International Side-payments to Improve Global Public Good Provision when Transfers are Refinanced through a Tax on Local and Global Externalities
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, A. Markandya, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke
International Economic Journal,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
This paper discusses a tax-transfer scheme that aims to address the under-provision problem associated with the private supply of international public goods and to bring about Pareto optimal allocations internationally. In particular, we consider the example of the global public good ‘climate stabilization’, both in an analytical and a numerical simulation model. The proposed scheme levies Pigouvian taxes globally, while international side-payments are employed in order to provide incentives to individual countries for not taking a free-ride from the international Pigouvian tax scheme. The side-payments, in turn, are financed via environmental taxes. As a distinctive feature, we take into account ancillary benefits that may be associated with local public characteristics of climate policy. We determine the positive impact that ancillary effects may exert on the scope for financing side-payments via environmental taxation. A particular attractive feature of ancillary benefits is that they arise shortly after the implementation of climate policies and therefore yield an almost immediate payback of investments in abatement efforts. Especially in times of high public debt levels, long periods of amortization would tend to reduce political support for investments in climate policy.
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Financial Constraints and Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-level Evidence
Claudia M. Buch, I. Kesternich, A. Lipponer, Monika Schnitzer
Review of World Economics,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
Low productivity is an important barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their impact on the FDI decision. Theoretically, we show that financial constraints can affect highly productive firms more than firms with low productivity because the former are more likely to expand abroad. We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German domestic and multinational firms which contains information on parent-level financial constraints as well as on the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms’ foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by firms most likely to consider investing abroad. The locational information in our dataset allows exploiting cross-country differences in contract enforcement. Consistent with theory, we find that poor contract enforcement in the host country has a negative impact on FDI decisions.
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Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, E. Sheshinski
Economica,
2010
Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
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Organization and Financing of Innovation, and the Choice between Corporate and Independent Venture Capital
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 6,
2009
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of competition on the optimal organization and financing structures in innovation-intensive industries. We show that as an optimal response to competition, firms may choose external organization structures established in collaboration with specialized start-ups where they provide start-up financing from their own resources. As the intensity of the competition to innovate increases, firms move from internal to external organization of projects to increase the speed of product innovation and to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to rival firms in their industry. We also show that as the level of competition increases, firms provide a higher level of financing for externally organized projects in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Our results help explain the emergence of organization and financing arrangements such as CVC and strategic alliances, where large established firms organize their projects in collaboration with external specialized firms and provide financing for externally organized projects from their own internal resources.
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Financial constraints and the margins of FDI
Claudia M. Buch
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 29/2009,
2009
Abstract
Recent literature on multinational firms has stressed the importance of low productivity as a barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their impact on the FDI decision (the extensive margin) and foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German multinationals which contains information on parent-level and affiliate-level financial constraints as well as about the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms’ foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by large firms. Financial constraints at the parent level matter for the extensive, but less
so for the intensive margin. For the intensive margin, financial constraints at the affiliate level are relatively more important.
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Can Art Finance itself?
Sören Eisenbeiß, Niels Krap, Tobias Glufke
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
Kann sich Kultur selbst finanzieren? Nach den starken Einsparungen der Jahre 2003 und davor ist seit drei Jahren zwar wieder eine Tendenz der Ausgabenerhöhung des Bundes festzustellen (für 2008 ist auf Bundesebene ein Mehrbetrag von 1,3% für Kultur und Medien, das bedeutet Gesamtausgaben von 1,1 Mrd. Euro, geplant), dennoch muß oder sollte die Frage der Wirtschaftlichkeit von Kultur gestellt werden. Denn ebenso wie die Ausgaben des Bundes steigen die Kosten der kulturellen Einrichtungen beispielsweise durch Mehrwertsteuererhöhung oder gestiegene Energiepreise. Wenn sich aber Kultur nicht durch die Beiträge der direkten Konsumenten finanzieren kann, ist zu prüfen, ob und in welchem Maß der Staat diese subventionieren sollte. Das IWH untersuchte im Frühjahr 2007 an den Spielhäusern „neues theater Halle“ und „Anhaltisches Theater Dessau“ durch Besucherbefragungen, inwiefern diese ihre Einnahmen erhöhen und somit ihren Subventionsbedarf kürzen können. Es konnte festgestellt werden, daß die Nachfrage der Besucher eher schwach auf moderate Preiserhöhungen reagiert. Dies hat zur Folge, daß die Theater tatsächlich durch angemessene Preissteigerungen ihre eigenen Einnahmen erhöhen können, welche allerdings nicht ausreichen, um die fiskalische Förderung wegfallen zu lassen. Für eine weitere Unterstützung spricht zumindest, daß sie nicht nur direkten Nutzen für die Theatergänger, sondern darüber hinausgehende positive externe Effekte erzielen.
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Current trends – Less external financing of East German manufacturing enterprises
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
1995
Abstract
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