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Media Response Archive 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 December 2021 IWH: Ausblick auf Wirtschaftsjahr 2022 in Sachsen mit Bezug auf IWH-Prognose zu Ostdeutschland: "Warum Sachsens…

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Anniversary 2017

Anniversary 2017 25 years IWH. Highlights and turning points. A quarter of a century ago, our employees started to work for IWH. What has happened from then until now? Content 25…

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Exit Expectations and Debt Crises in Currency Unions

Alexander Kriwoluzky, G. J. Müller, M. Wolf
IWH Discussion Papers, No. 18, 2015
Abstract
Membership in a currency union is not irreversible. Exit expectations may emerge during sovereign debt crises, because exit allows countries to reduce their liabilities through a currency redenomination. As market participants anticipate this possibility, sovereign debt crises intensify. We establish this formally within a small open economy model of changing policy regimes. The model permits explosive dynamics of debt and sovereign yields inside currency unions and allows us to distinguish between exit expectations and those of an outright default. By estimating the model on Greek data, we quantify the contribution of exit expectations to the crisis dynamics during 2009 to 2012.
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Interest Benefits from the Debt Crisis to the German Budget: Updated Calculations

IWH Online, No. 8, 2015
Abstract
In a recent IWH online note, the IWH suggested that due to “flight to safety” effects, Germany was able to issue government debt at lower rates than otherwise would have been possible. The total savings was calculated to be around Euro 100 billion or about 3 percent of German GDP. This note provides further evidence on the interest savings to the German budget that extend the calculations in two dimensions. Using this refined methodology, we obtain interest savings to the German budget of just under Euro 90 billion.
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10.08.2015 • 30/2015

Germany Benefited Substantially from the Greek Crisis

The balanced budget in Germany is largely the result of lower interest payments due to the European debt crisis. Research from the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association shows that the debt crisis resulted in a reduction in German bund rates of about 300 basis points (BP), yielding interest savings of more than EUR 100 billion (or more than 3% of gross domestic product, GDP) during the period 2010 to 2015. A significant part of this reduction is directly attributable to the Greek crisis. When discussing the costs to the German tax payer of saving Greece, these benefits should not be overlooked, as they tend to be larger than the expenses, even in a scenario where Greece does not repay any of its debts.

Reint E. Gropp
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Germany’s Benefit from the Greek Crisis

IWH Online, No. 7, 2015
Abstract
This note shows that the German public sector balance benefited significantly from the European/Greek debt crisis, because of lower interest payments on public sector debt. This is due to two effects: One, in crisis times investors disproportionately seek out safe investments (“flight to safety“), bidding down the returns on safe-haven assets. We show that German bunds strongly benefited from this effect during the Greek debt crisis. Second, while the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy stance was quite close to an “optimal“ monetary policy stance for Germany from 1999 to 2007, during the crisis monetary policy was too accommodating from a German perspective, due to the emerging disparities across the Euro area. As a result of these two effects, our calculations suggest that the German sovereign saved more than 100 billion Euros in interest expenses between 2010 and mid-2015. That is, Germany benefited from the Greek crisis even in case that Greece defaults on all its debt (a total of 90 billions) owed to the German government via diverse channels (European Stability Mechanism [ESM], International Monetary Fund [IMF], or directly).
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EFN Report Summer 2015: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2015 and 2016

EFN Reports, No. 3, 2015
Abstract
External conditions for the euro area economy are still favourable, albeit somewhat less so than at the beginning of the year. Oil prices are by more than a third lower than they were on average in 2014, but about 10 USD higher than in January. Long term interest rates are still very low, but by half a percentage point higher than in January. Worldwide growth in production and trade has disappointed in the first quarter of 2015, and recent leading indicators point to no more than a slightly faster expansion of world production for the rest of the year. The risks of contagion from the Greek crisis to the partner countries appear limited, because financial exposure to the Greek banking sector has been very much reduced. The EU nowadays has instruments with considerable power to fight losses of confidence, and the other countries that received financial assistance in the euro crisis appear politically much more stable, and their economies (including that of Cyprus in the first quarter of this year) have started growing at quite satisfactory rates. According to our forecasts, the euro area GDP will grow by 1.6% in 2015 and by 2.1% in 2016, as negative factors slowly become less important. Both private consumption and investment will expand at a good pace, and the unemployment rate will diminish, but still remain above 10% by the end of 2016. The main risk is that the Greek crisis has a more negative effect on confidence than initially expected. Our inflation forecast for 2015 is 0.2%, with the possibility of a mild deflation not excluded. During the first quarter of 2015 rising oil prices were the main contributors to the ascending inflation expectations, while during the second quarter upward surprises over expected inflation have come from manufactured goods and services. For 2016, we expect that inflation will increase up to 1.2%, still below the 2% ECB’s target.
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