The Effect of Bank Failures on Small Business Loans and Income Inequality
Salvador Contreras, Amit Ghosh, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
January
2023
Abstract
Using variation in the timing and location of branches of failed banks we analyze its effect on income inequality. Employing a difference-in-differences specification we find that bank failures increased the GINI by 0.3 units (or 0.7%). We show that the rise in inequality is due to a decrease in the incomes of the poor that outpaces declines of the rest. We further show that individuals with lower levels of education exhibit a relatively greater decline in real wages and weekly hours worked. Exploring channels of transmission, we find income inequality is explained by a general decline in small business loans. This in turn reduces net new small business formation and their job creation capacity, a sector that hires a substantial share of low-income earners.
Read article
BigTech Credit, Small Business, and Monetary Policy Transmission: Theory and Evidence
Yiping Huang, Xiang Li, Han Qiu, Dan Su, Changhua Yu
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2022
Abstract
This paper provides both theoretical and empirical analyses of the differences between BigTech lenders and traditional banks in response to monetary policy changes. Our model integrates Knightian uncertainty into portfolio selection and posits that BigTech lenders possess a diminishing informational advantage with increasing firm size, resulting in reduced ambiguity when lending to smaller firms. The model suggests that the key distinction between BigTech lenders and traditional banks in response to shifts in funding costs, triggered by monetary policy changes, is more evident at the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin, particularly during periods of easing monetary policy. Using a micro-level dataset of small business loans from both types of lenders, we provide empirical support for our theoretical propositions. Our results show that BigTech lenders are more responsive in establishing new lending relationships in an easing monetary policy environment, while the differences in loan amounts are not statistically significant. We also discuss other loan terms and the implications of regulatory policies.
Read article
Bank Failures, Local Business Dynamics, and Government Policy
Salvador Contreras, Manthos D. Delis, Amit Ghosh, Iftekhar Hasan
Small Business Economics,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
Using MSA-level data over 1994–2014, we study the effect of bank failures on local business dynamics, in the form of net business formation and net job creation. We find that at least one bank failure in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) with the mean population prevents approximately 475 net businesses from forming in that area, compared with MSAs that experience no bank failures, ceteris paribus. The equivalent effect on net job creation is 16,433 net job losses. Our results are even stronger for small businesses, which are usually more dependent on bank-firm relationships. These effects point to significant welfare losses stemming from bank failures, highlighting an important role for government intervention. We show that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is effective in reducing the negative effects of bank failures on local business dynamics. This positive effect of TARP is quite uniform across small and large firms.
Read article
The Impact of Delay: Evidence from Formal Out-of-Court Restructuring
Randall K. Filer, Dejan Kovač, Jacob N. Shapiro, Stjepan Srhoj
Abstract
Bankruptcy restructuring procedures are used in most legal systems to decide the fate of businesses facing financial hardship. We study how bargaining failures in such procedures impact the economic performance of participating firms in the context of Croatia, which introduced a „pre-bankruptcy settlement“ (PBS) process in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007 - 2009. Local institutions left over from the communist era provide annual financial statements for both sides of more than 180,000 debtor-creditor pairs, enabling us to address selection into failed negotiations by matching a rich set of creditor and debtor characteristics. Failures to settle at the PBS stage due to idiosyncratic bargaining problems, which effectively delays entry into the standard bankruptcy procedure, leads to a lower rate of survival among debtors as well as reduced employment, revenue, and profits. We also track how bargaining failures diffuse through the network of creditors, finding a significant negative effect on small creditors, but not others. Our results highlight the impact of delay and the importance of structuring bankruptcy procedures to rapidly resolve uncertainty about firms‘ future prospects.
Read article
06.07.2021 • 18/2021
IWH Bankruptcy Update: June Data Incomplete – Small Forecasted Increase in Bankruptcies
Despite incomplete June data, the month-over-month increase in German corporate bankruptcies is projected to be small. Furthermore, the increase is largely attributable to the higher number of business days in June, according to the IWH Bankruptcy Report, which is published by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and provides a monthly update on German bankruptcy statistics.
Steffen Müller
Read
Sovereign Default Risk, Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Monetary-Fiscal Stabilisation
Markus Kirchner, Malte Rieth
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 22,
2020
Abstract
This paper examines the role of sovereign default beliefs for macroeconomic fluctuations and stabilisation policy in a small open economy where fiscal solvency is a critical problem. We set up and estimate a DSGE model on Turkish data and show that accounting for sovereign risk significantly improves the fit of the model through an endogenous amplication between default beliefs, exchange rate and inflation movements. We then use the estimated model to study the implications of sovereign risk for stability, fiscal and monetary policy, and their interaction. We find that a relatively strong fiscal feedback from deficits to taxes, some exchange rate targeting, or a monetary response to default premia are more effective and efficient stabilisation tools than hawkish inflation targeting.
Read article
The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
Read article
Transmitting Fiscal Covid-19 Counterstrikes Effectively: Mind the Banks!
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
The German government launched an unprecedented range of support programmes to mitigate the economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic for employees, self-employed, and firms. Fiscal transfers and guarantees amount to approximately €1.2 billion by now and are supplemented by similarly impressive measures taken at the European level. We argue in this note that the pandemic poses, however, also important challenges to financial stability in general and bank resilience in particular. A stable banking system is, in turn, crucial to ensure that support measures are transmitted to the real economy and that credit markets function seamlessly. Our analysis shows that banks are exposed rather differently to deteriorated business outlooks due to marked differences in their lending specialisation to different economic sectors. Moreover, a number of the banks that were hit hardest by bleak growth prospects of their borrowers were already relatively thinly capitalised at the outset of the pandemic. This coincidence can impair the ability and willingness of selected banks to continue lending to their mostly small and medium sized entrepreneurial customers. Therefore, ensuring financial stability is an important pre-requisite to also ensure the effectiveness of fiscal support measures. We estimate that contracting business prospects during the first quarter of 2020 could lead to an additional volume of non-performing loans (NPL) among the 40 most stressed banks ‒ mostly small, regional relationship lenders ‒ on the order of around €200 million. Given an initial stock of NPL of €650 million, this estimate thus suggests a potential level of NPL at year-end of €1.45 billion for this fairly small group of banks already. We further show that 17 regional banking markets are particularly exposed to an undesirable coincidence of starkly deteriorating borrower prospects and weakly capitalised local banks. Since these regions are home to around 6.8% of total employment in Germany, we argue that ensuring financial stability in the form of healthy bank balance sheets should be an important element of the policy strategy to contain the adverse real economic effects of the pandemic.
Read article
Banks’ Equity Performance and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
Elyas Elyasiani, Iftekhar Hasan, Elena Kalotychou, Panos K. Pouliasis, Sotiris Staikouras
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
No. 2,
2020
Abstract
Using an extensive global sample, this paper investigates the impact of the term structure of interest rates on bank equity returns. Decomposing the yield curve to its three constituents (level, slope and curvature), the paper evaluates the time-varying sensitivity of the bank’s equity returns to these constituents by using a diagonal dynamic conditional correlation multivariate GARCH framework. Evidence reveals that the empirical proxies for the three factors explain the variations in equity returns above and beyond the market-wide effect. More specifically, shocks to the long-term (level) and short-term (slope) factors have a statistically significant impact on equity returns, while those on the medium-term (curvature) factor are less clear-cut. Bank size plays an important role in the sense that exposures are higher for SIFIs and large banks compared to medium and small banks. Moreover, banks exhibit greater sensitivities to all risk factors during the crisis and postcrisis periods compared to the pre-crisis period; though these sensitivities do not differ for market-oriented and bank-oriented financial systems.
Read article
Stress Tests and Small Business Lending
Kristle R. Cortés, Yuliya Demyanyk, Lei Li, Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 1,
2020
Abstract
Post-crisis stress tests have altered banks’ credit supply to small business. Banks most affected by stress tests reallocate credit away from riskier markets and toward safer ones. They also raise interest rates on small loans. Quantities fall most in high-risk markets where stress-tested banks own no branches, and prices rise mainly where they do. The results suggest that banks price the stress-test induced increase in capital requirements where they have local knowledge, and exit where they do not. Stress tests do not, however, reduce aggregate credit. Small banks seem to increase their share in geographies formerly reliant on stress-tested lenders.
Read article
