Seit 1990 wurden im Rahmen der „Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ (GRW) rund 68 Milliarden Euro an Unternehmen in strukturschwachen Regionen in Ost- und Westdeutschland vergeben. Dieser Beitrag verdeutlicht die Rolle der Banken dabei und zeigt erhebliche räumliche Unterschiede bei den Subventionen.

We investigate how shareholder-debtholder conflict of interest affects the corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. Consistent with the notion that board representation grants lenders’ access to private information that helps monitor and influence firms’ tax practice, we find that appointments of affiliated banker directors significantly reduce firms’ tax avoidance behavior, while appointing unaffiliated banker directors shows no such effect. The impact of affiliated banker directors on alleviating tax avoidance is stronger among firms with severer conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders, specifically among firms with weaker corporate governance, higher financial leverage and higher CEO stock ownership.

This paper investigates how state ownership affects financial reporting practices in China. Using several measures of state (government) ownership, we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in state ownership decreases financial statement comparability by 36.61%, and the impact is more pronounced when the central authority has majority control of the company. Moreover, lower earnings quality and lower levels of accounting conservatism among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may explain the lower accounting comparability between SOEs and non-SOEs (NSOEs). Additionally, similar (different) managerial objectives converge (diverge) financial statement comparability between SOEs and NSOEs. Last, the geographical locations of firms also contribute to financial statement comparability. We employ a difference-in-differences design, changes regression and entropy balancing to mitigate potential endogeneity bias.

Soil is central to the complex interplay among biodiversity, climate, and society. This paper examines the interconnectedness of soil biodiversity, climate change, and societal impacts, emphasizing the urgent need for integrated solutions. Human-induced biodiversity loss and climate change intensify environmental degradation, threatening human well-being. Soils, rich in biodiversity and vital for ecosystem function regulation, are highly vulnerable to these pressures, affecting nutrient cycling, soil fertility, and resilience. Soil also crucially regulates climate, influencing energy, water cycles, and carbon storage. Yet, climate change poses significant challenges to soil health and carbon dynamics, amplifying global warming. Integrated approaches are essential, including sustainable land management, policy interventions, technological innovations, and societal engagement. Practices like agroforestry and organic farming improve soil health and mitigate climate impacts. Effective policies and governance are crucial for promoting sustainable practices and soil conservation. Recent technologies aid in monitoring soil biodiversity and implementing sustainable land management. Societal engagement, through education and collective action, is vital for environmental stewardship. By prioritizing interdisciplinary research and addressing key frontiers, scientists can advance understanding of the soil biodiversity–climate change–society nexus, informing strategies for environmental sustainability and social equity.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.