Rent-Sharing und Energiekosten: In welchem Umfang geben Industrieunternehmen Gewinne und Verluste an ihre Beschäftigten weiter?
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2024
Abstract
Diese Studie untersucht, wie die betrieblichen Erträge zwischen deutschen Industrieunternehmen und ihren Beschäftigten aufgeteilt werden. Dafür werden Energiepreisänderungen auf Unternehmensebene und die daraus resultierenden Veränderungen im Unternehmensertrag betrachtet. Wir finden heraus, dass höhere Energiepreise die Löhne drücken und dass ein Rückgang bei den Erträgen um 10% zu einem Rückgang der Löhne um 2% führt. Dieser Zusammenhang ist asymmetrisch, was bedeutet, dass die Löhne nicht von Senkungen der Energiepreise profitieren, aber durch Energiepreiserhöhungen sinken. Kleine Unternehmen geben Schwankungen im Ertrag stärker an die Beschäftigten weiter als Großunternehmen.
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Media Response November 2024 IWH: Manchmal wäre der Schlussstrich die angemessenere Lösung in: TextilWirtschaft, 21.11.2024 IWH: Existenzgefahr Nun droht eine Pleitewelle in: DVZ…
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German economy in transition ‒ weak momentum, low potential growth The Joint Economic Forecast Project Group forecasts a 0.1% decline in Germany's gross domestic product in 2024.…
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Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
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Identifying Rent-sharing Using Firms‘ Energy Input Mix
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2022
Abstract
We present causal evidence on the rent-sharing elasticity of German manufacturing firms. We develop a new firm-level Bartik instrument for firm rents that combines the firms‘ predetermined energy input mix with national energy carrier price changes. Reduced-form evidence shows that higher energy prices depress wages. Instrumental variable estimation yields a rent-sharing elasticity of approximately 0.20. Rent-sharing induced by energy price variation is asymmetric and driven by energy price increases, implying that workers do not benefit from energy price reductions but are harmed by price increases. The rent-sharing elasticity is substantially larger in small (0.26) than in large (0.17) firms.
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The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections
Ester Faia, Maximilian Mayer, Vincenzo Pezone
SAFE Working Papers,
No. 269,
2022
Abstract
We present causal evidence on the effect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and show that firms that lose centrality in the network experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement date. The key driver of our results is the role of boardroom connections in reducing asymmetric information. The complementarities with the input-output and cross-ownership networks are consistent with this channel. Using hand-collected data, we also show that network centrality has a positive effect on directors’ compensation, providing evidence of rent sharing.
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Labor in the Boardroom
Jörg Heining, Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
No. 2,
2021
Abstract
We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.
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To Rent or not to Rent: A Household Finance Perspective on Berlin's Short-term Rental Regulation
Antonios Mavropoulos
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
With the increasing concerns that accompany the rising trends of house sharing economies, regulators impose new laws to counteract housing supply scarcity. In this paper, I investigate whether the ban on short-term entire house listings activated in Berlin in May 2016 had any adverse effects from a household finance perspective. More specifically, I derive short-term rental income and counter-factually compare it with long-term rental income to find that the ban, by decreasing the supply of short-term housing, accelerated short-term rental income but did not have any direct effect on long-term rental income. Commercial home-owners therefore would find renting on the short-term market to be financially advantageous.
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Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Steffen Müller
ILR Review,
No. 5,
2020
Abstract
The authors use three distinct methods to investigate the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. First, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects decomposition of workers’ wages reveal that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. Next, recentered influence function (RIF) regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Finally, in an Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, the authors find that decreasing bargaining coverage is the only factor they consider that contributes to the marked rise in premia dispersion over time.
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