Bank Concentration and Retail Interest Rates
S. Corvoisier, Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.
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Ten years of ecological reconstruction in the New Länder
Steffen Hentrich, Walter Komar, Martin Weisheimer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 16,
2000
Abstract
Der Beitrag analysiert die Fortschritte des ökologischen Aufbauprozesses in den neuen Ländern. Schwerpunkte sind hierbei die ökologische Modernisierung der Wirtschaft, der Ausbau der Entsorgungsinfrastruktur und die Beseitigung altlastbedingter Investiti-onshemmnisse. Darauf aufbauend wird noch zu bewältigender Handlungsbedarf im Umweltschutz der neuen Länder aufgezeigt.
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Environmental policy under product differentiation and asymmetric costs - Does leapfrogging occur and is it worth it?
Jacqueline Rothfels
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 124,
2000
Abstract
This paper studies the influence of environmental policies on environmental quality, domestic firms, and welfare. Point of departure is Porter’s hypothesis that unilateral environmental regulation may enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms. This hypothesis has recently received considerable support in theoretical analyses, especially if imperfectly competitive markets with strategic behavior on behalf of the agents are taken into account. Our work contributes to this literature by explicitely investigating the implications of asymmetric cost structures between a domestic and a foreign firm sector. We use a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation, where the consumption of a product causes environmental harm. Allowing for differentiated products, the domestic industry can either assume the market leader position or lag behind in terms of the environmental quality of the produced product. Assuming as a benchmark case that the domestic industry lags behind, we investigate the possibility of the government to induce leapfrogging of the domestic firm, i.e. a higher quality produced by the domestic firm after regulation than that of the competitor prior to regulation. It is shown that in the case of a cost advantage for the domestic firm in the production process the imposition of a binding minimum quality standard can serve as a tool to induce leapfrogging. In case of a cost disadvantage the same result can be achieved through an adequate subsidization of quality dependend production costs. Thus, careful regulation enables the domestic firm in both scenarios to better its competitive position against foreign competitors and to earn larger profits. Additionally, environmental quality and welfare can be enhanced.
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Environmental policy and entrepreneurial adjustments under imperfect competition
Jacqueline Rothfels
Schriften des IWH,
No. 6,
2000
Abstract
Seit den 80er Jahren hat sich eine intensive Debatte um die Frage entwickelt, inwie weit sich unilaterale umweltpolitische Maßnahmen nachteilig auf heimische Unterneh men auswirken. Als Argument gegen solche Politiken wird häufig ins Feld geführt, daß sich die Produktionskosten erhöhen und damit die internationale Wettbewerbsposition der inländischen Unternehmen verschlechtert.
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How could the lacking competitive pressure in the field of passing energy through be met?
Martin Weisheimer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
1998
Abstract
Da die Stromnetze weiterhin als natürliches Monopol fungieren, muss über die Durchleitung von Fremdstrom der Wettbewerb eingeführt werden.Die Arbeit zeigt, welche Aufgaben und Lösungsmöglichkeiten hierfür bestehen. Die RPI-x-Preisformel wird besonders dargestellt und empfohlen.
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Economic policy prioritizes competitiveness - A commentary
Rüdiger Pohl
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
1997
Abstract
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Employment effects of a reduction of continued pay in case of sickness
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Christian Dreger
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
1997
Abstract
Eine Kürzung der Lohnfortsetzung im Krankheitsfall führt zu einem Rückgang der Lohnne-benkosten und damit zu einer Stärkung der Wettbewerbsposition, was – für sich genommen – einen Beschäftigungsaufbau befördert. Eine eingeschränkte Lohnfortzahlung führt jedoch letztlich auch zu einer Verringerung der Nettolohn- und -gehaltssumme und damit der ge-samtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage sowie des Beschäftigungsniveaus. Die komplexen Wirkungen der gegenläufigen Effekte einer Verringerung der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall werden hier mit Hilfe des makroökonometrischen Modells des IWH berechnet. Es wird deutlich, dass die jetzt gesetzlich möglichen Einschränkungen der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall eher gering sind.
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Pay rate policy approaches for improving competitiveness of East German economy
Rüdiger Pohl, Hilmar Schneider
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 13,
1996
Abstract
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Phonebanking
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
European Economic Review,
No. 2,
1995
Abstract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first stage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market for deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is increased as transaction costs are lowered. Universal phonebanking prevails when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. Specialization can occur in that one bank offers the phone option while the other does not.
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