Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets: A Correction
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, Miguel García-Cestona
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 3,
2008
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Bouckaert and Degryse [2004] (denoted B&D) present a model in which banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. In this note, we point out an error in B&D and show that, although banks' information disclosure may indeed arise in equilibrium, it only does so if adverse selection is not too harsh.
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Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction
Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 14,
2006
Abstract
This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.
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Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse
Journal of Industrial Economics,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Evolving Structural Patterns in the Enlarging European Division of Labour: Sectoral and Branch Specialisation and the Potentials for Closing the Productivity Gap
Johannes Stephan
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 5,
2003
Abstract
This report summarises the results generated in empirical analysis within a larger EU 5th FP RTD-project on the determinants of productivity gaps between the current EU-15 and accession states in Central East Europe. The focus of research in this part of the project is on sectoral specialisation patterns emerging as a result of intensifying integration between the current EU and a selection of six newly acceding economies, namely Estonia, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia. The research-leading question is concerned with the role played by the respective specialisation patterns for (i) the explanation of observed productivity gaps and for (ii) the projection of future potentials of productivity growth in Central East Europe.
For the aggregated level, analysis determines the share of national productivity gaps accountable to acceding countries’ particular sectoral patterns, and their role for aggregate productivity growth: in Poland, the Slovak Republic and Hungary, sectoral shares of national productivity gaps are considerable and might evolve into a ‘barrier’ to productivity catch-up.Moreover, past productivity growth was dominated by a downward adjustment in employment rather than structural change. With the industrial sector of manufacturing having been identified as the main source of national productivity gaps and growth, the subsequent analysis focuses on the role of industrial specialisation patterns and develops an empirical model to project future productivity growth potentials. Each chapter closes with some policy conclusions.
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