Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.
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Die Bedeutung interner Kapitalmärkte für die Organisationsform von Unternehmen
Diemo Dietrich
WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium,
2006
Abstract
Die Investitions- und Finanzierungslehre hat in jüngerer Vergangenheit Neuland betreten, indem sie berücksichtigt, dass ein Unternehmen typischerweise nicht nur ein Projekt unter der Leitung eines Managers durchführt. Vielmehr betreibt ein Unternehmen viele Projekte, wobei eine Unternehmenszentrale die operative Durchführung der Projekte an Divisionsmanager delegiert. Welche Implikationen ergeben sich aus dieser Sichtweise für die Funktionsfähigkeit von Kapitalmärkten? Welche Rolle spielen hierbei unternehmensinterne Allokationsmechanismen? Was kann hieraus für die Grenzen der Unternehmung abgeleitet werden?
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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The Potentials for Technology Transfer via Foreign Direct Investement in Central and East Europe - Results of a Field Study
Judit Hamar, Johannes Stephan
East-West Journal of Economics and Business,
1 & 2
2005
Abstract
Foreign direct investment plays a particularly crucial role for the processes of technological catch-up in Central East Europe. Whilst most countries of this region have received considerable direct investments, the composition of kinds of subsidiaries is different between countries and hence will the prospects for intense technology transfer also differ between countries. This contribution aims to compare the potentials for internal and external technology transfer across countries of Central East Europe by analysing the management-relationship between subsidiaries and their parents and the market-relationships between subsidiaries and their host economy. For this, a firm-level database of some 458 subsidiaries in Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia is analysed empirically.
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What if Financial Markets were inefficient?
Marian Berneburg
Globale Wirtschaft - nationale Verantwortung: Wege aus dem Druckkessel,
2005
Abstract
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How do multinationals meet investment decisions: The case study of General Motors
Diemo Dietrich, Daniel Höwer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 10,
2005
Abstract
In der öffentlichen Diskussion um die Bedeutung multinationaler Konzerne für die deutsche Wirtschaft hatten und haben die Ereignisse im Zusammenhang mit Opel, der deutschen Tochter von General Motors, ein besonderes Maß an Aufmerksamkeit erregt. Als mit der Änderung der Konzernstruktur im Juni 2004 der unternehmensinterne Wettbewerb um die Produktionskapazitäten institutionalisiert wurde, war dies von vielen Beobachtern als Schritt hin zu mehr Effizienz und höherer Profitabilität gewertet worden. Doch ein solcher interner Wettbewerb um die Ressourcen eines Unternehmens kann behindert sein und zu ineffizienter Mittelverwendung führen: Informationsund Durchsetzungsprobleme sowie Machtkämpfe innerhalb eines Konzerns schränken nämlich die Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft der Konzernleitung ein, vorhandene Ressourcen in ihre produktivsten Unternehmensteile zu lenken. Unter Rückgriff auf die institutionenökonomische Organisationslehre werden mögliche Effizienzprobleme der unternehmensinternen Allokation von Kapital aufgezeigt und deren Relevanz im Rahmen einer Fallstudie zu General Motors/Opel diskutiert.
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The integration of imperfect financial markets: Implications for business cycle volatility
Claudia M. Buch, C. Pierdzioch
Journal of Policy Modeling,
No. 7,
2005
Abstract
During the last two decades, the degree of openness of national financial systems has increased substantially. At the same time, asymmetries in information and other financial market frictions have remained prevalent. We study the implications of the opening up of national financial systems in the presence of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility. In our empirical analysis, we show that countries with more developed financial systems have lower business cycle volatility. Financial openness has no strong impact on business cycle volatility, in contrast. In our theoretical analysis, we study the implications of the opening up of national financial markets and of financial market frictions for business cycle volatility using a dynamic macroeconomic model of an open economy. We find that the implications of opening up national financial markets for business cycle volatility are largely unaffected by the presence of financial market frictions.
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Distance and International Banking
Claudia M. Buch
Review of International Economics,
No. 4,
2005
Abstract
This paper asks how important distance is as a determinant of international banking and whether distance has become less important over time. If technological progress has lowered information costs and if information costs increase in distance, the importance of distance should have declined. I use data on assets and liabilities of commercial banks from five countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK, and US) in 50 host countries for the years 1983–99 to test this hypothesis. Generally, I find that banks hold significantly lower assets in distant markets and that the importance of distance for the foreign asset holdings of banks has not changed.
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Financial Openness and Business Cycle Volatility
Claudia M. Buch, Jörg Döpke, C. Pierdzioch
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 5,
2005
Abstract
This paper discusses whether the integration of international financial markets affects business cycle volatility. In the framework of a new open economy macro-model, we show that the link between financial openness and business cycle volatility depends on the nature of the underlying shock. Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Our results also show that the link between business cycle volatility and financial openness has not been stable over time.
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Bank Market Discipline
Reint E. Gropp, M. Schleicher
ECB Monthly Bulletin,
2005
Abstract
This article reviews the conceptual issues surrounding market discipline for banks and describes to what extent market discipline could complement supervisory activities. The potential of market discipline has been explicitly recognised in the New Basel Accord. In addition to capital requirements (Pillar I) and supervisory review (Pillar II), the Accord provides for a greater role of financial markets in complementing traditional supervisory activities by asking banks for increased transparency with regard to their operations (Pillar III). This article puts Pillar III in the broader context of direct and indirect market discipline. It is argued that both direct and indirect market discipline should be enhanced by the transparency requirements of the New Capital Accord, but that other conditions may also need to be met in order for market discipline to become more effective. Nevertheless, the article also shows that aggregated market prices can play a useful role in monitoring banking sector stability.
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