IWH at 2020 ASSA Annual Meeting in San Diego
IWH at 2020 ASSA Annual Meeting in San Diego Next year’s 2020 ASSA Annual Meeting , organised by the American Economic Association (AEA) on an annual basis, is going to take place…
See page
Research Clusters
Three Research Clusters Research Cluster "Economic Dynamics and Stability" Research Questions This cluster focuses on empirical analyses of macroeconomic dynamics and stability.…
See page
Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown Bag Seminar" was offered on a regular basis by members of the Financial Markets department and their…
See page
Speed Projects
Speed Projects On this page, you will find the IWH EXplore Speed Projects in chronologically descending order. 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2022 SPEED 2022/02…
See page
Projects
Our Projects 07.2022 ‐ 12.2026 Evaluation of the InvKG and the federal STARK programme On behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection, the IWH and the RWI…
See page
Research Groups
Our Research Groups Banking, Regulation, and Incentive Structures Data Science in Financial Economics Econometric Tools for Macroeconomic Forecasting and Simulation Education,…
See page
PhD Courses
PhD Courses IWH-DPE Courses DPE courses website CGDE website Course materials: see Intranet, P:\Projekte\Doktoranden\Doktorandenkurse Courses at other Institutions Bavarian…
See page
Banking Market Deregulation and Mortality Inequality
Iftekhar Hasan, Thomas Krause, Stefano Manfredonia, Felix Noth
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2022
Abstract
This paper shows that local banking market conditions affect mortality rates in the United States. Exploiting the staggered relaxation of branching restrictions in the 1990s across states, we find that banking deregulation decreases local mortality rates. This effect is driven by a decrease in the mortality rate of black residents, implying a decrease in the black-white mortality gap. We further analyze the role of mortgage markets as a transmitter between banking deregulation and mortality and show that households' easier access to finance explains mortality dynamics. We do not find any evidence that our results can be explained by improved labor outcomes.
Read article
Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firms’ Choice of Debt Structure
Iftekhar Hasan, Walid Saffar, Yangyang Chen, Leon Zolotoy
Journal of Banking and Finance,
December
2021
Abstract
We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.
Read article
Stock Price Fragility and the Cost of Bank Loans
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yinjie (Victor) Shen, Pengfei Ye
Journal of Empirical Finance,
September
2021
Abstract
This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms’ financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar’s (2011) stock price fragility measure, we find that there is a positive relationship between fragility and firms’ costs of bank loans. This effect is most pronounced when lenders rely more on institutional shareholders to discipline corporate management, or when loans are made by relationship lenders, suggesting that unstable flows could weaken institutional investors’ monitoring effectiveness and strengthen relationship banks’ bargaining power.
Read article