Entrenchment through Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from CEO Network Centrality
Salim Chahine, Yiwei Fang, Iftekhar Hasan, Mohamad Mazboudi
International Review of Financial Analysis,
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates whether CEOs with high network centrality entrench themselves when taking CSR decisions and how that affects firm value. Evidence portrays that CSR in firms with more central CEOs is negatively associated with firm-value, and this association is mitigated by better corporate governance mechanisms and by geographic areas of higher social capital. This negative association is lower during disasters which reflect periods of positive exogenous shocks to the societal demand for CSR. Furthermore, CSR by more central CEOs is positively associated with future increases in CEO compensation and future improvement in a CEO's network position. The findings reveal that, in general, central CEOs use CSR to entrench themselves and gain private benefits rather than increase shareholder value.
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Wage Delegation in the Field
Sabrina Jeworrek, Vanessa Mertins
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
No. 4,
2019
Abstract
By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.
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CEO Investment of Deferred Compensation Plans and Firm Performance
Domenico Rocco Cambrea, Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Giulia Fantini
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,
No. 7,
2019
Abstract
We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.
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Benchmark on Themselves: CEO-directors’ Influence on the CEO Compensation
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Managerial Finance,
No. 7,
2019
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms.
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Bonusbeschränkung bei Banken: Das Ziel der Risikoverringerung wird nicht erreicht
Konstantin Wagner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Im Jahr 2014 trat die Regulierung zur Deckelung der variablen Vergütung von Bankvorständen in der Europäischen Union (EU) in Kraft. Ziel dieser Regulierung ist es, die Anreize zur übermäßigen Risikoübernahme zu vermindern. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob die Regulierung ihr erklärtes Ziel erreichen konnte und ob sie zudem mit unbeabsichtigten Konsequenzen einherging. Der Vergleich der Vergütungsniveaus vor und nach Einführung der Deckelung zeigt: Banken haben ihre Vorstände für den Verlust variabler Vergütung mit einer permanenten Erhöhung fixer Vergütungsbestandteile entschädigt. Gleichzeitig nahm die risikogewichtete Rentabilität betroffener Institute ab, was auf ein höheres Eigenrisiko zurückzuführen ist. Abgesichert durch hohe Fixgehälter gehen Banker offenbar höhere Risiken ein. Der befürchtete Exodus talentierter Banker aus Europa blieb aus.
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Motivating High‐impact Innovation: Evidence from Managerial Compensation Contracts
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Zenu Sharma, Maya Waisman
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
No. 3,
2019
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.
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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Abstract
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous results indicate an increase of risk, even in its systemic dimension according to selected measures. The return component of bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated with raised the increase in fixed compensation of executives. The ability of the policy to enhance financial stability is therefore doubtful.
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State Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements: Regulations that Stifle Productivity!
S. Anand, Iftekhar Hasan, P. Sharma, Haizhi Wang
Human Resource Management,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
Noncompete agreements (also known as covenants not to compete [CNCs]) are frequently used by many businesses in an attempt to maintain their competitive advantage by safeguarding their human capital and the associated business secrets. Although the choice of whether to include CNCs in employment contracts is made by firms, the real extent of their restrictiveness is determined by the state laws. In this article, we explore the effect of state‐level CNC enforceability on firm productivity. We assert that an increase in state level CNC enforceability is detrimental to firm productivity, and this relationship becomes stronger as comparable job opportunities become more concentrated in a firm's home state. On the other hand, this negative relationship is weakened as employee compensation tends to become more long‐term oriented. Results based on hierarchical linear modeling analysis of 21,134 firm‐year observations for 3,027 unique firms supported all three hypotheses.
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R&D Collaborations and the Role of Proximity
Philipp Marek, Mirko Titze, Clemens Fuhrmeister,
Regional Studies,
No. 12,
2017
Abstract
R&D collaborations and the role of proximity. Regional Studies. This paper explores the impact of proximity measures on knowledge exchange measured by granted research and development (R&D) collaboration projects in German NUTS-3 regions. The results are obtained from a spatial interaction model including eigenvector spatial filters. Not only geographical but also other forms of proximity (technological, organizational and institutional) have a significant influence on the emergence of collaborations. Furthermore, the results suggest interdependences between proximity measures. Nevertheless, the analysis does not show that other forms of proximity may compensate for missing geographical proximity. The results indicate that (subsidized) collaborative innovation activities tend to cluster.
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