Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
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Do Federal Reserve Bank Presidents’ Interest Rate Votes in the FOMC Follow an Electoral Cycle?
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 9,
2016
Abstract
We find that Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ regional bias in their dissenting interest rate votes in the Federal Open Market Committee follows an electoral cycle. Presidents put more weight on their district’s economic environment during the year prior to their (re-)election relative to nonelection years.
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Forecast Dispersion, Dissenting Votes, and Monetary Policy Preferences of FOMC Members: The Role of Individual Career Characteristics and Political Aspects
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Public Choice,
No. 3,
2014
Abstract
Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.
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Regional House Price Dynamics and Voting Behavior in the FOMC
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do.
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Did Consumers Want Less Debt? Consumer Credit Demand versus Supply in the Wake of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis
Reint E. Gropp, J. Krainer, E. Laderman
Abstract
We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.
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In Search for Yield? Survey-based Evidence on Bank Risk Taking
Claudia M. Buch, S. Eickmeier, Esteban Prieto
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
No. 43,
2014
Abstract
Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.
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Does Central Bank Staff Beat Private Forecasters?
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen, A. Jung
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2012
Abstract
In the tradition of Romer and Romer (2000), this paper compares staff forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) for inflation and output with corresponding private forecasts. Standard tests show that the Fed and less so the ECB have a considerable information advantage about inflation and output. Using novel tests for conditional predictive ability and forecast stability for the US, we identify the driving forces of the narrowing of the information advantage of Greenbook forecasts coinciding with the Great Moderation.
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Stages of the Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset Bubble?
Lucjan T. Orlowski
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2008
Abstract
Dieser Beitrag begründet, warum die Schwere der gegenwärtigen globalen Finanzkrise von der ständigen Verlegung internationaler Liquidität auf verschiedene Anlagemärkte beeinflusst wird. Dieser Prozess kann als „wandernde“ spekulative Vermögensblase bezeichnet werden. Nachdem sie durch den Niedergang des amerikanischen Subprime-Hypothekenmarkts und der hypothekengedeckten Wertpapiere ausgelöst worden war, hat sie sich auf andere Kreditfelder, auf strukturierte Finanzprodukte und globale Finanzinstitutionen ausgebreitet. Die Reaktionen der Wirtschaftspolitik, insbesondere der Geldpolitik, sind bisher nicht angemessen ausgefallen, da sie sich auf eine unsystematische Re-Kapitalisierung der betroffenen und auch verantwortlichen Investitionsbanken konzentrierten. Stattdessen sollte die Geldpolitik darauf abzielen, die weltweite Überschussliquidität in produktive Investitionen zu lenken. Eine sinnvolle Maßnahme wäre die Einführung eines Inflationsziels im Rahmen einer vorwärts-blickenden geldpolitischen Strategie durch die amerikanische Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) und andere Zentralbanken. Damit könnten die inflationären Effekte der gegenwärtigen Liquiditätsinjektionen und der steigenden Preise für Warenfutures reduziert werden. Entscheidend ist auch, dass sich die Inflationsbekämpfung nicht an der Kerninflationsrate, sondern an der tatsächlichen Inflationsrate orientiert, da insbesondere die Preissteigerungen auf den Futuremärkten demnächst in die Kerninflationsrate durchschlagen werden.
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Market Indicators, Bank Fragility, and Indirect Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Economic Policy Review,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
A paper presented at the October 2003 conference “Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms“ cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School.
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