The Causal Impact of Gender Norms on Mothers’ Employment Attitudes and Expectations
Henning Hermes, Marina Krauß, Philipp Lergetporer, Frauke Peter, Simon Wiederhold
CESifo Working Papers,
No. 11572,
2024
Abstract
This field experiment investigates the causal impact of mothers’ perceptions of gender norms on their employment attitudes and labor-supply expectations. We provide mothers of young children in Germany with information about the prevailing gender norm regarding maternal employment in their city. At baseline, over 70% of mothers incorrectly perceive this gender norm as too conservative. Our randomized treatment improves the accuracy of these perceptions, significantly reducing the share of mothers who misperceive gender norms as overly conservative. The treatment also shifts mothers’ own labor-market attitudes towards being more liberal – and we show that specifically the shifted attitude is a strong predictor of mothers’ future labor-market participation. Consistently, treated mothers are significantly more likely to plan an increase in their working hours one year ahead.
Read article
Box 3.6.: Place-based industrial policies and credit markets: Evidence from the former East and West
Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter
EBRD Transition Report 2024-25,
December
2024
Abstract
The Transition Report 2024-25 focuses on industrial policies in the EBRD regions and beyond. Such policies have seen a resurgence, seeking to address market failures such as environmental degradation. However, their track record is mixed. Their growing popularity is shaped primarily by domestic political economy considerations and rising geopolitical tensions. While industrial policies are typically employed by higher-income economies, they are also now used more frequently in economies with less administrative and fiscal capacity to implement them.
Read article
The Distribution of National Income in Germany, 1992-2019
Stefan Bach, Charlotte Bartels, Theresa Neef
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2024
Abstract
This paper analyzes the distribution and composition of pre-tax national income in Germany since 1992, combining personal income tax returns, household survey data, and national accounts. Inequality rose from the 1990s to the late 2000s due to falling labor incomes among the bottom 50% and rising incomes in the top 10%. This trend reversed after 2007 as labor incomes across the bottom 90% increased. The top 1% income share, dominated by business income, remained relatively stable between 1992 and 2019. A large share of Germany’s top 1% earners are non-corporate business owners in labor-intensive professions. At least half of the business owners in P99-99.9 and a quarter in the top 0.1% operate firms in professional services – a pattern mirroring the United States. From 1992 to 2019, Germany’s top 0.1% income concentration exceeded France’s and matched U.S. levels until the late 2000s.
Read article
IWH-Flash-Indikator IV. Quartal 2024 und I. Quartal 2025
Katja Heinisch, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Birgit Schultz
IWH-Flash-Indikator,
No. 4,
2024
Abstract
Der deutsche Konjunkturmotor stottert weiter vor sich hin. Obwohl das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) im dritten Quartal 2024 um 0,2% zunahm, liegt es immer noch unter dem Niveau vom ersten Quartal 2024, da das zweite Quartal nach neuesten Zahlen weitaus schwächer ausgefallen ist als zuvor gemeldet (vgl. Abbildung 1). Der leichte Zuwachs im dritten Quartal dürfte dabei vor allem auf gestiegene staatliche und private Konsumausgaben zurückzuführen sein. In den Unternehmen ist die Stimmung weiterhin trüb und die wirtschaftspolitische Unsicherheit dürfte weiterhin hoch bleiben. Zudem belasten nach wie vor gestiegene Energie- und Lohnkosten die Investitionsbereitschaft der Unternehmen. Alles in allem dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) laut IWH-Flash-Indikator im vierten Quartal 2024 stagnieren. Für den Jahresbeginn 2025 deuten allerdings die Frühindikatoren auf eine Belebung der wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten und einen Anstieg des BIP um 0,4% hin. Diese reflektieren jedoch noch nicht die jüngsten politischen Ereignisse in den USA und in Deutschland.
Read article
Was weiß die deutsche Bevölkerung über Ungleichheiten im Zugang zu Kitas? Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Befragung
Johannes Baur, Henning Hermes, Philipp Lergetporer, Fabian Mierisch, Guido Schwerdt, Simon Wiederhold
ifo Schnelldienst,
No. 10,
2024
Abstract
Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund besuchen im Vergleich zu Kindern ohne Migrationshintergrund deutlich seltener Kindertagesstätten (Kitas), obwohl gerade sie von einem Kitabesuch besonders profitieren würden. Ist sich die Bevölkerung dieser Diskrepanz bewusst? Und wie steht sie zu verschiedenen politischen Maßnahmen, die dieses Problem angehen? Wir untersuchen, ob Informationen über Ungleichheiten und Diskriminierung in der frühkindlichen Betreuung die Zustimmung der Bevölkerung zu gleichheitsfördernden Politikmaßnahmen beeinflussen. Dafür befragen wir 4 800 repräsentativ ausgewählte Personen aus der deutschen Bevölkerung. Es zeigt sich, dass die Befragten oft erhebliche Fehleinschätzungen über das Ausmaß der Ungleichheiten und Diskriminierung beim Kitazugang zwischen Familien mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund haben. Zufällig bereitgestellte Informationen über das tatsächliche Ausmaß dieser Diskrepanzen verringern die politische Polarisierung, d.h. Unterschiede in der Zustimmung zu Unterstützungsmaßnahmen für Familien mit Migrationshintergrund. Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass verzerrte Wahrnehmungen sozialer Ungleichheiten zu Meinungsunterschieden in der Bevölkerung beitragen. Ein besserer Informationsstand in der Bevölkerung könnte diese Polarisierung in der Zustimmung zu gleichheitsfördernden Politikmaßnahmen beim Zugang zu Kitas verringern.
Read article
Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Herbst 2024: Deutsche Wirtschaft im Umbruch
Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Oliver Holtemöller, Stefan Kooths, Torsten Schmidt, Timo Wollmershäuser
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 10,
2024
Abstract
The German economy has stagnated for over two years, with a slow recovery anticipated in the coming quarters. However, growth is unlikely to reach pre-COVID-19 levels anytime soon. Decarbonisation, digitisation, demographic changes, and heightened competition from China are dampening growth prospects. GDP is projected to decline by 0.1 % in 2024, with increases of 0.8 % and 1.3 % in the subsequent years. Rising private consumption and improving foreign trade are expected to contribute positively to the economic upturn in Germany. Economic policy should prioritise reducing productivity barriers, facilitating structural changes, and lowering political uncertainty to support recovery.
Read article
26.09.2024 • 27/2024
Services stabilise the East German economy – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2024 and of Länder data from recent publications of the Statistical Offices
In 2024, the East German economy is expected to grow by 0.2%, while it will decline by 0.1% in Germany as a whole. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) is forecasting an East German growth rate of 0.7% in 2025, and a rate of 1.2% in 2026. According to the IWH forecast, the unemployment rate in eastern Germany is likely to be 7.5% in 2024 as well as 2025 and 7.2% in 2026.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read
26.09.2024 • 26/2024
Joint Economic Forecast 2/2024: German economy in transition ‒ weak momentum, low potential growth
The Joint Economic Forecast Project Group forecasts a 0.1% decline in Germany's gross domestic product in 2024. Looking further ahead, the institutes expect a weak recovery with growth of 0.8% (2025) and 1.3% (2026). Compared to the spring forecast, this represents a down-ward revision of 0.2 (2024) and 0.6 (2025) percentage points. “In addition to the economic downturn, the German economy is also being weighed down by structural change,” says Dr Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, head of Forecasting and Economic Policy at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). “Decarbonisation, digitalisation, and demographic change – alongside stronger competition with companies from China – have triggered structural adjustment processes that are dampening the long-term growth prospects of the German economy.”
Oliver Holtemöller
Read
05.09.2024 • 24/2024
Moderate economic growth in the world – German economy continues to stagnate
Production in Germany has been stagnating for two years and is roughly the same level as shortly before the outbreak of the pandemic. Investment of firms is particularly weak. An important reason for fewer investments is the sluggish export business. Private households are also holding back on consumption, mainly due to concerns about the longer-term economic outlook. According to the autumn forecast of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), gross domestic product in Germany is likely to stagnate in 2024 and to increase by 1.0% in 2025 as capacity utilisation normalises. In June, the IWH forecast had still assumed a growth of 0.3% in 2024 and of 1.5% in 2025. In East Germany, gross domestic product will increase by 0.3% this year and by 0.9% in 2025.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read
Moderate economic growth in the world – German economy continues to stagnate
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
The recent moderate pace of the global economy will continue for the time being. In Europe, the economy is likely to pick up slightly from the winter half-year 2024/2025. In Germany, the sluggish export business in particular is providing a lack of economic impetus. However, private consumption will contribute to a slight economic recovery in the winter half-year. Gross domestic product is likely to stagnate in 2024 and grow by 1.0% in 2025.
Read article