Financial Transaction Taxes: Announcement Effects, Short-run Effects, and Long-run Effects
Sebastian Eichfelder, Mona Noack, Felix Noth
Abstract
We analyze the impact of the French 2012 financial transaction tax (FTT) on trading volumes, stock prices, liquidity, and volatility. We extend the empirical research by identifying FTT announcement and short-run treatment effects, which can distort difference-in-differences estimates. In addition, we consider long-run volatility measures that better fit the French FTT’s legislative design. While we find strong evidence of a positive FTT announcement effect on trading volumes, there is almost no statistically significant evidence of a long-run treatment effect. Thus, evidence of a strong reduction of trading volumes resulting from the French FTT might be driven by announcement effects and short-term treatment effects. We find evidence of an increase of intraday volatilities in the announcement period and a significant reduction of weekly and monthly volatilities in the treatment period. Our findings support theoretical considerations suggesting a stabilizing impact of FTTs on financial markets.
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Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy
Claudia M. Buch, Björn Hilberg, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking and Finance,
November
2016
Abstract
Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system. Regimes for the restructuring and resolution of banks, financed by bank levies, aim at reducing these costs. This paper evaluates the German bank levy, which has been implemented since 2011. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the levy were lower than expected. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and by the central institutions of savings banks and credit unions. Third, for those banks, which were affected by the levy, we find evidence for a reduction in lending and higher deposit rates.
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Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece
Nikolaos Artavanis, Adair Morse, Margarita Tsoutsoura
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
No. 2,
2016
Abstract
We document that in semiformal economies, banks lend to tax-evading individuals based on the bank’s assessment of the individual’s true income. This observation leads to a novel approach to estimate tax evasion. We use microdata on household credit from a Greek bank and replicate the bank underwriting model to infer the banks estimate of individuals’ true income. We estimate that 43–45% of self-employed income goes unreported and thus untaxed. For 2009, this implies €28.2 billion of unreported income, implying forgone tax revenues of over €11 billion or 30% of the deficit. Our method innovation allows for estimating the industry distribution of tax evasion in settings where uncovering the incidence of hidden cash transactions is difficult using other methods. Primary tax-evading industries are professional services—medicine, law, engineering, education, and media. We conclude with evidence that contemplates the importance of institutions, paper trail, and political willpower for the persistence of tax evasion.
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Corporate Taxation and Firm Location in Germany
Götz Zeddies
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2015
Abstract
German Fiscal Federalism is characterized by a high degree of fiscal equalization which lowers the efficiency of local tax administration. Currently, a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme is on the political agenda. One option is to grant federal states the right to raise surtaxes on statutory tax rates set by the central government in order to reduce the equalization rate. In such an environment, especially those federal states with lower economic performance would have to raise comparatively high surtaxes. With capital mobility, this could further lower economic performance and thus tax revenues. Although statutory tax rates are so far identical across German federal states, corporate tax burden differs for several reasons. This paper tries to identify the impact of such differences on firm location. As can be shown, effective corporate taxation did seemingly not have a significant impact on firm location across German federal states.
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Eine flexible Ländersteuer bei einem hohen Ausgleich von Finanzkraftunterschieden
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2014
Abstract
Am Ende des Jahres 2019 tritt das Finanzausgleichsgesetz außer Kraft. Im Zuge dessen ergibt sich eine historische Chance, die Reibungsverluste im gegenwärtigen Ausgleichssystem durch eine Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen zu verringern. Ein aktuell viel diskutierter Vorschlag sieht eine flexible Ländersteuer vor. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, welche Auswirkungen eine solche erweiterte Steuerautonomie für die Bundesländer hätte und welche Möglichkeiten sich diesbezüglich für eine anreizfreundliche Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs mit hoher Ausgleichsintensität ergeben würden.
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Taxes, Banks and Financial Stability
Reint E. Gropp
R. de Mooij and G. Nicodème (eds), Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector. MIT Press,
2014
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009, numerous new taxes on financial institutions have been discussed or implemented around the world. This paper discusses the connection between the incidence of the taxes, their incentive effects, and policy makers’ objectives. Combining basic insights from banking theory with standard models of tax incidence shows that the incidence of such taxes will disproportionately fall on small and medium size enterprises. The arguments presented suggest it is unlikely that the taxes will have a beneficial impact on financial stability or raise significant amounts of revenue without increasing the cost of capital to bank dependent firms significantly.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort Under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
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