On the Economic Architecture of the Workplace: Repercussions of Social Comparisons among Heterogeneous Workers
Oded Stark, Walter Hyll
Journal of Labor Economics,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
We analyze the impact on a firm’s profits and optimal wage rates, and on the distribution of workers’ earnings, when workers compare their earnings with those of co-workers. We consider a low-productivity worker who receives lower wage earnings than a high-productivity worker. When the low-productivity worker derives (dis)utility not only from his own effort but also from comparing his earnings with those of the high-productivity worker, his response to the sensing of relative deprivation is to increase the optimal level of effort. Consequently, the firm’s profits are higher, its wage rates remain unchanged, and the distribution of earnings is compressed.
Read article
Is Rated Debt Arm's Length? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
Reint E. Gropp, C. Hirsch, Jan Pieter Krahnen
CFS Working Papers, No. 2011/10,
No. 10,
2011
Abstract
In this paper we challenge the view that corporate bonds are always arm's length debt. We analyze the effect of bond ratings on the stock price return to acquirers in M&A transactions, which tend to have significant effects on creditor wealth. We find acquirers abnormal returns to be higher if they are unrated, controlling for a wide variety of other effects identified in the literature. Tracing the difference in returns to distinct managerial decisions, we find that, everything else constant, rated firms increase their leverage in takeover transactions by less than their unrated counterparts. Consistent with a significant role for rating agencies, we find monitoring effects to be strongest when acquirer bonds are rated at the borderline between investment grade and junk. Finally, we are able to empirically exclude a large number of alternative explanations for the empirical regularities that we uncover.
Read article
The Political Setting of Social Security Contributions in Europe in the Business Cycle
Toralf Pusch, Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
Social security revenues are influenced by business cycle movements. In order to
support the working of automatic stabilizers it would be necessary to calculate social insurance contribution rates independently from the state of the business cycle. This paper investigates whether European countries set social contribution rates according to such a rule. By means of VAR estimations, country-specific effects can be analyzed – in contrast to earlier studies which used a panel design. As a result, some countries under investigation seem to vary their social contribution rates in a procyclical way.
Read article
Exchange Rate Expectations and the Pricing of Chinese Cross-listed Stocks
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
I show that the price discounts of Chinese cross-listed stocks (American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and H-shares) to their underlying A-shares indicate the expected yuan/US dollar exchange rate. The forecasting models reveal that ADR and H-share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates, particularly at long forecast horizons. Using panel estimations, I find that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect, the risk of competitive devaluations, relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, and the risk of currency crisis.
Read article
Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
Read article
Interest Rate Convergence in the Euro-Candidate Countries: Volatility Dynamics of Sovereign Bond Yields
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade,
2010
Abstract
We argue that a “static“ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond yields is not conducive to assessing stability of financial systems in euro-candidate countries. Instead, we advocate a dynamic approach to assessing interest rate convergence to a common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. Accordingly, we empirically test volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields during the January 2, 2001-January 22, 2009, sample period. Our results show a varied degree of the relationship between domestic and eurozone sovereign bond yields, the most pronounced for the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. We find some divergence of relative bond yields since the EU accession.
Read article
Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects
Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel
Industrial Relations,
No. 4,
2010
Abstract
Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.
Read article
