Monopolistic Competition and Costs in the Health Care Sector
Ingmar Kumpmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 17,
2009
Abstract
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are no price differences between physicians. A monopolistic health insurer is able to counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs.
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A Simple Macro Model of Original Sin based on Optimal Price Setting under Incomplete Information
Axel Lindner
International Economics and Economic Policy,
2009
Abstract
This paper analyses the consequences of “original sin“ (the fact that the currency of an emerging market economy usually cannot be used to borrow abroad) for macroeconomic stability. The approach is based on third-generation models of currency crises, but differs from alternative versions by explicitly modeling the price setting behavior of firms if prices are sticky and there is incomplete information about the future exchange rate. It is shown that a small depreciation is beneficial, but a large one is detrimental.
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Growth, Employment, Poverty Alleviation and Institutional Development – Lessons from Country Cases – An Introduction
Tobias Knedlik, Karl Wohlmuth
African Development Perspectives Yearbook, No. 14,
2009
Abstract
Economic growth is a central concept in judging the progress of economic development. Since the early years of economic sciences, economists aim to explain the differences in the production of goods and services among economies. Economic policy focuses on economic growth as the basis for the well-being of nations. The simple idea is that the extension of the productive capacity and finally the increase of consumption possibilities in an economy is the basis of all policies aiming to increase a nation’s welfare. It is therefore not surprising that aims of development policy are often linked to specific economic growth targets. So the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals are assumed only to be achieved if a certain level of economic growth can be reached.
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The Economic Optimality of Sanction Mechanisms in Interorganizational Ego Networks – A Game Theoretical Analysis –
Muhamed Kudic, Marc Banaszak
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2009
Abstract
Even though small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co-operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – so-called “micromultinational enterprises” (mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network). The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficiency analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demonstrates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combination of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under-emphasized topic in the literature.
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Openness and Growth: The Long Shadow of the Berlin Wall
Claudia M. Buch, Farid Toubal
Journal of Macroeconomics,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
The question whether international openness causes higher domestic growth has been subject to intense discussions in the empirical growth literature. This paper addresses the issue in the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. We analyze whether the slow convergence in per capita incomes between East and West Germany and the lower international openness of East Germany are linked. We address the endogeneity of openness by adapting the methodology proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999) to a panel framework. We instrument openness with time-invariant exogenous geographic variables and time-varying exogenous policy variables. We also distinguish the impact of different channels of integration. Our paper has three main findings. First, geographic variables have a significant impact on regional openness. Second, controlling for geography, East German states are less integrated into international markets along all dimensions of integration considered. Third, the degree of openness for trade has a positive impact on regional income per capita.
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Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy
Axel Lindner
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
2009
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: Communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight on their private information in the transparent case than in the case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
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The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
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Keeping the Bubble Alive! The Effects of Urban Renewal and Demolition Subsidies in the East German Housing Market
Dominik Weiß
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 11,
2009
Abstract
German urban renewal programs are favoring the cities in the Eastern part since the re-unification in 1990. This was accompanied additionally by attractive tax incentives, designed as an accelerated declining balance method of depreciation for housing investments during the late 1990s. The accumulated needs for comfortable housing after 40 years of a disastrous housing policy of the GDR era were generally accepted as justification for the subvention policy. But various subsidies and tax incentives caused a construction boom, false allocations, and a price bubble in Eastern Germany. After recognizing that the expansion of housing supply was not in line with the demographic development and that high vacancy rates were jeopardizing housing companies and their financial backers, policy changed in 2001. Up to now, the government provides demolition grants to reduce the vast oversupply. By means of a real option approach, it is ex-plained how different available forms of subsidies and economic incentives for landlords lift real estate values. The option value representing growth expectations and opportunities is calculated as an observable market value less an estimated fundamental value. Empirical results disclose higher option premiums for cities in Eastern Germany and a strong correlation of the option premium with urban renewal spending.
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Effects of Heterogeneity on Bank Efficiency Scores
J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool
European Journal of Operational Research,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
Bank efficiency estimates often serve as a proxy of managerial skill since they quantify sub-optimal production choices. But such deviations can also be due to omitted systematic differences among banks. In this study, we examine the effects of heterogeneity on bank efficiency scores. We compare different specifications of a stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier model with a baseline specification. After conducting a specification test, we discuss heterogeneity effects on efficiency levels, ranks and the tails of the efficiency distribution. We find that heterogeneity controls influence both banks’ optimal costs and profits and their ability to be efficient. Differences in efficiency scores are important for more than only methodological reasons. First, different ways of accounting for heterogeneity result in estimates of foregone profits and additional costs that are significantly different from what we infer from our general specification. Second, banks are significantly re-ranked when their efficiency is estimated with a specification other than the preferred, general specification. Third, the general specification gives the most reliable estimates of the probability of distress, although differences to the other specifications are low.
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Low Skill but High Volatility?
Claudia M. Buch
CESifo Working Paper No. 2665,
2009
Abstract
Globalization may impose a double-burden on low-skilled workers. On the one hand, the relative supply of low-skilled labor increases. This suppresses wages of low-skilled workers and/or increases their unemployment rates. On the other hand, low-skilled workers typically face more limited access to financial markets than high-skilled workers. This limits their ability to smooth shocks to income intertemporally and to share risks across borders. Using cross-country, industry-level data for the years 1970 - 2004, we document how the volatility of hours worked and of wages of workers at different skill levels has changed over time. We develop a stylized theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence, and we test the predictions of the model. Our results show that greater financial globalization and development increases the volatility of employment, and this effect is strongest for low-skilled workers. A higher share of low-skilled employment has a dampening impact.
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