Economy in Shock — Financial Policy is Holding Up
Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Claus Michelsen, Torsten Schmidt, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
Nach Ansicht der führenden deutschen Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute bricht die Konjunktur in Deutschland als Folge der Corona-Pandemie drastisch ein. Um die Infektionswelle abzubremsen, hat der Staat die wirtschaftliche Aktivität hierzulande stark eingeschränkt. Deshalb dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt 2020 um 4,2 % schrumpfen. Die Rezession hinterlässt deutliche Spuren auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und im Staatshaushalt. In der Spitze wird die Arbeitslosenquote auf 5,9 % und die Zahl der Kurzarbeiter auf 2,4 Mio. hochschnellen. Die finanzpolitischen Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen führen 2020 zu einem Rekorddefizit im gesamtstaatlichen Haushalt von 159 Mrd. Euro. Nach dem Shutdown wird sich die Konjunktur schrittweise erholen. Entsprechend fällt der Anstieg des Bruttoinlandsprodukts 2021 mit 5,8 % kräftig aus. Mit dieser Prognose sind erhebliche Abwärtsrisiken verbunden, etwa weil sich die Pandemie deutlich langsamer abschwächen lässt, oder weil das Wiederhochfahren der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität schlechter gelingt als angenommen bzw. eine erneute Ansteckungswelle auslöst.
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08.04.2020 • 5/2020
Economy in Shock – Fiscal Policy to Counteract
The coronavirus pandemic is triggering a severe recession in Germany. Economic output will shrink by 4.2% this year. This is what the leading economics research institutes expect in their spring report. For next year, they are forecasting a recovery and growth of 5.8%.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Monetary-fiscal Policy Interaction and Fiscal Inflation: A Tale of Three Countries
Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Samad Sarferaz
European Economic Review,
2016
Abstract
We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.
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Monetary-fiscal Policy Interaction and Fiscal Inflation: A Tale of Three Countries
Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky, Samad Sarferaz
Abstract
We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary-fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S. and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of high fiscal budget deficits and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary-fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.
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Monetary Policy under the Microscope: Intra-bank Transmission of Asset Purchase Programs of the ECB
L. Cycon, Michael Koetter
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 9,
2015
Abstract
With a unique loan portfolio maintained by a top-20 universal bank in Germany, this study tests whether unconventional monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced corporate borrowing costs. We decompose corporate lending rates into refinancing costs, as determined by money markets, and markups that the bank is able to charge its customers in regional markets. This decomposition reveals how banks transmit monetary policy within their organizations. To identify policy effects on loan rate components, we exploit the co-existence of eurozone-wide security purchase programs and regional fiscal policies at the district level. ECB purchase programs reduced refinancing costs significantly, even in an economy not specifically targeted for sovereign debt stress relief, but not loan rates themselves. However, asset purchases mitigated those loan price hikes due to additional credit demand stimulated by regional tax policy and enabled the bank to realize larger economic margins.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
Der Beitrag wurde anlässlich des gemeinsamen Workshops des Conseil d'Analyse Économique (CAE) und des Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung zum Thema fiskalische und ökonomische Integration des Euroraums verfasst. Er diskutiert die makroökonomischen Wirkungen einer Bankenunion und mögliche Ausgestaltungsvarianten vor dem Hintergrund der aktuell diskutierten Vorschläge.
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A Macroeconomist’s View on EU Governance Reform: Why and How to Establish Policy Coordination?
Hubert Gabrisch
Economic Annals,
No. 191,
2011
Abstract
This paper discusses the need for macroeconomic policy coordination in the E(M)U. Coordination of national policies with cross-border effects does not exist at the macroeconomic level, although requested by the EU Treaty. The need for coordination stems from current account imbalances, which origin in market-induced capital flows, destabilizing the real exchange rates between low and high wage countries. The recent attempts of the Commission and the European Council to reform E(M)U governance do not address this problem and thus remain incapable to protect against future instability.
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What Might Central Banks Lose or Gain in Case of Euro Adoption – A GARCH-Analysis of Money Market Rates for Sweden, Denmark and the UK
Herbert S. Buscher, Hubert Gabrisch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 9,
2011
Abstract
This study deals with the question whether the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and the UK can really influence short-term money markets and thus, would lose this influence in case of Euro adoption. We use a GARCH-M-GED model with daily money market rates. The model reveals the co-movement between the Euribor and the shortterm interest rates in these three countries. A high degree of co-movement might be seen as an argument for a weak impact of the central bank on its money markets. But this argument might only hold for tranquil times. Our approach reveals, in addition, whether there is a specific reaction of the money markets in turbulent times. Our finding is that the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has indeed a significant impact on the three money market rates, and there is no specific benefit for these countries to stay outside the Euro area. However, the GARCH-M-GED model further reveals risk divergence and unstable volatilities of risk in the case of adverse monetary shocks to the economy for Sweden and Denmark, compared to the Euro area. We conclude that the danger of adverse monetary developments cannot be addressed by a common monetary
policy for these both countries, and this can be seen as an argument to stay outside the Euro area.
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Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
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