Do Federal Reserve Bank Presidents’ Interest Rate Votes in the FOMC Follow an Electoral Cycle?
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Applied Economics Letters,
No. 9,
2016
Abstract
We find that Federal Reserve Bank presidents’ regional bias in their dissenting interest rate votes in the Federal Open Market Committee follows an electoral cycle. Presidents put more weight on their district’s economic environment during the year prior to their (re-)election relative to nonelection years.
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A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector
Sanja Jakovljević, Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Annual Review of Financial Economics,
2015
Abstract
We review existing empirical research on the design and impact of regulation in the banking sector. The impact of each individual piece of regulation may inexorably depend on the set of regulations already in place, the characteristics of the banks involved (from their size or ownership structure to operational idiosyncrasies in terms of capitalization levels or risk-taking behavior), and the institutional development of the country where the regulation is introduced. This complexity is challenging for the econometrician, who relies either on single-country data to identify challenges for regulation or on cross-country data to assess the overall effects of regulation. It is also troubling for the policy maker, who has to optimally design regulation to avoid any unintended consequences, especially those that vary over the credit cycle such as the currently developing macroprudential frameworks.
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Electoral Credit Supply Cycles Among German Savings Banks
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
IWH Online,
No. 11,
2015
Abstract
In this note we document political lending cycles for German savings banks. We find that savings banks on average increase supply of commercial loans by €7.6 million in the year of a local election in their respective county or municipality (Kommunalwahl). For all savings banks combined this amounts to €3.4 billion (0.4% of total credit supply in Germany in a complete electoral cycle) more credit in election years. Credit growth at savings banks increases by 0.7 percentage points, which corresponds to a 40% increase relative to non-election years. Consistent with this result, we also find that the performance of the savings banks follows the same electoral cycle. The loans that the savings banks generate during election years perform worse in the first three years of maturity and loan losses tend to be realized in the middle of the election cycle.
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Drivers of the Spatial Emergence and Clustering of the Photovoltaic Industry in Germany
M. Breul, T. Broekel, Matthias Brachert
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie,
No. 3,
2015
Abstract
The drivers of the spatial emergence and clustering of the photovoltaic industry in Germany. Following the relatedness literature, we explore to what extent related industries influenced the regional emergence of the photovoltaic (PV) industry. In addition, we shed light on factors explaining selective processes of clustering. We particularly argue that generic resources and resources of related activities have been crucial for the regional concentration in early phases of the industry life cycle. With increasing maturity, industry-specific resources became more important. Based on a unique dataset containing population dynamics of the German PV industry, the hypotheses are tested empirically. Our results partially confirm the assumed beneficial effects of related industries for the emergence of the PV industry. Moreover, we observe changes in the relative importance of factors supporting regional concentration, with industry-specific resources becoming dominant as the industry matures.
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Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
s1
2014
Abstract
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
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Do Government Owned Banks Trade Market Power for Slack?
Andreas Hackethal, Michael Koetter, Oliver Vins
Applied Economics,
No. 33,
2012
Abstract
The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.
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Business Volatility, Job Destruction, and Unemployment
Steven J. Davis, R. Jason Faberman, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, Javier Miranda
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
No. 2,
2010
Abstract
Unemployment inflows fell from 4 percent of employment per month in the early 1980s to 2 percent by the mid 1990s. Using low frequency movements in industry-level data, we estimate that a 1 percentage point drop in the quarterly job destruction rate lowers the monthly unemployment inflow rate by 0.28 points. By our estimates, declines in job destruction intensity account for 28 (55) percent of the fall in unemployment inflows from 1982 (1990) to 2005. Slower job destruction accounts for similar fractions of long-term declines in the rate of unemployment.
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Bank Credit Standards, Demand, Pro-cyclicality and the Business Cycle: A Comment
Á. Maddaloni, J. L. Peydró Alcalde, J. Suárez, Reint E. Gropp
Moneda y crédito,
No. 230,
2010
Abstract
We analyze the determinants fo standards and demand for loans to firms and house-holds over the last business cycle using the comprehensive and confidential Bank Lending Survery from the Euro area. There is significant variation of standards and demand over the cycle. Standards for business loans vary more during the business cycle than the lending standards for households, whereas credit demand from households varies more than demand from firms. Lending standards vary mainly due to charges in perception of borrower risk, bank balance sheet positions and competitive pressures. In particular, we find that higher GDP growth softens lending standards for all loans, i. e. lending standards are pro-cyclical. However, we also find pro-cyclicality in credit demand.
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Race to the Market: Can Standards Survive the Acceleration of Innovation and Product Life Cycles?
Ulrich Blum
Spatial Dispersed Production and Network Governance, Papers Presented at the 11th Uddevalla Symposium, 15 – 17. May 2008, Kyoto, Research Report 2008,
2008
Abstract
Plagiate aus Schwellenländern haben in den vergangenen Jahren sehr stark die Diskussion über den Schutz intellektueller Eigentumsrechte dominiert. Das vernachlässigt die historische Tatsache, dass fast alle Länder, die aufschließen wollten, zunächst Technologien kopiert haben. Diese Diskussion überschattet auch die weit wichtigere Frage, ob die ständige Zunahme der Wettbewerbsintensität, welche die Produktlebenszyklen verringert und Druck auf Inventions- und Innovationssysteme ausübt, genügend Zeit zum Patentieren und Standardisieren lässt. Das Patentsystem setzt nicht nur Anreize für versunkene Kosten in Forschung und Entwicklung, sondern stellt auch einen ersten Schritt zur Verbreitung von Technologien durch die Patentschrift dar. Dieser Zusammenhang kann vor allem mit Blick auf den Aufbau von Standards (insbesondere Normen) für Wettbewerbsplattformen in aufnahmefähigen und verlässlichen Märkten langfristig kritische Wirkungen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung haben. Darüber hinaus führt das Migrieren von Technologien, als Folge der beständigen Neuordnung der räumlichen Arbeitsteilung, zu der nachteiligen Situation, dass Länder, die nunmehr Technologien beheimaten, nicht die erforderlichen Institutionen der Wissenskodifizierung besitzen.
Exogene Faktoren, die, zumindest nicht kurzfristig, durch den Standardisierungsprozess beeinflusst werden können, betreffen das Niveau der Kooperation zwischen interessierten Gruppen (und das wechselseitige Vertrauen und die institutionellen Verbindungen), die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Technologie, die Fähigkeit Externalitäten durch die Wissenskodifizierung zu erzeugen und die Produktivität der Technologie selbst. Der wichtigste einzelne Erfolgsfaktor, den die Standardisierungseinrichtungen selbst beeinflussen können, ist die Geschwindigkeit, mit der ein Normungskomitee voranschreitet und rechtzeitig die Norm festlegen kann. Im Kontext eines spieltheoretischen Modells und auf der Basis von Daten über veröffentlichte Normen von 1997 bis 2007 kann gezeigt werden, dass diese Herausforderung von den Normungsorganisationen bisher erfolgreich gemeistert wurde.
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The Great Risk Shift? Income Volatility in an International Perspective
Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 2465,
2008
Abstract
Weakening bargaining power of unions and the increasing integration of the world economy may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This paper documents and explains changes in income volatility. Using a theoretical framework which builds distribution risk into a real business cycle model, hypotheses on the determinants of the relative volatility of capital and labor are derived. The model is tested using industry-level data. The data cover 11 industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, and a maximum of 35 years. The paper has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor and capital incomes has declined, reflecting the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the idiosyncratic component of income volatility has hardly changed over time. Third, crosssectional heterogeneity in the evolution of relative income volatilities is substantial. If anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile in relative terms. Fourth, income volatility is related to variables measuring the bargaining power of workers. Trade openness has no significant impact.
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