When Arm’s Length is too Far: Relationship Banking over the Credit Cycle
Thorsten Beck, Hans Degryse, Ralph De Haas, Neeltje van Horen
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
We conduct face-to-face interviews with bank CEOs to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders. We then use the geographic coordinates of these banks’ branches and of 14,100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle. We find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom, it alleviates such constraints during a downturn. This positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn. Moreover, our evidence suggests that relationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans.
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The Effects of Fiscal Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model – The Case of the German Stimulus Packages During the Great Recession
Andrej Drygalla, Oliver Holtemöller, Konstantin Kiesel
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the effects of the stimulus packages adopted by the German government during the Great Recession. We employ a standard medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model extended by non-optimising households and a detailed fiscal sector. In particular, the dynamics of spending and revenue variables are modeled as feedback rules with respect to the cyclical component of output. Based on the estimated rules, fiscal shocks are identified. According to the results, fiscal policy, in particular public consumption, investment, transfers and changes in labour tax rates including social security contributions prevented a sharper and prolonged decline of German output at the beginning of the Great Recession, suggesting a timely response of fiscal policy. The overall effects, however, are small when compared to other domestic and international shocks that contributed to the economic downturn. Our overall findings are not sensitive to the allowance of fiscal foresight.
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Explaining Wage Losses after Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Rents
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Abstract
Why does job displacement, e.g., following import competition, technological change, or economic downturns, result in permanent wage losses? The job displacement literature is silent on whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We therefore estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums. Premiums are measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects approach, as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Using German administrative data, we find that wage losses are, on average, fully explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses in wages and premiums are minor for workers displaced from small plants and strongly increase with pre-displacement firm size, which provides an explanation for the large and persistent wage losses that have been found in previous studies mostly focusing on displacement from large employers.
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How Effective is Macroprudential Policy during Financial Downturns? Evidence from Caps on Banks' Leverage
Manuel Buchholz
Working Papers of Eesti Pank,
No. 7,
2015
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of a macroprudential policy instrument, caps on banks' leverage, on domestic credit to the private sector since the Global Financial Crisis. Applying a difference-in-differences approach to a panel of 69 advanced and emerging economies over 2002–2014, we show that real credit grew after the crisis at considerably higher rates in countries which had implemented the leverage cap prior to the crisis. This stabilising effect is more pronounced for countries in which banks had a higher pre-crisis capital ratio, which suggests that after the crisis, banks were able to draw on buffers built up prior to the crisis due to the regulation. The results are robust to different choices of subsamples as well as to competing explanations such as standard adjustment to the pre-crisis credit boom.
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Financial Factors in Macroeconometric Models
Sebastian Giesen
Volkswirtschaft, Ökonomie, Shaker Verlag GmbH, Aachen,
2013
Abstract
The important role of credit has long been identified as a key factor for economic development (see e.g. Wicksell (1898), Keynes (1931), Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1957, 1964)). Even before the financial crisis most researchers and policy makers agreed that financial frictions play an important role for business cycles and that financial turmoils can result in severe economic downturns (see e.g. Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1981, 1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). However, in practice researchers and policy makers mostly used simplified models for forecasting and simulation purposes. They often neglected the impact of financial frictions and emphasized other non financial market frictions when analyzing business cycle fluctuations (prominent exceptions include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). This has been due to the fact that most economic downturns did not seem to be closely related to financial market failures (see Eichenbaum (2011)). The outbreak of the subprime crises ― which caused panic in financial markets and led to the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 ― then led to a reconsideration of such macroeconomic frameworks (see Caballero (2010) and Trichet (2011)). To address the economic debate from a new perspective, it is therefore necessary to integrate the relevant frictions which help to explain what we have experienced during recent years.
In this thesis, I analyze different ways to incorporate relevant frictions and financial variables in macroeconometric models. I discuss the potential consequences for standard statistical inference and macroeconomic policy. I cover three different aspects in this work. Each aspect presents an idea in a self-contained unit. The following paragraphs present more detail on the main topics covered.
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The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster's Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Kredit und Kapital,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany. This recession is very different from previous recessions in particular regarding their causes and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts withthe best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts in the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is small.
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The Financial Crisis from a Forecaster’s Perspective
Katja Drechsel, Rolf Scheufele
Abstract
This paper analyses the recession in 2008/2009 in Germany, which is very different from previous recessions, in particular regarding its cause and magnitude. We show to what extent forecasters and forecasts based on leading indicators fail to detect the timing and the magnitude of the recession. This study shows that large forecast errors for both expert forecasts and forecasts based on leading indicators resulted during this recession which implies that the recession was very difficult to forecast. However, some leading indicators (survey data, risk spreads, stock prices) have indicated an economic downturn and hence, beat univariate time series models. Although the combination of individual forecasts provides an improvement compared to the benchmark model, the combined forecasts are worse than several individual models. A comparison of expert forecasts with the best forecasts based on leading indicators shows only minor deviations. Overall, the range for an improvement of expert forecasts during the crisis compared to indicator forecasts is relatively small.
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The global downturn and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness
Filippo di Mauro, Katrin Forster, Ana Lima
ECB Occasional Paper Series,
No. 119,
2010
Abstract
World trade contracted sharply in late 2008 and early 2009 following the deepening of the financial crisis in September 2008. This paper discusses the main mechanisms behind the global downturn in trade and its impact on euro area exports and competitiveness. It finds that the euro area was hit particularly hard by the contraction in global demand.
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Characteristics of Business Cycles: Have they Changed?
Oliver Holtemöller, J. Rahn, M. H. Stierle
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
The most recent economic downturn has shown that economic activity nowadays is still prone to large fluctuations. Despite a long tradition of research, the understanding of such fluctuations, namely business cycles, is still far from comprehensive. Moreover, in a developing world with new technologies, faster communication systems, a higher integration of world markets and increasingly better-skilled people the nature of business cycles changes continuously and new insights can be drawn from recent experience.
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Recent Developments and Risks in the Euro Area Banking Sector
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2002
Abstract
This article provides an overview of euro area banks’ exposure to risk and examines the effects of the cyclical downturn in 2001. It describes the extent to which euro area banks’ risk profile has changed as a result of recent structural developments, such as an increase in investment banking, mergers, securitisation and more sophisticated risk management techniques. The article stresses that the environment in which banks operated in 2001 was fairly complex due to the relatively weak economic performance of all major economies as well as the events of 11 September in the United States. It evaluates the effects of these adverse circumstances on banks’ stability and overall performance. The article provides bank balance sheet information as well as financial market prices, arguing that the latter may be useful when assessing the soundness of the banking sector in a forward-looking manner. It concludes with a review of the overall stability of euro area banks, pointing to robustness in the face of the adverse developments in 2001 and the somewhat improved forward-looking indicators of banks’ financial strength in early 2002.
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