Analyse der Effekte des Atomausstiegs auf die deutschen Großhandelsstrompreise 2023
Christoph Schult
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2024
Abstract
Seit dem Atomausstieg am 15. April 2023 sind die Großhandelsstrompreise in Deutschland deutlich gesunken. Innerhalb des deutschen Merit-Order-Systems galten Atomkraftwerke als die kostengünstigste Form der Stromerzeugung. Hätten die Atomkraftwerke weiterbetrieben werden können, wären die Großhandelsstrompreise für den Zeitraum vom 16. April 2023 bis zum 31. Dezember 2023 voraussichtlich um 1% bis 8% niedriger gewesen. Insbesondere im Oktober hätte der Weiterbetrieb der Atomkraftwerke die Großhandelsstrompreise gesenkt, vor allem in Zeiten hoher Stromnachfrage und geringer Verfügbarkeit erneuerbarer Energien.
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The Effects of the Iberian Exception Mechanism on Wholesale Electricity Prices and Consumer Inflation: A Synthetic-controls Approach
Miguel Haro Ruiz, Christoph Schult, Christoph Wunder
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2024
Abstract
This study employs synthetic control methods to estimate the effect of the Iberian exception mechanism on wholesale electricity prices and consumer inflation, for both Spain and Portugal. We find that the intervention led to an average reduction of approximately 40% in the spot price of electricity between July 2022 and June 2023 in both Spain and Portugal. Regarding overall inflation, we observe notable differences between the two countries. In Spain, the intervention has an immediate effect, and results in an average decrease of 3.5 percentage points over the twelve months under consideration. In Portugal, however, the impact is small and generally close to zero. Different electricity market structures in each country are a plausible explanation.
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08.09.2022 • 22/2022
Energy crisis in Germany
Dwindling gas supplies from Russia and soaring prices for gas and electricity are leading to massive real income losses and a recession in Europe and Germany. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that German gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 1.1% in 2022 and decrease by 1.4% in 2023. Consumer prices are expected to rise by 7.9% in 2022 and 9.5% in 2023.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Ceremonial Encapsulation and the Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technology in Germany
Iciar Dominguez Lacasa
Journal of Economic Issues,
No. 4,
2014
Abstract
This inquiry employs ideas advanced by institutionalist thinker Paul Dale Bush to shed light on technology diffusion in Germany’s electrical generation and distribution industry. Research findings suggest that what Bush labeled as ceremonial dominance affects outcomes in technology selection. Evidence suggests that fossil fuel and nuclear technologies have remained favored by power producers despite the externalized environmental costs to society associated with their implementations. Advances in government policy have indeed created a framework that favorably accommodates renewable energy technologies. However, what Bush labeled ceremonial dominance is shown to persist and to contribute to ceremonial encapsulation. Consequently, renewable energy technologies have diffused only to the point that the powers behind the industry remain in dominant positions. Although there is measurable, incremental technological change in the electrical power industry, in light of the urgency of climate change problems, technologies supporting the electrical power system need to be selected more judiciously.
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The Economics of Restructuring the German Electricity Sector
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
The debate about the development of German electricity prices after the liberalization of energy markets in 1998 raises the question of failures in market restructuring. However, a general statement would be misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development, analyzed for the exemplary case of household prices, shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Externe Publikationen,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Externe Publikationen,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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Liberalization of Electricity Markets in Selected European Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, M. Keim, P. J. J. Welfens
Diskussionsbeiträge des Europäischen Instituts für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW), Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Nr. 124,
No. 124,
2004
Abstract
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Fragen der Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsmärkte in der EU. Man kann feststellen, dass die Gemeinschaftsdirektive 96/92/EC die Wechselbeziehungen der Elektrizitätsmärkte nicht ausreichend behandelt. Außerdem wird vor allem in Deutschland der Zugang für Dritte nicht effektiv gefördert, wobei der Zusammenschluss eines großen Elektrizitätsunternehmens und einem dominanten Gasunternehmen neue spezielle Fragen aufgeworfen hat. Hingegen verläuft der Liberalisierungsprozess in Skandinavien konsequenter. Osteuropäische EU-Beitrittsländer sind langfristig potenzielle Elektrizitätsexporteure sobald Modernisierungen zu niedrigeren Energie- und Elektrizitätsverbrauch führen. Russland sollte rasch WTO-Mitglied werden, um Zugang zu den westeuropäischen Elektrizitätsmärkten zu bekommen, wobei Russland in den gesamten Liberalisierungsdiskussionen noch keine Rolle gespielt hat. Mittelfristig können Überschusskapazitäten in einer EU-27 erwartet werden. Zweifelhaft jedoch ist, ob Politiker, die ansonsten so ehrgeizige Ambitionen in der Umweltpolitik zeigen, einer gesamteuropäischen Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsmärkte zustimmen werden. Außerdem werden regulierungspolitische Aspekte behandelt.
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