Productivity: More with Less by Better
Available resources are scarce. To sustain our society's income and living standards in a world with ecological and demographic change, we need to make smarter use of them.
Dossier
In a nutshell
Nobel Prize winners Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus state in their classic economics textbook: Economics matters because resources are scarce. Indeed, productivity research is at the very heart of economics as it describes the efficiency with which these scarce resources are transformed into goods and services and, hence, into social wealth. If the consumption of resources is to be reduced, e. g., due to ecological reasons, our society’s present material living standards can only be maintained by productivity growth. The aging of our society and the induced scarcity of labour is a major future challenge. Without productivity growth a solution is hard to imagine. To understand the processes triggering productivity growth, a look at micro data on the level of individual firms or establishments is indispensable.
All experts, press releases, publications and events on “Productivity”
Productivity is output in relation to input. While the concept of total factor productivity describes how efficiently labour, machinery, and all combined inputs are used, labour productivity describes value added (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) per worker and measures, in a macroeconomic sense, income per worker.
Productivity Growth on the Slowdown
Surprisingly, despite of massive use of technology and rushing digitisation, advances in productivity have been slowing down during the last decades. Labour productivity growth used to be much higher in the 1960s and 1970s than it is now. For the G7 countries, for example, annual growth rates of GDP per hour worked declined from about 4% in the early 1970s to about 2% in the 1980s and 1990s and then even fell to about 1% after 2010 (see figure 1).
This implies a dramatic loss in potential income: Would the 4% productivity growth have been sustained over the four and a half decades from 1972 to 2017, G7 countries’ GDP per hour would now be unimaginable 2.5 times as high as it actually is. What a potential to, for instance, reduce poverty or to fund research on fundamentals topics as curing cancer or using fusion power!
So why has productivity growth declined dramatically although at the same time we see, for instance, a boom in new digital technologies that can be expected to increase productivity growth? For sure, part of the decline might be spurious and caused by mismeasurement of the contributions of digital technologies. For instance, it is inherently difficult to measure the value of a google search or another video on youtube. That being said, most observers agree that part of the slowdown is real.
Techno-Pessimists and Techno-Optimists
Techno-pessimists say, well, these new technologies are just not as consequential for productivity as, for instance, electrification or combustion engines have been. Techno-optimists argue that it can take many years until productivity effects of new technologies kick in, and it can come in multiple waves. New technology we have now may just be the tools to invent even more consequential innovations in the future.
While this strand of the discussion is concerned with the type of technology invented, others see the problem in that inventions nowadays may diffuse slowly from technological leaders to laggards creating a wedge between few superstar firms and the crowd (Akcigit et al., 2021). Increased market concentration and market power by superstar firms may reduce competitive pressure and the incentives to innovate.
Finally, reduced Schumpeterian business dynamism, i.e. a reduction in firm entry and exit as well as firm growth and decline, reflects a slowdown in the speed with which production factors are recombined to find their most productive match.
While the explanation for and the way out of the productivity puzzle are still unknown, it seems understood that using granular firm level data is the most promising path to find answers.
What are the Origins of Productivity Growth?
Aggregate productivity growth can originate from (i) a more efficient use of available inputs at the firm level as described above or (ii) from an improved allocation of resources between firms.
Higher efficiency at the firm level captures, e.g., the impact of innovations (Acemoglu et al., 2018) or improved firm organisation (management) (Heinz et al., 2020; Müller und Stegmaier, 2017), while improved factor allocation describes the degree of which scarce input factors are re-allocated from inefficient to efficient firms (‘Schumpeterian creative destruction’) (Aghion et al., 2015; Decker et al., 2021).
Most economic processes influence the productivity of existing firms and the growth and the use of resources of these firms and their competitors as well. The accelerated implementation of robotics in German plants (Deng et al., 2020), the foreign trade shocks induced by the rise of the Chinese economy (Bräuer et al., 2019), but also the COVID-19 pandemic, whose consequences are still to evaluate (Müller, 2021) not only effects on productivity and growth of the firms directly affected but at the same time may create new businesses and question existing firms.
While productivity can be measured at the level of aggregated sectors or economies, micro data on the level of individual firms or establishments are indispensable to study firm organisation, technology and innovation diffusion, superstar firms, market power, factor allocation and Schumpeterian business dynamism. The IWH adopts this micro approach within the EU Horizon 2020 project MICROPROD as well as with the CompNet research network.
As “creative destruction” may also negatively affect the persons involved (e. g., in the case of layoffs, Fackler et al., 2021), the IWH analyses the consequences of bankruptcies in its Bankruptcy Research Unit and looks at the implications of creative destruction for the society, e. g., within a project funded by Volkswagen Foundation searching for the economic origins of populism and in the framework of the Institute for Research on Social Cohesion.
Publications on “Productivity”
European Firm Concentration and Aggregate Productivity
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, No. 2, 2023
Abstract
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
Subventionswettbewerb: Subventionen für Halbleiter?
in: Wirtschaftsdienst, No. 3, 2023
Abstract
Hochtechnologien gelten als die Branchen der Zukunft. Europa will hier nicht den Anschluss verlieren. Auch gegen Lieferengpässe und Produktionsengpässe durch gestörte Lieferketten will sich Europa besser wappnen. Mit dem „European Chips Act“ will die Europäische Kommission gemeinsam mit den Mitgliedstaaten mehr als 40 Mrd. Euro ausgeben, um die europäische Halbleiter-Produktion von gegenwärtig 10 % auf dann 20 % der globalen Produktion zu steigern. Halbleiter sind nicht nur in Gebrauchsgegenständen wie Handys, Laptops und Autos, sie sind auch unverzichtbar, wenn die grüne und digitale Wende gelingen soll. Photovoltaikanlagen, nachhaltige Produktion und E-Mobilität – all das braucht Computerchips. Der „European Chips Act“ ist daher die Antwort der EU auf den „Chips-Act“ der USA, der mehr als 50 Mrd. US-$ für Halbleiter vorsieht, um die Produktion zu sichern, zu modernisieren und auszubauen.
Aktuelle Trends: Wirtschaftswachstum und sinkende CO2-Emissionen schließen sich nicht aus
in: Wirtschaft im Wandel, No. 1, 2023
Abstract
Erneuerbare Energiequellen und energiesparender technischer Fortschritt ermöglichen es, den CO2-Ausstoß einer Volkswirtschaft bei steigendem Bruttoinlandsprodukt zu senken. Um die Klimaziele zu erreichen, müssen diese Anstrengungen aber noch deutlich verstärkt werden
Wirtschaftliche Folgen des Gaspreisanstiegs für die deutsche Industrie
in: Wirtschaft im Wandel, No. 1, 2023
Abstract
Die Gaspreise haben sich in Deutschland infolge des Lieferstopps russischen Erdgases deutlich erhöht, mit möglichen Folgen für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der deutschen Industrie. Wir berechnen den Gasverbrauch auf Produktebene für die Zeit vor der Energiekrise mit Hilfe der Mikrodaten der amtlichen Statistik, um zielgenau abschätzen zu können, bei welchen Produkten eine Drosselung der Produktion zur maximalen Gaseinsparung bei minimalen wirtschaftlichen Verlusten führen würde. Die Verwendung von Mikrodaten zeigt, dass die Folgen für Umsatz und Wertschöpfung in der Industrie bei Weitem nicht so negativ ausfallen werden wie von vielen befürchtet.
Robots, Occupations, and Worker Age: A Production-unit Analysis of Employment
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 5, 2023
Abstract
We analyse the impact of robot adoption on employment composition using novel micro data on robot use in German manufacturing plants linked with social security records and data on job tasks. Our task-based model predicts more favourable employment effects for the least routine-task intensive occupations and for young workers, with the latter being better at adapting to change. An event-study analysis of robot adoption confirms both predictions. We do not find adverse employment effects for any occupational or age group, but churning among low-skilled workers rises sharply. We conclude that the displacement effect of robots is occupation biased but age neutral, whereas the reinstatement effect is age biased and benefits young workers most.