Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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Tail-risk Protection Trading Strategies
Natalie Packham, Jochen Papenbrock, Peter Schwendner, Fabian Wöbbeking
Quantitative Finance,
No. 5,
2017
Abstract
Starting from well-known empirical stylized facts of financial time series, we develop dynamic portfolio protection trading strategies based on econometric methods. As a criterion for riskiness, we consider the evolution of the value-at-risk spread from a GARCH model with normal innovations relative to a GARCH model with generalized innovations. These generalized innovations may for example follow a Student t, a generalized hyperbolic, an alpha-stable or a Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD). Our results indicate that the GPD distribution provides the strongest signals for avoiding tail risks. This is not surprising as the GPD distribution arises as a limit of tail behaviour in extreme value theory and therefore is especially suited to deal with tail risks. Out-of-sample backtests on 11 years of DAX futures data, indicate that the dynamic tail-risk protection strategy effectively reduces the tail risk while outperforming traditional portfolio protection strategies. The results are further validated by calculating the statistical significance of the results obtained using bootstrap methods. A number of robustness tests including application to other assets further underline the effectiveness of the strategy. Finally, by empirically testing for second-order stochastic dominance, we find that risk averse investors would be willing to pay a positive premium to move from a static buy-and-hold investment in the DAX future to the tail-risk protection strategy.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders‘ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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How does Institutional Setting Affect the Impact of EU Structural Funds on Economic Cohesion? New Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe
Marina Grusevaja, Toralf Pusch
Journal of Common Market Studies,
2012
Abstract
Structural Funds are the main instrument of the EU Cohesion Policy. Their effective use is subject to an ongoing debate in political and scientific circles. European fiscal assistance under this heading should promote economic and social cohesion in the member states of the European Union. Recently the domestic institutional capacity to absorb, to distribute and to invest Structural Funds effectively has become a crucial determinant of the cohesion process and has attracted attention of the scientific community. The aim of this study is to shed light on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the countries of the first Central and Eastern European enlargement round in 2004. Using regional data for these countries we have a look on the impact of several institutional governance variables on the effectiveness of Structural Funds. In the interpretation of results reference is made to regional economics. Results of the empirical analysis indicate an influence of certain institutional variables on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the new member states.
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Towards Unrestricted Public Use Business Microdata: The Synthetic Longitudinal Business Database
John M. Abowd, Ron S. Jarmin, Satkartar K. Kinney, Javier Miranda, Jerome P. Reiter, Arnold P. Reznek
International Statistical Review,
No. 3,
2011
Abstract
In most countries, national statistical agencies do not release establishment-level business microdata, because doing so represents too large a risk to establishments’ confidentiality. One approach with the potential for overcoming these risks is to release synthetic data; that is, the released establishment data are simulated from statistical models designed to mimic the distributions of the underlying real microdata. In this article, we describe an application of this strategy to create a public use file for the Longitudinal Business Database, an annual economic census of establishments in the United States comprising more than 20 million records dating back to 1976. The U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Internal Revenue Service recently approved the release of these synthetic microdata for public use, making the synthetic Longitudinal Business Database the first-ever business microdata set publicly released in the United States. We describe how we created the synthetic data, evaluated analytical validity, and assessed disclosure risk.
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The Great Risk Shift? Income Volatility in an International Perspective
Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 2465,
2008
Abstract
Weakening bargaining power of unions and the increasing integration of the world economy may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This paper documents and explains changes in income volatility. Using a theoretical framework which builds distribution risk into a real business cycle model, hypotheses on the determinants of the relative volatility of capital and labor are derived. The model is tested using industry-level data. The data cover 11 industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, and a maximum of 35 years. The paper has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor and capital incomes has declined, reflecting the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the idiosyncratic component of income volatility has hardly changed over time. Third, crosssectional heterogeneity in the evolution of relative income volatilities is substantial. If anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile in relative terms. Fourth, income volatility is related to variables measuring the bargaining power of workers. Trade openness has no significant impact.
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The Loss Distribution of the Entrepreneurial Bad Debt Risk – a Simulation-based Model
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2006
Abstract
Ein wichtiges Instrument des Risikocontrollings stellt die Unterlegung von Risiken mit Eigenkapital- bzw. Liquiditätsreserven dar. Hierfür ist es erforderlich, für alle wesentlichen Einzelrisiken Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungen der möglichen Verluste zu bestimmen, auf deren Grundlage die Ermittlung des Eigenkapitalbedarfs erfolgen kann. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein simulationsbasiertes Modell vorgestellt, daß eine Bewertung des Forderungsausfallrisikos eines gewerblichen Unternehmens ermöglicht. Es werden Wege aufgezeigt, wie die Risikokomponenten Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit, Ausfallquote und Forderungshöhe zum Ausfallzeitpunkt geschätzt werden können. Dabei werden sowohl Unsicherheiten bei der Bestimmung der Inputfaktoren als auch deren Variabilität berücksichtigt. Für den Fall, daß ein Unternehmen nicht in der Lage ist, alle Risikokomponenten selbständig zu schätzen, werden auf Grundlage einer empirischen Erhebung Verteilungsfunktionen zur Bestimmung der Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit und der Ausfallquote zur Verfügung gestellt.
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Measurement of Contagion in Banks' Equity Prices
Reint E. Gropp, G. Moerman
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within-country and across country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically important” banks in the EU.
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Why do we have an interbank money market?
Jürgen Wiemers, Ulrike Neyer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 182,
2003
Abstract
The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy. Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides for balancing daily liquidity fluctuations banks participate in the interbank market because they have different marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank. In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost differences occur because banks have different marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The necessary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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