Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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Do Asset Purchase Programmes Shape Industry Dynamics? Evidence from the ECB's SMP on Plant Entries and Exits
Manfred Antoni, Talina Sondershaus
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2019
Abstract
Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.
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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Moritz Stieglitz
Abstract
Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.
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Channeling the Iron Ore Super-cycle: The Role of Regional Bank Branch Networks in Emerging Markets
Helge Littke
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2018
Abstract
The role of the financial system to absorb and to intermediate commodity boom induced windfall gains efficiently presents one of the most pressing issues for developing economies. Using an exogenous increase in iron ore prices in March 2005, I analyse the role of regional bank branch networks in Brazil in reallocating capital from affected to non-affected regions. For the period from March 2004 to March 2006, I find that branches directly exposed to this shock by their geographical location experience an increase in deposit growth in the post-shock period relative to non-affected branches. Given that these deposits are not reinvested locally, I further show that branches located in the non-affected region increase lending growth depending on their indirect exposure to the booming regions via their branch network. Even tough, these results provide evidence against a Dutch Disease type crowding out of the non-iron ore sector, further evidence suggests that this capital reallocation is far from being optimal.
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Complexity and Bank Risk During the Financial Crisis
Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Economics Letters,
January
2017
Abstract
We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ complexity and relate it to banks’ riskiness. The sample covers stock listed Euro area banks from 2007 to 2014. Bank stability is significantly affected by complexity, whereas the direction of the effect differs across complexity measures.
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Lend Global, Fund Local? Price and Funding Cost Margins in Multinational Banking
Rients Galema, Michael Koetter, C. Liesegang
Review of Finance,
No. 5,
2016
Abstract
In a proposed model of a multinational bank, interest margins determine local lending by foreign affiliates and the internal funding by parent banks. We exploit detailed parent-affiliate-level data of all German banks to empirically test our theoretical predictions in pre-crisis times. Local lending by affiliates depends negatively on price margins, the difference between lending and deposit rates in foreign markets. The effect of funding cost margins, the gap between local deposit rates faced by affiliates abroad and the funding costs of their parents, on internal capital market funding is positive but statistically weak. Interest margins are central to explain the interaction between internal capital markets and foreign affiliates lending.
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The Role of Complexity for Bank Risk during the Financial Crisis: Evidence from a Novel Dataset
Thomas Krause, Talina Sondershaus, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ business and geographical complexity. Using these measures of complexity, we evaluate how they relate to banks’ idiosyncratic and systemic riskiness. The sample covers stock listed banks in the euro area from 2007 to 2014. Our results show that banks have increased their total number of subsidiaries while business and geographical complexity have declined. Bank stability is significantly affected by our complexity measures, whereas the direction of the effect differs across the complexity measures: Banks with a higher degree of geographical complexity and a higher share of foreign subsidiaries seem to be less stable. In contrast, a higher share of non-bank subsidiaries significantly decreases the probability for a state aid request during the recent crisis period. This heterogeneity advises against the use of a single complexity measure when evaluating the implications of bank complexity.
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Shareholder Bargaining Power and the Emergence of Empty Creditors
Stefano Colonnello, M. Efing, Francesca Zucchi
Abstract
Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders‘ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.
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