Currency Crises
Oliver Holtemöller, Sushanta Mallick
Economic Modelling,
No. 34,
2013
Abstract
Based on 69 sample countries, this paper examines the effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on real effective exchange rates (REER) in these sample countries. Using the misalignment of actual REER from its equilibrium level, we have estimated the factors explaining the extent of currency over- or under-valuation. Overall, we find that the higher the flexibility of the currency regime, the lower is the misalignment. The estimates are robust to different sub-samples of countries. We then explore the impact of such misalignment on the probability of a currency crisis in the next period, indicating the extent to which misalignment could be used as a leading indicator of a potential crisis. This paper thus makes a new contribution to the debate on the choice of exchange rate regime by bringing together real exchange rate misalignment and currency crisis literature.
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The New EU Countries and Euro Adoption
Hubert Gabrisch, Martina Kämpfe
Intereconomics,
No. 3,
2013
Abstract
In the new member states of the EU which have not yet adopted the euro, previous adoption strategies have come under scrutiny. The spillovers and contagion from the global financial crisis revealed a new threat to the countries’ real convergence goal, namely considerable vulnerability to the transmission of financial instability to the real economy. This paper demonstrates the existence of extreme risks for real convergence and argues in favour of a new adoption strategy which does not announce a target date for the currency changeover and which allows for more flexible and countercyclical monetary, fiscal and wage policies.
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