Angewandte Industrieökonomik: Theorien, Modelle, Anwendungen
Ulrich Blum, Simone Müller, Andreas Weiske
,
2006
Abstract
Das moderne Unternehmertum stellt eine Mischung aus Bürgersinn und Abenteurertum dar. Bürgersinn bedeutet Wirtschaftlichkeit und Ehrlichkeit, letztlich das Beachten der Marktregeln; Abenteurertum bedeutet Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern, Pioniergeist, Innovation, Wettbewerb - und damit auch die mögliche Vernichtung des Konkurrenten. Der moderne Unternehmer ist damit in der Beschreibung von Werner Sombart (1913) janusköpfig und bedarf daher einer speziellen Wirtschaftsgesinnung, die Max Weber (1905) ausgiebig erörtert hat und die der Gewinnerzielung eine positive moralische Qualität zumißt. Die Theorie der Unternehmung der Neoklassik enthält nichts von dieser Qualität des realen Unternehmertums. Es ist die moderne Industrieökonomik, die versucht, Modelle zu entwickeln, die der Wirklichkeit näher stehen und eine empirischen Überprüfung erlauben. Sie steht in vielerlei Hinsicht methodisch auf einer neoklassischen Basis, die durch das Konzept des strategischen Handelns, also eines Verhaltens, das die Reaktionen der anderen am Markt Beteiligten in das eigene Kalkül einbezieht, verbreitert ist. Dabei werden Elemente der Evolutionsökonomik, der Risikotheorie und der modernen Informationstheorie einbezogen. Die großen Fragen des Unternehmers, der letztlich am Markt einen höheren als den Normalgewinn am Markt anstrebt, lauten: Unter welchen Bedingungen soll ich in den Markt eintreten - und wann werden potentielle Konkurrenten dies ebenfalls tun? Wie soll ich meine Preise setzen und welche Reaktionen muß ich erwarten? Wie kann ich dem Mitbewerber freundliches Verhalten signalisieren? Wie kann ich mich von anderen Anbietern unterscheiden? Welche Bedeutung hat dabei Innovation und Werbung? Vorgestellt wird dies in drei großen Kapiteln über Technologie und Marktstruktur, über Preissetzung und Signals sowie über Forschung, Entwicklung und Innovation, die jeweils zu Anfang die zugrundeliegenden Verhaltensmuster in einem gesellschaftlichen - gelegentlich einem historischen Kontext aufzeigen und abschließend die wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen benennen. Diesen vorangestellt sind drei Kapitel; von dieses führt das erste in das strategische Denken als intellektuellen Kern der Industrieökonomik ein; anschließend wird die klassische "alte" Industrieökonomik als Kern einer bis heute vor allem für die Wettbewerbsleitbilder des Kartellrechts bedeutsamen Wettbewerbsleitbilder dargestellt. Schließlich werden die neoklassischen Basismodelle präsentiert. Weiterhin wird jedes Kapitel durch Übungsaufgaben mit Lösungsskizzen ergänzt.
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Equity and Bond Market Signals as Leading Indicators of Bank Fragility
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 2,
2006
Abstract
We analyse the ability of the distance to default and subordinated bond spreads to signal bank fragility in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both indicators. The distance to default exhibits lead times of 6-18 months. Spreads have signal value close to problems only. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators. We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other information and find that their additional information content may be small but not insignificant. The results suggest that market indicators reduce type II errors relative to predictions based on accounting information only.
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Die Bedeutung interner Kapitalmärkte für die Organisationsform von Unternehmen
Diemo Dietrich
WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium,
2006
Abstract
Die Investitions- und Finanzierungslehre hat in jüngerer Vergangenheit Neuland betreten, indem sie berücksichtigt, dass ein Unternehmen typischerweise nicht nur ein Projekt unter der Leitung eines Managers durchführt. Vielmehr betreibt ein Unternehmen viele Projekte, wobei eine Unternehmenszentrale die operative Durchführung der Projekte an Divisionsmanager delegiert. Welche Implikationen ergeben sich aus dieser Sichtweise für die Funktionsfähigkeit von Kapitalmärkten? Welche Rolle spielen hierbei unternehmensinterne Allokationsmechanismen? Was kann hieraus für die Grenzen der Unternehmung abgeleitet werden?
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Structural Change during Transition: Is Russia Becoming a Service Economy?
Albrecht Kauffmann
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Universität Potsdam, Nr. 80,
No. 80,
2005
Abstract
This paper analyses the structural change in Russia during the transition from the planned to a market economy. With regard to the famous three sector hypothesis, broad economic sectors were formed as required by this theory. The computation of their shares at GNP at market prices using Input-Output tables, and the adjustment of results from distortions, generated as side effects of tax avoidance practices, shows results that clearly reject claims that Russia would be on the road to a post-industrial service economy. Instead, at least until 2001, a tendency of “primarisation“ could be observed, that presents Russia closer to less-developed countries.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Externe Publikationen,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Economic Capability of East German Regions: Results of a Cluster Analysis
Franz Kronthaler
Regional Studies,
No. 6,
2005
Abstract
This paper analyses the economic capability of East German regions compared with West German regions. Based on new growth theory and new economic geography, and using relevant empirical literature, regions are clustered according to a set of growth factors. The clustering results find little evidence that the economic capability of East German regions is already comparable with West German regions. Economic disadvantages are particularly rooted in lower technical progress, a lack of entrepreneurship, lower business and industrial concentration, and a loss of human capital. However, there are a few East German regions with a high economic capability, but even those suffer from economic disadvantages such as lower technical progress, lower industrial activity and a poorer regional accessibility.
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