Does the Technological Content of Government Demand Matter for Private R&D? Evidence from US States
Viktor Slavtchev, Simon Wiederhold
Abstract
Governments purchase everything from airplanes to zucchini. This paper investigates the role of the technological content of government procurement in innovation. We theoretically show that a shift in the composition of public purchases toward high-tech products translates into higher economy-wide returns to innovation, leading to an increase in the aggregate level of private research and development (R&D). Collecting unique panel data on federal procurement in US states, we find that reshuffling procurement toward high-tech industries has an economically and statistically significant positive effect on private R&D, even after extensively controlling for other R&D determinants. Instrumental-variable estimations support a causal interpretation of our findings.
Read article
Technological Intensity of Government Demand and Innovation
Viktor Slavtchev, Simon Wiederhold
Abstract
Governments purchase everything from airplanes to zucchini. This paper investigates whether the technological intensity of government demand affects corporate R&D activities. In a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth, we show that an increase in the share of government purchases in high-tech industries increases the rewards for innovation, and stimulates private-sector R&D at the aggregate level. We test this prediction using administrative data on federal procurement performed in US states. Both panel fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations provide results in line with the model. Our findings bring public procurement within the realm of the innovation policy debate.
Read article
Germany on the Way to Energy Efficiency in the Housing Sector: Subsidy Programs by the Federal Government and the Länder Level
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2011
Abstract
Als Ergänzung eines zunehmend rigider werdenden Ordnungsrechtes, welches die Mindestanforderungen festlegt, existiert auf der Ebene von Bund und Ländern ein breites Angebot von Förderprogrammen für die Sanierung energetisch relevanter Gebäudeteile. Der Bund fördert in diesem Zusammenhang energetisch hochwertige Sanierungsinvestitionen, welche über den Mindeststandard des Ordnungsrechtes hinausgehen. Während die Förderprogramme auf der Bundesebene – abgesehen von der Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Finanzierungsmodelle – für alle Investoren sowie für Gebäude, die älter als 15 Jahre sind, bundesweit die gleichen Rahmenbedingungen anlegen, zeigen die Bundesländer eine differenziertere Ausgestaltung ihrer Förderpolitik, die spezifische Faktoren der regionalen Wohnungsmärkte berücksichtigt. Eine Analyse der Wirkung dieser Förderlandschaft auf die regionale Sanierungsaktivität wird Thema weiterer Forschungen sein.
Read article
The Impact of Government Procurement Composition on Private R&D Activities
Viktor Slavtchev, Simon Wiederhold
Abstract
This paper addresses the question of whether government procurement can work as a de facto innovation policy tool. We develop an endogenous growth model with quality-improving in-novation that incorporates industries with heterogeneous innovation sizes. Government demand in high-tech industries increases the market size in these industries and, with it, the incentives for private firms to invest in R&D. At the economy-wide level, the additional R&D induced in high-tech industries outweighs the R&D foregone in all remaining industries. The implications of the model are empirically tested using a unique data set that includes federal procurement in U.S. states. We find evidence that a shift in the composition of government purchases toward high-tech industries indeed stimulates privately funded company R&D.
Read article
Exchange Rate Expectations and the Pricing of Chinese Cross-listed Stocks
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
I show that the price discounts of Chinese cross-listed stocks (American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and H-shares) to their underlying A-shares indicate the expected yuan/US dollar exchange rate. The forecasting models reveal that ADR and H-share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates, particularly at long forecast horizons. Using panel estimations, I find that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect, the risk of competitive devaluations, relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, and the risk of currency crisis.
Read article
Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
Read article
What Happened to the East German Housing Market? – A Historical Perspective on the Role of Public Funding –
Claus Michelsen, Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 20,
2009
Abstract
The paper analyses the development of the East German housing market after the reunification of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. We analyse the dynamics of the East German housing market within the framework of the well-known stock-flow model, proposed by DiPasquale and Wheaton. We show that the today observable disequilibrium to a large extend is caused by post-unification housing policy and its strong fiscal incentives to invest into the housing stock. Moreover, in line with the stylized empirical facts, we show that ‘hidden reserves’ of the housing market were reactivated since the economy of East Germany became market organized. Since initial undersupply was overcome faster than politicians expected, the implemented fiscal stimuli were too strong. In contrast to the widespread opinion that outward migration caused the observable vacancies, this paper shows that not weakness of demand but supply side policies caused the observable disequilibrium.
Read article
