IWH at 2020 ASSA Annual Meeting in San Diego
IWH at 2020 ASSA Annual Meeting in San Diego Next year’s 2020 ASSA Annual Meeting , organised by the American Economic Association (AEA) on an annual basis, is going to take place…
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East Germany
The Nasty Gap 30 years after unification: Why East Germany is still 20% poorer than the West Dossier In a nutshell The East German economic convergence process is hardly…
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Productivity
Productivity: More with Less by Better Available resources are scarce. To sustain our society's income and living standards in a world with ecological and demographic change, we…
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Research Clusters
Three Research Clusters Research Cluster "Economic Dynamics and Stability" Research Questions This cluster focuses on empirical analyses of macroeconomic dynamics and stability.…
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Projects
Our Projects 07.2022 ‐ 12.2026 Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme On behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection, the IWH and the RWI…
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Do Household Wealth Shocks Affect Productivity? Evidence From Innovative Workers During the Great Recession
Shai B. Bernstein, Richard R. Townsend, Timothy McQuade
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
We investigate how the deterioration of household balance sheets affects worker productivity, and in turn economic downturns. Specifically, we compare the output of innovative workers who experienced differential declines in housing wealth during the financial crisis but were employed at the same firm and lived in the same metropolitan area. We find that, following a negative wealth shock, innovative workers become less productive and generate lower economic value for their firms. The reduction in innovative output is not driven by workers switching to less innovative firms or positions. These effects are more pronounced among workers at greater risk of financial distress.
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Capital Misallocation and Innovation
Christian Schmidt, Yannik Schneider, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
SSRN Solutions Research Paper Series,
2020
Abstract
This paper documents that "zombie" lending by undercapitalized banks distorts competition and impedes corporate innovation. This misallocation of capital prevents both the exit of zombie and entry of healthy firms in affected industries adversely impacting output and competition. Worse, capital misallocation depresses patent applications, particularly in high technology- and R&D-intensive sectors, and industries with neck- and-neck competition. We strengthen our results using an IV approach to address reverse causality and innovation survey data from the European Commission. Overall, our results are consistent with externalities imposed on healthy firms through the misallocation of capital.
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Promoting Higher Productivity in China — Does Innovation Expenditure Really Matter?
Hoang Minh Duy, Filippo di Mauro, Jo Van Biesebroeck
Singapore Economic Review,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
The slowing down of the global economy adds additional challenges to China? economic policies as the country orchestrates its transition to lower resource dependency and higher technology intensity of output. Are policies aimed at technologically advanced sectors the right answer? Drawing from a newly created dataset of firms? balance sheets over the period 1998?2013, matched with patents data until 2009, we uncover that expenditure in innovation had limited effect on boosting productivity, without generating a clear gain in overall productivity for the high-tech sector. As a matter of fact, there is a much higher dispersion in productivity outcomes in firms belonging to the low-technology sectors, which derives from a bunch of champions in those sectors scoring higher productivity dynamics than in the High-technology sectors. The paper finds those barriers to entry and in general, market power of incumbents in the high-tech generate less than optimal resource reallocation, which hampers the overall productivity. Policies should presumably aim at removing such obstacles rather than solely promote innovation expenditure.
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Motivating High‐impact Innovation: Evidence from Managerial Compensation Contracts
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Zenu Sharma, Maya Waisman
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
No. 3,
2019
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.
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Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, Nicholas Bloom, William R. Kerr
American Economic Review,
No. 11,
2018
Abstract
We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth, and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A new and central economic force is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using US Census microdata on firm-level output, R&D, and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output, and R&D. Taxing the continued operation of incumbents can lead to sizable gains (of the order of 1.4 percent improvement in welfare) by encouraging exit of less productive firms and freeing up skilled labor to be used for R&D by high-type incumbents. Subsidies to the R&D of incumbents do not achieve this objective because they encourage the survival and expansion of low-type firms.
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